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I. INTRODUCTION
O N March 4, 1990, Hank Gathers, one of the nation's premier col-
lege basketball players, collapsed during an intercollegiate confer-
ence tournament game.1 He was pronounced dead two hours later.2 The
cause of death was given as "cardiomyopathy, a heart muscle disorder of
unknown cause that damaged both lower heart chambers, or
ventricles." 3
Gathers' fatal collapse was not the first indication of his heart dis-
ease. He had fainted during a game on December 9, 1989.1 Following
the earlier collapse, Gathers was admitted to a hospital where he under-
went diagnostic testing. He was diagnosed as having exercise-induced
ventricular tachycardia.5 He was placed on 240 milligrams per day of
propranolol (also known as inderal), a standard cardiac drug,6 and on
December 21, 1989, was cleared to return to basketball by an internal
medicine specialist at the hospital where his condition had been
diagnosed.7
What transpired after Gathers' December diagnosis and treatment is
disputed. Following an autopsy which showed that at the time of his
death Gathers had only 26 nanograms' of propranolol per milliliter in his
blood, the Medical Examiner concluded that the amount was less than a
1. Lawrence K. Altman, As a Lawsuit Looms on Death of Gathers, Many Major Questions Re-
main Unanswered, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1990, at B1 I [hereinafter Altman, Major Questions]. Dur-
ing the 1988-89 college basketball season, Gathers became only the second player in National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) history to lead the country in both rebounding and scoring.
William C. Rhoden, A Player's Hunger and Thirst and Longing for a Better Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
14, 1990, at D7. One National Basketball Association coach projected that Gathers would be among
the top 10 to 15 college players selected in the 1990 professional basketball association draft held in
June, 1990. Shelley Smith, The Death of a Dream, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 19, 1990, at 11, 12
[hereinafter Smith, Death of a Dream].
2. Altman, Major Questions, supra note 1, at Bll.
3. Id
4. Lawrence K. Altman, Suit Calls Coach and Doctors Negligent in Gathers'Death, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 1990, at 43 [hereinafter Altman, Doctors Negligent]; Smith, Death of a Dream, supra note 1,
at 11.
5. Altman, Major Questions, supra note 1, at BI5. Ventricular tachycardia is a "rapid beating of
the heart, usually applied to rates over 100 per minute... originating in an ectopic [aberrant; out of
place] focus in the ventricle." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1550 (25th ed. 1990) (ventricular
tachycardia); id. at 488 (ectopic).
6. For a technical description of inderal, see PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2387-90 (1991)
[hereinafter PDR].
7. Altman, Doctors Negligent, supra note 4; Altman, Major Questions, supra note 1.
8. A nanogram is one billionth of a gram. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
786 (1984).
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therapeutic dose.9 This conclusion gave rise to the speculation that
Gathers had not been taking the medication, or at least had not been
taking it in therapeutic amounts, near the time of his death.'0 There is
apparently no dispute that the amount of propranolol Gathers was tak-
ing had been reduced a number of times from the initial dosage of 240
milligrams per day to 120 milligrams per day and finally to 80 milligrams
per day at the time of his death.'1 There is dispute over whether Gath-
ers, himself, or Paul Westhead, his coach at Loyola Marymount, re-
quested the reduction. 2
On March 7, 1990, the Los Angeles Times reported that Gathers had
failed to keep an appointment for a treadmill stress test the week before
he died and that he was suspected of not taking his medication. 3 An
unidentified cardiologist quoted by the Los Angeles Times also reported
that Gathers had been advised not to play basketball any longer.'
4
A $32.5 million lawsuit filed by Gathers' family against Westhead
and 12 other Loyola Marymount University officials and doctors, 15 and a
9. Altman, Major Questions, supra note 1, at B15. Pharmacology experts have challenged this
conclusion because propranolol blood levels vary widely and are often inaccurate in persons taking
the drug in therapeutic doses. lId
The Physicians Desk Reference states:
Propranolol is almost completely absorbed from the gastrointestinal tract, but a portion
is immediately bound by the liver. Peak effect occurs in one to one and one-half hours.
The biologic half-life is approximately four hours. There is no simple correlation be-
tween dose or plasma level and therapeutic effect, and the dose-sensitivity range as ob-
served in clinical practice is wide. The principal reason for this is that sympathetic tone
varies widely between individuals. Since there is no reliable test to estimate sympathetic
tone or to determine whether total beta blockade has been achieved, proper dosage re-
quires titration.
PDR, supra note 6, at 2388.
10. Altman, Major Questions, supra note 1, at B15.
11. Altman, Doctors Negligent, supra note 4, at 43. An article in the March 4, 1991 issue of
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED reported that the dosage of medicine had been lowered even further, to 40
milligrams per day. Shelley Smith, A Bitter Legacy, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 4, 1991, at 63, 74
[hereinafter Smith, A Bitter Legacy].
12. Altman, Major Questions, supra note 1, at B15 (indicates dosage may have been reduced at
Gathers' request); Altman, Doctorfs Negligent, supra note 4, at 43 (discusses physician correspon-
dence in which a cardiologist states that Westhead had repeatedly urged a reduction in Gathers'
medication). Gathers' cardiologist, Dr. Vernon Hattori, wrote in a letter to Gathers' primary physi-
cian that he met with Gathers to discuss options in terms of changing to another drug and to tell him
that switching medications might keep him out of another game. According to the letter, Gathers is
reported to have said that he preferred a lower dose of propranolol. Id.
13. Elliot Almond & Mary Ann Hudson, Doctor Advised Gathers to Quit Playing, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1990, at Cl.
14. Id.
15. Altman, Doctors Negligent, supra note 4, at 43.
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subsequent suit filed on behalf of Gathers' son,16 alleged, among other
things, that Gathers was not told his heart condition was potentially fatal
and that the propranolol was repeatedly decreased at the request of Wes-
thead, who believed the medication was causing Gathers to perform be-
low his potential.' 7 Furthermore, the Gathers' family attorney, Dr.
Bruce G. Fagel, has asserted that Gathers did not miss a treadmill stress
test and that family members had seen him taking his medication.18
Hank Gathers represents only one of a number of college athletes
who have been injured or have died while engaging in athletic contests
while "knowing" 9 of preexisting physical conditions which could lead to
serious injury or death.
Tony Penny, a basketball player on an athletic scholarship at Cen-
tral Connecticut State University, was admitted to the cardiac care unit
of New Britain (Connecticut) General Hospital after he experienced
chest pains while exercising.20 Dr. Milton J. Sands, Jr., Director of Car-
diology at the hospital, ultimately refused to clear Penny to return to
play basketball at Central Connecticut.2' Two other doctors, one a phy-
sician with the Boston Celtics, concurred with Sands' decision. 22 Deter-
mined to return to college basketball, Penny found cardiologists who
16. Douglas Lederman, Second Lawsuit Is Filed in Death of Athlete Who Collapsed During Bas-
ketball Game, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc., June 20, 1990, at A38 [hereinafter Lederman, Second Law-
suit Filed].
17. Altman, Doctors Negligent, supra note 4, at 43.
The PDR, supra note 6, at 2389, indicates that "[m]ost adverse effects have been mild and tran-
sient and have rarely required the withdrawal of therapy." Among side effects affecting the central
nervous system, the PDR lists light-headedness, mental depression manifested by insomnia, lassi-
tude, weakness, and fatigue. Id. The PDR also states that "[t]otal daily doses above 160 mg (when
administered as divided doses of greater than 80 mg each) may be associated with an increased
incidence of fatigue, lethargy, and vivid dreams." Id. The lawsuit brought on behalf of the family
also alleges that the team physician and trainer were negligent in failing to shock Gathers' heart with
a defibrillator after he fell unconscious on the court. Altman, Doctors Negligent, supra note 4, at 43.
18. Smith, Death of a Dream, supra note 1, at 11. Paul Westhead now coaches the Denver
Nuggets of the National Basketball Association. Westhead Taking Over as Coach of Nuggets, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1990, at 40. He has filed a $1 million suit against Fagel claiming defamation in
Fagel's blaming him for Gathers' death. Westhead Brings Defamation Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1991, at A24. On January 8, 1991, Fagel told reporters "'But for the actions of Paul Westhead in
the week before Hank Gathers's death, Hank would be alive today."' Id.
19. I place the word "knowing" in quotes because I believe that what an athlete (or any compe-
tent adult) "knows" and "consents to" in terms of medical treatment is a complex question involving
more than our general lay person's interpretation of those words.
20. Lawrence K. Altman, An Athlete's Health and a Doctor's Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,




cleared him to play.23 With the approval of the Connecticut Attorney
General, he resumed his basketball career at Central Connecticut and
sued Sands for $1 million for disrupting his athletic career.24 After com-
pleting his college career, Penny went to England where he joined his
brother on a professional basketball team.25 In February, 1990, Penny
died while playing basketball. 26 The Manchester, England, Coroner's
Office said Penny's death was due to natural causes; it was not drug re-
lated and no inquiry was scheduled to be held.27 Prior to his death,
Penny had dropped his suit against Dr. Sands.28
Marc Buoniconti, the son of a former professional football star, suf-
fered injuries which left him a quadriplegic while making a tackle in a
college football game.2 9 Buoniconti maintains that he was cleared to
play football despite a neck problem, the severity of which was never
made clear to him.30 Buoniconti ified suit against The Citadel, the col-
lege for which he played, and against the team doctor.31 His suit against
the college was settled out of court; he lost the suit against the
physician.
3 2
Mark Tingstad was luckier than Marc Buoniconti. When Tingstad,
a two-time Academic All-American football player at Arizona State Uni-
versity, tackled the opposing quarterback during a game, his body went
numb. 3 Tingstad knew he had a preexisting problem with his neck and
back. 4 Earlier, two physicians had discovered that he had a congenital
defect, a narrowing in his spinal column, and had advised him to leave
football.35 Another physician, an orthopedist and the Director of the
Sports Medicine Center at the University of Pennsylvania, while ac-
knowledging that Tingstad could be injured and suffer an episode of tran-
sient paralysis, believed that Tingstad could return to football and not







29. Gerald Eskenazi, Athletes and Health: Many at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1990, § 8
(Sports), at 1.
30. Id. at 1.
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ical staff were reported to be reluctant to allow Tingstad to play football,
they considered the orthopedist's advice, as well as the wishes of Ting-
stad and his parents, and allowed him to play. 7 Within hours of his
injury, Tingstad recovered.3" He then gave up football.3 9
In October, 1988, Mark Seay, the leading receiver for the Long
Beach State College football team, was visiting his sister's home and was
shot by a street gang member." Because of the shooting, he lost a kidney
and continues to have a bullet lodged near his heart.4" Long Beach State
subsequently told Seay he would not be permitted to return to the foot-
ball team because the risk to his remaining kidney was too great.42 In
August, 1989, Seay sued the university. The judge hearing the matter
denied Seay's motion for an injunction because there was no "clear
proof' that Seay's kidney was functioning properly.43 In March, 1990,
as Seay's case against the university was set to go to jury trial, he and the
university entered into a settlement by which Seay would be permitted to
play football if he signed a waiver relieving the school of all liability
should injury occur to his remaining kidney and if he agreed to wear a
flak jacket while playing.44
While the catastrophic results experienced or potentially exper-
ienced by these five athletes are fortunately not typical of the experiences









45. The NCAA reports that between 1931 and 1985, there were 79 college student fatalities
directly related to football. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, NCAA SPORTS
MEDICINE HANDBOOK 22, Table I (1987) [hereinafter NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK].
More than half of those fatalities occurred between 1931 and 1959. Id. Six were reported for the
decade ending in 1985. Id. Another 73 college student fatalities were indirectly related to football
between 1931 and 1985, with 11 of those occurring in the decade ending in 1985. Id. at Table II.
Between 1975 and 1985 the incidence of fatalities directly related to college football fluctuated be-
tween 0.00 and 2.67 per 100,000 participants. Id. at Table III. Between 1977 and 1985, 14 college
football players suffered permanent cervical cord injuries due to football. Id. at Table V. Between
1982 and 1985 there were no college athlete deaths directly related to sports other than football, and
5 college athlete deaths indirectly related to sports other than football (basketball, 2; ice hockey, 1;
tennis, 2). Id. at Table VI. No college athlete deaths were reported between 1982 and 1985 for the
sports of baseball, gymnastics, lacrosse, soccer, swimming, track, cross country, or wrestling. Id.
Three college athletes suffered "catastrophic injuries" between 1982 and 1985 in sports other than
football (1 each in gymnastics, lacrosse, and swimming). Id. at Table VII. No catastrophic injuries
were reported for those years for the sports of baseball, basketball, ice hockey, soccer, tennis, track,
1992] COLLEGE ATHLETES
potentially relevant to every college athlete. All five had been diagnosed
as having a preexisting medical condition that could subject them to seri-
ous injury or death if they continued to pursue their athletic careers, and
all five wanted to continue their careers.46 All five were ultimately
cleared, by physicians and by university officials, to return to play. Two
of the five died while engaging in their chosen sports activities (albeit one,
Penny, while he was no longer a student); two were paralyzed, one per-
manently. At least two, Gathers and Penny, had high hopes of lucrative
professional careers following their college playing days.47 All, by stan-
dard legal definitions, were adults48 when they chose to continue playing
their sports. Two, Penny and Seay, sued those whom they believed re-
sponsiblefor trying to prevent them from returning to athletics. Two, the
representatives of Gathers' family and Buoniconti, sued the universities
and team physicians following their catastrophes alleging, among other
things, that they should not have been cleared to play.
Shortly before Hank Gathers died, I had completed work on an arti-
cle in which I examined the doctrine of informed consent to medical
treatment, both in its theory and its practice.4 9 In that article, I had
cross country, or wrestling. Id The Chronicle of Higher Education reported that 2 college football
players died of heart-related illnesses during the 1989-90 academic year and 2 college players suf-
fered permanent paralysis from football related injuries. Douglas Lederman, Two College Football
Players Died of Heart-Related Ailments in 89-90, CHRoN. HIGHER EDUc., July 25, 1990, at A27,
A29. No college players died during the year as a result of injuries directly related to football. Id.
In May, 1991, the Chronicle reported that during the 1990 football season no college player died as a
result of injuries directly related to the sport. Douglas Lederman, Athletics Notes: Study Shows No
Football-Related Deaths in 1990 Season, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 1, 1991, at A34. Three
deaths were indirectly related to football - one each due to heart failure, heat stroke, and sickle-cell
anemia. Id. Approximately 12 athletes suffered permanent paralysis from football related injuries in
1990. Id. As of October 15, 1991, two college football players had died during the current season.
An autopsy reported that James Glenn, a walk-on kicker at Texas A&M University who died before
a practice, had an enlarged heart. Colleges, WASH. Posr, Oct. 2, 1991, at F2 (Fanfare). The autopsy
also showed that Glenn did not have coronary artery disease. Id. Rodney Stowers, a junior lineman
at Mississippi State University, died of a pulmonary hemorrhage and an inability to oxygenate his
blood while hospitalized with a broken leg he had suffered in a game the previous day. Mississippi
State Player Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at B14.
A recent review article reported that 5 out of every 100,000 young athletes may have heart condi-
tions making them vulnerable to sudden death and that 10 percent of those vulnerable - or 1-2 out
of every 200,000 athletes - will actually die. Francis M. McCaffrey et al., Sudden Cardiac Death in
Young Athletes, 145 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 177, 177 (Feb. 1991).
46. In college athletics, 13% of all injuries are reinjuries. Eskenazi, supra note 29, at 2.
47. Smith, Death of a Dream, supra note 1, at 11-12 (Gathers); Altman, Doctor's Warning, supra
note 20, at C3, (Penny).
48. See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 909
(1980), for a long list of the instances in which college students are considered to be adults.
49. Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward a New
Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 379 (1990).
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concluded that even though the law claims to believe in patient auton-
omy and self-determination and purports to protect patients' decision-
making powers in the context of medical care, neither law nor medicine
does so. Rather, once mandating that physicians make certain disclo-
sures to patients, the law then does little or nothing to require or even
encourage health care providers to ensure that their patients understand
the information disclosed; similarly, the law neither requires nor encour-
ages patients to make decisions concerning their health care.5 0 I rejected
the reasons given by health care providers in support of their beliefs that
patients are unable or unwilling to make such decisions.5" I argued that
the doctrine of informed consent in the context of medical treatment is a
goal worth pursuing and I suggested a number of ways in which that goal
might be furthered. Specifically, I proposed that health care providers
take steps to ensure that their patients understand the information neces-
sary to make decisions and also that patients be encouraged to make and
be supported in making those decisions.52 In addition to suggesting that
patients make those decisions, I also proposed that they be held responsi-
ble for those decisions, leaving patients the right to sue health care prov-
iders for medical malpractice only if the providers were actually
negligent in making the required disclosures or in performing the agreed
upon diagnostic or therapeutic procedures.53 I believed my ideas,
although certainly subject to debate, were worth trying in the context of
competent adult patients seeking medical treatment.
And then Hank Gathers died. I began to wonder if my ideas about
the theory and practice of the doctrine of informed consent to medical
treatment, which I previously thought applicable to all competent adults,
would hold up in the context of college athletics. College athletes, while
legally adults, are nevertheless quite young.54 That youth may contrib-
ute not only to an immature ability to make decisions, but also to feelings
of immortality and invincibility - that is, even if the athletes' conditions
could result in dire consequences to someone else, the athletes believe
50. Id at 385-86, 391.
51. Id at 406-27. I addressed four broad arguments generally advanced by health care provid-
ers in response to the suggestion that competent adult patients are capable and should be required to
make their own health care decisions. Those arguments are that: (1) patients neither understand nor
remember what they are told; (2) testing patients' understanding of what they have been told is too
resource intensive; (3) patients want physicians to make decisions for them; and (4) physicians can
convince almost any patient to do what the physician believes is best for the patient. Id. at 409-25.
52. Id. at 406-27.
53. Id. at 408.
54. Although Hank Gathers was 23 at the time of his death, Rhoden, supra note 1, at D27,
many college athletes are between the ages of 18 and 21.
[Vol. 40
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those consequences could not happen to them because they are young
and strong.5" Furthermore, the reports of pressures imposed on college
athletes - to perform and to win - by coaches, other students and
teammates, alumni/ae, university officials, and themselves are legion.56
I wondered, therefore, whether my theory now must be revised in
the context of college athletes. Maybe athletes, because of their youth,
their strength, their (in)ability to resist certain pressures, could not un-
derstand the information presented to them and/or could not volunta-
rily, as that word is to be understood in the informed consent context,
57
make decisions concerning their own medical care and their athletic
careers.
If college athletes cannot make such decisions, however, other ques-
tions arise. Who should be delegated the responsibility for making those
decisions? And who should bear the responsibility if an athlete who is
cleared to return to play is subsequently injured or dies for reasons attrib-
uted to the medical condition and the athletic activity? If athletes are not
cleared to play, may they sue - the physician, the coach, the university
- and if so, what relief would they request and on what theories would
their requests be based?
This Article analyzes the question of whether college athletes should
be accorded the same rights and responsibilities as other competent
adults in making decisions concerning their medical care and their daily
activities, and the related issues if the answer to that question is "No."
Part II of the Article discusses briefly the doctrine of informed consent to
medical care as it has been developed in the United States. Part III re-
views and analyzes the issue of educational institutions' general responsi-
bility for the welfare of their students, the doctrine traditionally known
as in loco parentis.
Part IV specifically addresses the issue of whether the same rules of
informed consent which typically apply (or, as I argue, should apply) in
any medical treatment context should also apply to college athletes. This
Part questions whether college athletes should be treated as competent
adults or whether the pressures to excel, imposed by self and others, are
so great that a student athlete's decision should not, as a matter of law,
55. See infra notes 190-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of athletes' sense of their
own invincibility.
56. See infra notes 187-223 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the pressures imposed
upon college athletes.




be considered to be knowing and voluntary. It analyzes different types of
medical treatment - preparticipation physical examinations, therapeutic
procedures, and administration of drugs - and the legal doctrines relat-
ing to assumption of the risk and waivers of liability. Part IV also ad-
dresses the issue of substitute decisionmaking should college athletes be
judged incompetent to make their own medical treatment and return to
play decisions. The issues discussed include whether a substitute deci-
sionmaker should be appointed for the athlete, who the decisionmaker
should be, and what standard - a subjective, substituted judgement
standard or an objective, reasonable person standard - should be used
in making decisions for the athlete. Finally, this Part focuses on the po-
tentially conflicting interests of the team physician and addresses the
question of what responsibility the substitute decisionmaker must accept
if a decision to permit the athlete to return to competition is made and
the athlete is subsequently injured.
Part V discusses athletes' potential recourse should they be denied
the opportunity to return to play, focusing specifically on constitutional
procedural due process claims and on statutory relief pursuant to Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197358 and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990.19 Part VI concludes the Article with my own proposal
advocating that we treat college athletes as we do any other competent
adult in terms of medical treatment decisions, but also advocating that
we make the decisionmaking context - the world of college athletics -
more conducive to informed and voluntary decisionmaking. °
58. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
59. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1991).
60. A few limiting caveats are in order. First, I do not deal in this Article with issues which
arise from negligence in diagnosis or treatment. For example, I am willing to assume, for the sake of
argument, that an athlete suffering from a heart condition has been properly diagnosed and treated.
The issue is, even given that, whether athletes can be appropriately informed about the risks posed
by their conditions and by their continued playing, and whether they can make a knowing and
voluntary decision to continue to play.
Second, with the exception of a few cases relating to high school students' suits to compel their
school districts to allow them to play sports notwithstanding the students' physical disabilities, I
intend all of the material in this Article to relate to college athletes, not to high school students or to
professional athletes. Most high school students are minors and, even though they are sometimes
permitted to make medical treatment decisions, that power usually resides with their parents. See,
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. III, para. 4504 (Smith-Hurd 1978 & Supp. 1991) (minor 12 years or older
may consent to treatment for venereal disease, drug addiction, alcoholism); 1991 MINN. SESS. LAW
SERV. 148 (West) (minor 16 years or older may consent to hospitalization, routine diagnostic evalua-
tion, or short term acute care); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.5 (1990) (minor may consent to health
services provided by physician for prevention, diagnosis, treatment of venereal disease, pregnancy,
abuse of controlled substances or alcohol, or emotional disturbance); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.640
(1990) (minor 15 or older may consent to hospital care, medical or surgical diagnosis, or treatment
[Vol. 40
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II. THE LAW OF INFORMED CONSENT 6 1
The theory behind the doctrine of informed consent in medical deci-
sionmaking is that competent adults possess rights of individual auton-
omy and self-determination and, therefore, have the right to make
decisions concerning their own health care.62 Although the right to au-
tonomous decisionmaking is not absolute and may in certain instances be
overridden by various state interests,63 those state interests are generally
applied narrowly, leaving the competent adult with much theoretical
freedom in making health care decisions.61
The legal doctrine of informed consent as it applies to medical deci-
by physician); Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330, 338 (Kan. 1970)
(17 year old mature enough to understand nature and consequences of proposed medical procedure
and to consent knowingly); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327-28 (Ill. 1990) (evidence clear and con-
vincing that minor is mature enough to appreciate consequences of actions and mature enough to
exercise judgment of adult); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 749 (Tenn. 1987) (minor aged 17
years, 7 months had capacity to consent to medical treatment). While some of the same issues
relevant to college athletes are also relevant to professional athletes, the two are also quite different
in many respects.
Finally, in addressing the issue of liability of colleges and universities and their employees, I
recognize but do not address the issue that in some jurisdictions the institutions may be immune
from suit because of principles of governmental or charitable immunity.
61. This section is a condensed and updated version of portions of an article I wrote previously,
entitled Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling
Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379 (1990). This discussion is included herein with the
permission of the WASHINGTON & LEE LAW REVIEW.
For more in-depth discussions of the history and content of the doctrine, see JAY KATz, THE
SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 48-84 (1984); 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTrrlONER RELATIONSHIP 18-32 (1982) [all volumes,
hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT]; Martin S. Pernick, The Patient's Role in Medical
Decisionmaking: A Social History of Informed Consent in Medical Therapy, in 3 PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at app. E. See also Lori B. Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and
the Decisionmaking Process, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 163, 175-80 (1984).
62. See, eg., Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960) ("Anglo-American law starts
with the premise of thorough-going self determination."); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105
N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to deter-
mine what shall be done with his own body . "), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Bing v.
Thuneg, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
63. Individual decisionmaking in the health care context has traditionally been subject to being
overridden by four compelling state interests - preserving life, protecting innocent third parties,
preventing suicide, and maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession. See, eg.. Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 161-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Superintendent of Belchertown State
Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977).
64. With increasing frequency, the courts are treating the individual's right to make decisions
concerning his or her own health care as more important than the interests advanced by the state,
even if the individual's decision could result in death. For a more complete discussion of the courts'
weighing of these competing interests, see infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text.
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sionmaking was first announced in 1957 in dicta by the California Dis-
trict Court of Appeal in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of
Trustees.65 Since 1957, many state courts and a number of state legisla-
tures have addressed the doctrine of informed consent to medical
treatment.66
Until the development of the informed consent doctrine began, un-
consented-to medical procedures were treated as batteries.6 7 With the
development of the doctrine, the action became one in negligence.68
Therefore, an action based upon the failure of a physician to secure the
informed consent of a patient to medical treatment requires all of the
standard elements of a negligence action - duty, breach of duty, cause
in fact, legal cause, and actual injury - to be present. Most of the ques-
tions raised in informed consent cases relate to the establishment of a
duty, cause in fact, or actual injury.
In terms of duty, courts69 have used one of two theories to impose
upon physicians a duty to disclose certain information to patients, in-
cluding details relating to the patient's medical condition, the proposed
treatment plan, alternatives to the proposed treatment, and the risks and
65. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). Salgo was a medical malpractice case in which a
verdict for the plaintiff was reversed due to error in the trial court's jury instruction on the issue of
res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 172 n.4. The California Court of Appeal also addressed the question of
physicians' duty to make certain disclosures to patients because of the likelihood that the same issue
might be raised on retrial. Id. at 181.
66. See eg., Riedisser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d 1052 (Ariz. 1975); Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88
(Ark. 1980); Hansbrough v. Kosyak, 490 N.E.2d 181 (Il1. 1986); Cowman v. Hornaday, 329 N.W.2d
422 (Iowa 1983); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1980); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014
(Md. 1977); Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 439 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1982); Cornfeldt v.
Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1980); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Largey v.
Rothman, 540 A.2d 504 (NJ. 1988) (per curiam) (overruling Kaplan v. Haines, 241 A.2d 235 (N.J.
1968), which had affirmed the same case, 232 A.2d 840, 849 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967));
Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio 1985); Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1984), cert denied, 320 S.E.2d 35 (S.C. 1984); Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367 (S.D.
1985); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(1) (Michie 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766
.103(3)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-4304 (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40.
320(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905(l)(A) (West 1990); NEB.
R . STAT. § 44-2816 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:2(II)(a) (1983); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2805-d(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(a)(1) (1990); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.103 (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1909(a)(1) (Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.70.050(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1991).
67. See, eg., Berkey v. Anderson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Mohr v. Williams, 104
N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
68. See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 793 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1100-03 (Kan.
1960); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 556-57 (Okla. 1979).
69. In explaining the development of the informed consent doctrine, I refer to courts rather than
legislatures because most of that development has occurred through the courts.
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benefits inherent in the proposed treatment and in the alternatives.7' In a
majority of jurisdictions, a physician's duty to disclose information to a
patient is judged by a standard based upon practice within the medical
profession - that information which a reasonable medical practitioner
would disclose under the same or similar circumstances.7 The courts in
a growing number of jurisdictions, however, have held that the physi-
cian's duty to disclose is founded on a patient-based standard.72 These
courts define the physician's duty to disclose to include that information
which is material to a patient's decision.73 A risk is generally defined as
material "'when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or
should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach signifi-
cance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego
the proposed therapy.' "7
Most informed consent cases involve allegations that physicians
failed to warn patients of risks associated with proposed therapeutic
70. Although "informed consent" implies a patient's comprehending the information disclosed
and actually engaging in a decisionmaking process, the courts' treatment of the doctrine has ad-
dressed almost entirely the physician's duty to disclose as opposed to a concern for the patient's
understanding the information or actually making decisions. See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772, 780 n.15 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
71. This standard was originally articulated by the Kansas Supreme Court in Natanson v.
Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960). See also Riedisser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Ariz.
1975); Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88, 89-90 (Ark. 1980); Hansbrough v. Kosyak, 490 N.E.2d 181,
189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1129-30 (Me. 1980); Aiken v. Clary,
396 S.W.2d 668, 673 (Mo. 1965); Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690, 696-97 (S.C. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 320 S.E.2d 35 (S.C. 1984). Almost all states establishing a statutory standard of care in
informed consent cases have adopted the professional standard of care. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-
114-206(b)(1) (Michie 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103(3)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-4304 (1985); KY. REv. STAT. ANm. § 304.40-320(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905(1)(A) (West 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2816 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507-C:2(Ii)(a) (1983); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1) (McKinney 1991); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-21.13(a)(1) (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-26-115(a)(1)-(2) (1980); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1909(a)(1) (Supp. 1990). But see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.103 (1991) (patient-based
standard); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 7.70.050(1)-(2) (West 1991) (same).
72. See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 784; Cowman v. Hornaday, 329 N.W.2d 422,
427 (Iowa 1983); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (Md. 1977); Harnish v. Children's Hosp.
Medical Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 243-44 (Mass. 1982); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 640
(Minn. 1980); Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 509-10 (N.J. 1988) (overruling Kaplan v. Haines,
241 A.2d 235 (N.J. 1968), which had affirmed the same case, 232 A.2d 840, 848 (N.J. 1967)). The
superior court in Largey had incorrectly held that the physician's duty to disclose was to be judged
against the practice of the reasonable medical practitioner. Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145,
1148 (Ohio 1985); Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367, 375 (S.D. 1985).
73. See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 784.
74. Id at 787 (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy,
64 Nw. U. L. REv. 628, 640 (1970)).
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treatments.75 Under either the physician-based or the patient-based stan-
dard of disclosure, before a patient may recover for a physician's failure
to warn of a risk, the undisclosed risk must materialize and must cause
harm to the patient, thereby satisfying the actual injury requirement of a
negligence action.76 No court has created a cause of action based solely
on failure to disclose without a consequent injury connected to the infor-
mation not disclosed. That is, the patient's rights to autonomy and self-
determination, protected in the informed consent context through the
physician's duty to disclose the information necessary for the patient to
make an informed decision, are not protected separate and apart from
the manifestation of the undisclosed risk.
The causal connection between the undisclosed information and the
patient's harm exists only where the patient would have opted against the
treatment which caused the injury if the disclosure had been made.77 In
almost all jurisdictions, causation is judged by an objective standard: re-
gardless of what the individual patient might have done had the physi-
cian disclosed the risk, where the reasonable patient would have opted for
treatment even if the risk had been disclosed, causation is not proved and
the patient cannot recover against the physician.7 8  Courts excuse phy-
75. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 772 (risk of paralysis associated with a
laminectomy); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960) (risk of bums from radioactive cobalt
treatment); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979) (risk of fistula leading to incontinence
associated with hysterectomy).
76. See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 790.
77. See, eg., id.
78. See, eg., id. at 791; Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, (Cal. 1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295
A.2d 676, 689-90 (R.I. 1972).
But see Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d at 558-59. There, rather than adopting a reasonable patient
standard of causation, the court decided that the patient's right of self-determination compels a
subjective standard of causation, Le., if patients testify that they would have declined treatment had
a material risk been disclosed, even if the reasonable patient would not have refused the treatment
had the disclosure been properly made, then the issues of causation and plaintiffs' credibility must be
left to the finder of fact. Id. at 559. Despite the Scott court's recognition of the right of patients to
make decisions different from those made by "reasonable" patients under the same or similar cir-
cumstances, the court did not go further and find a cause of action based upon failure to disclose
alone, absent actual injury caused by the undisclosed risk. Furthermore, like all the other informed
consent cases, Scott v. Bradford was a case of physician's failure to disclose rather than a patient's
failure to comprehend a potential risk.
For another variation in the causation standard, see Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1154-55 (Ala.
1985), where the court held that the causation standard is "objective," but stated that "the objective
standard requires consideration by the factfinder of what a reasonable person with all of the charac-
teristics of the plaintiff, including his idiosyncrasies and religious beliefs, would have done under the
same circumstances." Id. at 1155 (emphasis added). Two dissenting justices in Fain v. Smith indi-
vidually interpreted the majority's statement of causation as being subjective, rather than objective.
Id. at 1163-64 (Jones, J., dissenting); id at 1164 (Adams, J., dissenting). In a forceful opinion,
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sicians from the duty to disclose where the information would not be
material to the patient's decision, where the patient had already discov-
ered the potential hazards of treatment, where the patient was uncon-
scious or in an emergency situation and the harm from a failure to treat
would be imminent and would outweigh possible harm due to the treat-
ment, and where disclosure would defeat the therapeutic course of
treatment.79
Most of the courts which have addressed the issue of a physician's
duty to disclose have stressed that the disclosure should be made in clear
and uncomplicated language.8 0 Despite the emphasis on disclosure in
language patients can understand, courts have not imposed a duty on
physicians to determine that the patient actually comprehends the infor-
mation disclosed.8 As I have argued earlier,82 however, I believe that to
protect adequately a person's rights of self-determination and autonomy
the law should impose a duty upon health care providers, not only to
disclose information which patients need in order to make choices about
their medical care, but also to attempt to insure that patients understand
Justice Jones argued in favor of the court's adopting a "patient's perspective" standard. Justice
Jones favored the term "patient's perspective" as opposed to "subjective," because he believed the
term "subjective" to be "an editorial comment disfavoring its application" whereas "reference to the
'reasonable person' standard as 'objective' carries its own inference of acceptance." Id. at 1157 n.2
(Jones, J., dissenting). Justice Jones explained that his
resolve that the "patient's perspective" standard is the proper causation standard... is
strengthened by the result of the hypothetical "flip-side" [argument].... Suppose that,
as in the present case, [the patient] underwent a pulmonary arteriogram and his heart
was punctured. At trial, however, [the patient] concedes that he gave informed consent
to the doctors for the performance of the procedure. But he then argues that the consent
was invalid because the "reasonable person" would not have consented....
... Logically, if the law allows patients to be unreasonable when they give consent,
the law should allow them to be unreasonable when they withhold consent.
Id. at 1159.
See also Leyson v. Steuermann, 705 P.2d 37,47 n.10 (Haw. 1985) (adopting "a modified objective
standard that determines the question [of causation] from the viewpoint of the actual patient acting
rationally and reasonably") (emphasis added).
79. See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 788-89; Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d at 10, 12;
Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d at 686, 689.
80. See, eg., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d at 11 (The scope of a duty of reasonable disclosure "does
not extend to a lengthy polysyllabic discourse on all possible complications."); Natanson v. Kline,
350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960) (The physician has an obligation "to disclose and explain to the
patient in language as simple as necessary the nature of the ailment, the nature of the proposed
treatment, the probability of success or of alternatives, and perhaps the risks of unfortunate results
and unforeseen conditions within the body.") (emphasis added).
81. But see IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.137(2) (West 1989) (requiring consent form to state that all
questions asked by patient have been answered in "satisfactory" manner); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.40 A(b) (West 1977) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5(2)(e) (1989) (same).
82. See Jones, supra note 49.
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that information and to encourage and assist them in actually making
decisions concerning their own treatment. It is this proposed standard to
which I refer throughout the remainder of this Article when I discuss the
doctrine of informed consent to medical treatment as it applies to college
athletes.
III. COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
WELL-BEING OF STUDENTS:
THE DOCTRINE OF IN Loco PARENTIS
Until the 1960s, colleges and universities stood in an in loco parentis
relationship with their students.83 The theory behind the doctrine was
that colleges and universities stood in the place of students' parents and
therefore could fashion and enforce the same rules relating to the
mental training, moral and physical discipline, and welfare of the pupils...
which a parent could make for the same purpose, and so long as such regu-
lations do not violate divine or human law, courts [had] no more authority
to interfere than they [had] to control the domestic discipline of a father in
his family.
84
The courts theorized not only that colleges and universities stand in the
shoes of students' parents in making and enforcing such rules, but also
that this was within parents' expectations when they sent their children
to school.85 Prior to the decline in the applicability of the doctrine, the
cases raising the issue of the relationship between college and student
generally represented challenges by students who had been disciplined
for violation of a college rule. 6
During the 1960s the relationship of the college or university to its
students began to change. The age of the college population as a whole
83. Se eg., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 102 So. 637, 640 (Fla. 1924) (en bane); North v.
Board of Trustees, 27 N.E. 54, 56 (Ill. 1891); Gott v. Berea College, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (Ky. 1913);
Carr v. St. John's Univ., 231 N.Y.S.2d 403, 408, rev'd on other grounds, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1962), aft'd, 187 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1962). See Kelly W. Bhirdo, Note, The Liability and
Responsibility of Institutions of Higher Education for the On-Campus Victimization of Students, 16
J.C. & U.L. 119, 121-23 (1989), for a review of the in locoparentis doctrine before and after 1960.
84. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 102 So. at 640 (citing Gott v. Berea College, 161 S.W. at
206).
85. North v. Board of Trustees, 27 N.E. at 56; Carr v. St. John's Univ., 231 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
86. See, eg., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 102 So. 637 (Fla. 1924) (challenge by student
suspended for misconduct); North v. Board of Trustees, 27 N.E. 54 (Ill. 1891) (challenge by student
seeking reinstatement after dismissal for violating mandatory chapel attendance rule); Gott v. Berea
College, 161 S.W. 204 (Ky. 1913) (challenge by restaurant owner to college rule prohibiting students
from eating meals off campus); Carr v. St. John's Univ., 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1962) (challenge by
students dismissed for participating in civil marriage ceremony).
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was growing older.8 7 Those students whose ages were typical of "tradi-
tional" college students, Le., 18-21, were no longer considered minors by
the law in terms of, for example, voting, marrying, executing a will, or
serving in the military.a8 The social climate was changing, too. Students
were active on college campuses, not only in relation to civil rights or
anti-war protests, but also in terms of demanding more personal freedom
in their behavior and standard of living on campus.8 9 As the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals noted:
The campus revolutions of the late sixties and early seventies were a direct
attack by the students on rigid controls by the colleges and were an all-
pervasive affirmative demand for more student rights. In general, the stu-
dents succeeded, peaceably and otherwise, in acquiring a new status at col-
leges throughout the country. These movements, taking place almost
simultaneously with legislation and case law lowering the age of majority,
produced fundamental changes in our society. A dramatic reapportion-
ment of responsibilities and social interests of general security took place.
Regulation by the college of student life on and off campus has become
limited. Adult students now demand and receive expanded rights of pri-
vacy in their college life including, for example, liberal, if not unlimited,
partial [sic: parietal] visiting hours. College administrators no longer con-
trol the broad arena of general morals. At one time, exercising their rights
and duties in loco parentis, colleges were able to impose strict regulations.
But today students vigorously claim the right to define and regulate their
own lives. Especially have they demanded and received satisfaction of their
interest in self-assertion in both physical and mental activities, and have
vindicated what may be called the interest in freedom of the individual
will.
90
Students still, of course, challenge their dismissal from colleges and
universities for violation of rules and regulations. Now, however, when
those students argue that the college does not stand in loco parentis to
them, the courts agree.91 Nevertheless, the courts also generally uphold
the validity of the colleges' enacting and enforcing such rules, not on an
in loco parentis theory, but rather on a theory that colleges and universi-
ties have the right to enact and enforce rules to maintain discipline and
order on their campuses. 92
87. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 470 n. 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
88. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980).
89. Id at 139-40.
90. Id. (footnote omitted).
91. Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. at 470; Alumni Assoc. v. Sullivan, 572 A.2d 1209, 1213 (Pa. 1990).
92. Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. at 286; Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. at
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Unlike those students in discipline cases who traditionally argued
that colleges and universities did not stand in loco parentis to them and,
therefore, had no power to make and enforce rules governing their be-
havior, students who have been injured on college campuses or by other
students or entities associated with colleges have come increasingly to
argue that colleges do stand in loco parentis to them and should be held
responsible for their injuries.93 Courts have refused to impose liability on
colleges and universities for injuries occurring to students on campus or
at college related functions on an in loco parentis theory, however, and
instead have looked for some "special relationship" between the college
and the student.94
The courts have generally held that a special relationship is not cre-
ated by the fact that the injured student or another student or college
employee has violated a college rule resulting in the injury to the plain-
tiff/student95 or by the fact that the injury may have occurred in a col-
lege owned room or house.96 While the concept of foreseeability has
played a role in the courts' willingness to find a special relationship be-
tween the college or university and the student injured,97 that willingness
is also circumscribed. Courts have not found a "special relationship"
whenever any foreseeable injury has occurred, even if it is highly foresee-
able, such as students consuming alcohol and then injuring themselves or
93. See, eg., Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909
(1980) (action by student against college for injuries arising out of car accident following annual
sophomore class picnic at which another student (the driver of the car) had become intoxicated in
violation of college rule prohibiting possession or consumption of alcohol at college sponsored activi-
ties); Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (action by student against univer-
sity and dormitory advisers for injuries resulting from speed contest after alcohol consumed on
university premises in violation of university rules); University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54
(Colo. 1987) (en banc) (action by student against university for failing to protect him from injury in
using trampoline owned by fraternity and located on property leased from university); Swanson v.
Wabash College, 504 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (action by student against college for injuries
sustained during recreational baseball practice); Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331
(Mass. 1983) (action by student against college for injuries suffered when she was raped on campus);
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) (action by student injured on university
sponsored field trip when she became intoxicated and fell over a cliff).
94. See, eg., Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 812; University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744
P.2d at 59. See generally Tia Miyamoto, Liability of Colleges and Universities for Injuries During
ExtracurricularActivities, 15 J.C. & U.L. 149 (1988), for a review of the theories on which a college
or university may be found to have a duty to students injured while they are engaged in extracurricu-
lar activities.
95. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d at 141; Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552,
560-61 (Ill. 1987); Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d at 419.
96. University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d at 59; Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan Univ., 514
N.E.2d at 561-62.
97. See, eg., Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d at 336.
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others.9" Rather, they have generally imposed liability only in cases of
foreseeable criminal attacks against students.99
The burden of the injured student athlete seeking to hold the college
or university responsible for an athletic injury relating to a preexisting
medical condition for which the athlete had been treated and then per-
mitted to return to play would be to convince the court that the situation
is closer to the criminal attack than to the intoxication cases. Colleges
would probably argue that an athletic injury or re-injury is relatively
common," just as are injuries by students who consume alcohol. The
infrequency of severe injury such as death or quadriplegia, however, may
move the argument of athletes who suffer those injuries closer to the rare
criminal attack scenario.
There is language in a number of cases where no liability has been
imposed on the college or university which could support an athlete's
claim for recovery in an injury case. For example, in Baldwin v.
Zoradi,0 1 the court held that a university was not liable for injuries re-
sulting to a student in a speed contest after students had been drinking
alcohol on university premises in violation of university rules. The court
said, however, "In reference to the policy of preventing future harm, we
do not have here a case where university administrators collaborated
with others to encourage students to imbibe with knowledge of their in-
tention to thereupon operate a motor vehicle."' 0 2 Similarly, in Campbell
v. Board of Directors of Wabash College,10 3 the court refused to impose
liability on a college for injuries sustained when one student drank alco-
hol and drove, injuring another in an accident. In reaching its decision,
the court said, inter alia:
No evidence suggests that either the College or the Fraternity provided [the
student] with alcoholic beverages, that the College or Fraternity knew that
[the student] ever drank alcoholic beverages or that he would be drinking
on that particular night, or that the College or Fraternity knew that [the
student] would drive an automobile after becoming intoxicated.
1°4
Finally, in Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Univer-
98. See, eg., Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 818; Campbell v. Trustees of Wabash College,
495 N.E.2d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
99. See, eg., Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d at 335-36.
100. Thirteen percent of all college level athletic injuries are reinjuries. Eskenazi, supra note 29,
at 2.
101. 176 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1981).
102. Id. at 818.
103. 495 N.E.2d 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
104. Id. at 232.
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sity,"° a case involving the search of a student's room, the court stated
that even though the college does not stand in loco parentis to its stu-
dents, the college does have an "affirmative obligation" to make and en-
force reasonable regulations designed to protect campus order and
discipline and to promote an environment consistent with the educa-
tional process.
106
Given these cases, an athlete who has been injured, cleared to return
to play, and then reinjured may be able to state a cause of action against
university officials. In light of Baldwin, the injured student athlete could
allege and attempt to prove that university officials (for example, coaches
and physicians) "collaborated" to encourage previously injured athletes
to return to play with the knowledge that they could be reinjured. Rely-
ing on Campbell, the athlete could try to show that college officials pro-
vided the athlete with medical care or at least with the opportunity to
return to play knowing that the athlete had been injured or had a preex-
isting medical condition, either of which could result in subsequent seri-
ous injury. Finally, the athlete might want to argue that "the
environment consistent with the educational process," referred to by the
court in Moore includes keeping students safe from serious harm no mat-
ter what its source.
There are other instances, however, involving both severe injuries' °7
and college athletics °1 in which the courts have held the students, and
not the colleges, responsible for any injuries which occurred or might
occur. In Beach v. University of Utah,0 9 a student sued the university
after she became intoxicated and disoriented while on a school field trip.
As a result of her intoxication, she fell, suffering injuries which left her a
quadriplegic. In finding that the university owed no duty on these facts
the court said,
colleges and universities are educational institutions, not custodial....
Their purpose is to educate in a manner which will assist the graduate to
perform well in the civic, community, family and professional positions he
or she may undertake in the future. It would be unrealistic to impose upon
an institution of higher education the additional role of custodian over its
adult students and to charge it with responsibility for preventing students
from illegally consuming alcohol and, should they do so, with responsibility
105. 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
106. Id. at 729.
107. University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); Beach v. University
of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).
108. Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
109. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).
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for assuring their safety and the safety of others.... Fulfilling this charge
would require the institution to babysit each student, a task beyond the
resources of any school. But more importantly, such measures would be
inconsistent with the nature of the relationship between the student and the
institution, for it would produce a repressive and inhospitable environment,
largely inconsistent with the objectives of a modem college education.
110
In University of Denver v. Whitlock, a student sued the university
after he was rendered a quadriplegic from an accident on a trampoline
owned by a university fraternity and situated on the lawn of the frater-
nity house which was leased from the university. In finding no duty on
the part of the university, the Whitlock court said, "By imposing a duty
on the University in this case, the University would be encouraged to
exercise more control over private student recreational choices, thereby
effectively taking away much of the responsibility recently recognized in
students for making their own decisions with respect to private entertain-
ment and personal safety." '
Finally, in Wright v. Columbia University,1 13 a student sued Colum-
bia University pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,114 seeking the opportunity to participate in Columbia's intercolle-
giate football program. Columbia had refused him that opportunity be-
cause he had sight in only one eye. Wright offered proof (through an
expert) that there was not a substantial risk of injury to his sighted eye
because of his participation in football, that he understood and accepted
the risks of playing football even though his vision was impaired, and
that he and his parents were willing to release Columbia from any poten-
tial liability resulting from an injury related to his sight.115 Columbia
asserted that Wright should not play football because a subsequent injury
could leave him sightless and that he should instead concentrate on ob-
taining an education. 116 The court ordered Columbia to allow Wright
the opportunity to play football.
These three cases, indicating that college students must (or will be
permitted to) take responsibility for their own conduct, when contrasted
with those imposing liability upon educational institutions or recognizing
that a duty to protect students could be imposed on institutions under
110. Id. at 419 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
111. 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).
112. Id. at 60.
113. 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
114. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (Supp. 1991). See infra notes 172-77, 339-41, 345-49, 439-43 and ac-
companying text, for further discussions of plaintiff Wright's § 504 claim.
115. Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. at 791, 793.
116. Id. at 794.
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certain circumstances relating to foreseeability of harm, raise the issue of
whether college athletes should bear responsibility for injuries which oc-
cur if they return to play following illness or injury. Linked, of course, to
the question of who should bear responsibility for the subsequent injury,
is that of who - the student or a surrogate - should hold the ultimate
power to decide if the student returns to play. Whether the athlete is
capable of making that decision - and consequently whether he or she
should be held responsible for it - depends upon whether the athlete can
knowingly and voluntarily (a) consent to treatment and return to play
and (b) release the college or university and its employees from liability
for any subsequent treatment-related or play-related injury. Even if ath-
letes could do so in a vacuum, might the pressures they face, from them-
selves, their coaches, and their fans, preclude them from doing so in
reality? Part IV examines these questions.
IV. COLLEGE ATHLETES AND DECISIONMAKING
A. The Context of the Decision
Decisions concerning the diagnosis and medical treatment of college
athletes may arise in at least three specific contexts: preparticipation
physical examinations (occurring either before play begins or before a
previously injured or ill player is authorized to return to play), therapeu-
tic treatment once a player has become ill or has been injured, and ad-
ministration of drugs.
1. Diagnosis and Treatment The purpose of the physical examina-
tion administered to athletes prior to their initial participation in athletic
activities is to determine whether they are fit to withstand the physical
challenges of the sport. 117 The NCAA's policy concerning such exami-
117. The American Medical Association (AMA) believes that the "[m]edical evaluation goes
beyond the health examination, however, to assure each athlete the best possible health guidance.
Emphasis is to be placed on individual needs and capabilities with the ultimate goal of furthering the
health and development of youth." COMMITrEE ON THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF SPORTS, AMERI-
CAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, A GUIDE FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION OF CANDIDATES FOR SCHOOL
SPORTS 1 (1972) [hereinafter AMA GUIDE]. According to the AMA, the objectives of the prepar-
ticipation physical examination should be to
Determine the health status of candidates prior to exposure to participation and com-
petition;
Provide appropriate medical advice to promote optimum health and fitness;
Counsel the atypical candidate as to the sports or modification of sports which for
him/her would provide suitable activity;




nations states: "Before student-athletes accept the rigors of any organ-
ized sport, their health status should be evaluated. Such an examination
should determine whether the student-athlete is prepared to engage in a
particular sport." ' The NCAA's Sports Medicine Handbook describes
procedures relating to both medical evaluation of student athletes and
maintenance of the athletes' medical records:
1. A preparticipation medical evaluation should be required upon a stu-
dent-athlete's initial entrance into the institution's intercollegiate athletics
program. This initial evaluation should include a review of the student-
athlete's health history and a relevant physical exam.
2. Medical records should be maintained during the student-athlete's col-
legiate career and should include:
a. A record of injuries and illnesses, whether sustained during the
competitive season or the off-season;
b. Referrals for consultation or treatment;
c. Subsequent care and clearances, and
d. A completed yearly health status questionnaire.
3. An exit examination or evaluation at the conclusion of the student-
athlete's participation in a particular sport at that institution is also recom-
mended. Providing there is a continuous awareness of the health status of
the student-athlete, the traditional annual preparticipation physical exami-
nation of all student-athletes is not believed to be necessary.
119
There is little uniformity in the performance of preparticipation or
return to play physicals.120 While major universities may have full time
"sports physicians" on their staffs, many colleges and universities rely on
university physicians in general or physicians from the community in
which the college is located. Few team physicians are truly "experts" in
"sports medicine." Many are internists or family practitioners. The
thoroughness of the physical examination, itself, also varies. The Ameri-
can Medical Association recommends that preparticipation physicals in-
clude a urinalysis, hemoglobin test, tuberculin test, and chest x-ray, the
latter to detect cardiac problems or pulmonary disease.12 1 While cer-
tainly an examining physician (or a physician's assistant) would check a
student athlete's heart beat and blood pressure, and may generally screen
the athlete's vision, hearing, and balance, time and expense make un-
likely the performing of more complicated procedures. 122 For the young,
118. NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 45, Policy No. 1, § 1.
119. Id., Policy No. 2, § 3.
120. For a general discussion of preparticipation physicals and physicians' duties in administer-
ing such examinations, see Joseph H. King, Jr., The Duty and Standard of Care for Team Physicians,
18 Hous. L. REv. 657, 696-700 (1981).
121. AMA GUIDE, supra note 117, at 3.
122. For example, "[1]istening to the heart with a stethoscope is not specific enough to pick up
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apparently healthy athlete who reports no prior health problems, pre-
existing medical conditions, or injuries, such a general preparticipation
physical examination would probably be reasonable under the circum-
stances. If, of course, the athlete does report a preexisting condition or if
the general physical uncovers a potential problem, for example, an irreg-
ular heartbeat, the physician would be under a duty to advise the athlete
of the potential problem, to perform a more complete examination rela-
tive to the condition or refer the athlete to an appropriate specialist who
could perform such an examination, and to refuse to clear the athlete for
play until such an examination had been performed and the athlete in-
formed of the results.
123
Examinations following illness or injury tend to raise more complex
issues. Because the athlete has been ill or injured, the physician is on
notice that a general examination may not be sufficient before clearing
the athlete to return to play. If, for example, an athlete has suffered a
cervical injury, examination and clearance by an orthopedist and/or a
enlarged hearts - one of the leading causes of sudden death among seemingly healthy young ath-
letes." Sally Squires, Before They Take the Field, Athletes Must Get Physical, WASH. PoST, Aug. 15,
1991, at BI, B3. James Glenn, the Texas A&M football player who died in September, 1991, had an
enlarged heart. See supra note 45. More sophisticated procedures - exercise stress tests in which
the athlete's heart is monitored with an electrocardiogram, or echocardiography which uses sound
waves to picture the beating heart - are necessary to detect enlarged hearts. See Squires, supra.
Those tests can cost from a few hundred to one thousand dollars. Id.
It is also unlikely that the circumstances surrounding many physical exams lend themselves to the
counseling objective proposed by the AMA. See supra note 117. See also Grube v. Bethlehem Area
Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418, 420 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (physician performing physical examinations for
high school football team sees approximately 100 students in 2 day period "during which he checks
heart, lungs, ears, and nose").
123. McCaffrey et al., supra note 45, at 181, believe that, with a physical examination as recom-
mended by the American Academy of Pediatrics coupled with a competent screening which includes
a family history, most athletes with significant cardiac disease can and should be identified and
referred for accurate diagnosis and management. A family history is especially important for diag-
nosing a disorder like atherosclerotic coronary artery disease, which is very rare in those under 35
years of age. Id. at 179. See also Squires, supra note 122, at B3.
McCaffrey et al., also discuss how difficult it is to make precise diagnostic decisions, even when
some symptoms of cardiac disease are present. For example,
Without symptoms or signs suggestive of myocardial involvement, the diagnosis of
myocarditis [inflammation of the middle muscular layer of the heart wall] is exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible, to make. To restrict participation on the basis of a low-grade
fever, or to recommend evaluation of such noncardiac symptoms by a cardiologist, is
both impractical and unrealistic. Many athletes "play through" a cold or mild febrile
illness, especially if they are highly competitive.
McCaffrey et al., supra note 45, at 181. McCaffrey et al., do recommend that an athlete who does
not feel well because of a fever should be restricted, id., although it is hard to imagine a player who
would play with a wired jaw or a stress fracture of the foot, see infra note 201 and accompanying
text, agreeing to sit out a game because of a fever.
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neurologist may be in order. Similarly, if an athlete has been diagnosed
as having a cardiac related disorder, examination and clearance by a car-
diologist should be required.
Whatever the stage at which the physical is performed, the guiding
principle in determining a school's or a physician's liability should be
whether the examination and subsequent disclosure of information was
reasonable under the circumstances.124 Accidents will happen notwith-
standing the degree of care used. But if an athlete shows signs of illness
or injury, a different type of examination may be mandated than that
required for an apparently healthy athlete with no prior history of illness
or injury.
In terms of diagnosis and treatment following injury or illness, the
university or physician will again be held to a standard of reasonable care
under the circumstances, although the physician's specialty will be one of
the circumstances which dictates what conduct is reasonable. 125 What is
reasonable in any given situation for a specialist in cardiology, orthope-
dics, or sports medicine may be different from what would be reasonable
for a general internist. Each will be judged by the degree of skill, learn-
ing, and expertise of other physicians with the same or similar
backgrounds.
Principles relating to disclosure of information - according to the
courts the basic element of informed consent126 - should be the same for
the college athlete as they are for other patients. 127 In general, the laws
of the jurisdiction in which the university is located (and the diagnosis
and treatment made) will determine whether the disclosure will be
judged by a reasonable physician or a reasonable patient standard and,
should failure to disclose result in actual injury, whether causation will
be judged by an objective or a subjective standard.1 28 The information
124. See infra notes 428, 462 and accompanying text, for further discussion of the standard of
care to be applied to physicians in the sports medicine context.
125. See King, supra note 120, at 700, for a discussion of a physician's standard of care in
diagnosing and treating athletes' injuries.
126. See supra notes 70-74, 81 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the law's emphasis on
disclosure of information in informed consent cases.
127. If athletes are determined to be competent adults and able to make their own treatment
decisions, the law of informed consent as it applies to competent adults should apply to athletes as
well. If athletes are determined not to be competent adults, the athletes' surrogates are entitled to
the same information in making a decision for the athletes which the athletes would be entitled to
have if they were held to be competent. See Jones, supra note 49, at 425. For the purposes of this
section of the Article, I will assume that athletes will be found to be competent adults and, therefore,
the appropriate decisionmakers on issues relating to their health care.
128. See supra Part II of this Article for a discussion of the various standards relating to duty to
disclose and causation as applied throughout the United States.
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providers should also make reasonable efforts to ensure that the athlete
understands the information concerning condition, proposed treatment,
and alternatives.
129
Physicians' duties in terms of informed consent issues are the same
in relation to the administration of drugs to athletes for therapeutic pur-
poses as they are for any other therapeutic treatment. Drugs also are
administered to athletes, however, to enhance their performance and to
mask pain. Both raise serious issues in terms of an athlete's consent. In
both instances, the administration of drugs can have serious adverse side
effects. The disastrous effects of the use of steroids by athletes are well
known. 30 The NCAA prohibits the use of such drugs and declares ineli-
gible athletes who use them.131 Congress has now added anabolic ster-
oids to Section III of the Controlled Substances Act,1 32  making
distribution of anabolic steroids without a prescription a felony (punish-
129. See Jones, supra note 49, at 412-14, 416-19, for suggestions concerning the testing of pa-
tients' comprehension of information and ways to improve that comprehension.
130. Tommy Chaikin & Rick Telander, The Nightmare of Steroids, SPoRTs ILLUSTRATED, Oct.
24, 1988, at 82, 90, 94, 97, 100-02 (discussing acne, hair loss, insomnia, shrunken testicles, increased
blood pressure, heart murmur, liver disease, colitis, depression, anxiety, personality change, chest
pains, arm numbness, chills, vision problems, lingering headaches, unsteady balance); Michael Ash-
craft, Retired Pro Warns Students About Steroids, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1990, at B6 (discussing
cardiomyopathy attributed to athlete's use of steroids); David Behrens, A Workout with Steroids,
NEWSDAY, June 30, 1989, Pt. II, at 2 (discussing aggression, depression, liver disease, high blood
pressure); Jane E. Brody, Personal Health: Spreading Use of Steroids by Young Athletes Alarms
Sports Medicine Specialists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1988, at B8 (citing sexual and reproductive disor-
ders, high cholesterol); Ron Kotulak & Jon Van, College Athletes Still Ignore Steroid Risks, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 29, 1989, § 1, at 7 (citing cardiovascular disease, liver damage, reproductive problems);
The Risks of Using Anabolic Steroids, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1988, at B8 (citing heart disease, sexual
and reproductive disorders, immune deficiencies, liver disorders, fetal growth problems, psychologi-
cal disturbances including aggression, sexual violence, psychotic episodes, and severe depression);
Steroid Use by Teen-Agers Cited, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1990, at 42 ("more than 250,000 adolescents,
mostly boys, have used steroids to build muscles and enhance athletic performance"; adverse side
effects include stunted growth, mood changes, long term dependence on steroids, increased irritabil-
ity, violent behavior, depression, mania, psychosis, suicide); Karen Klinger, Domestic News, UPI,
Feb. 14, 1990, available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (discussing heart attack, stroke, psychi-
atric problems, withdrawal, liver damage, and sudden death). A recent study reported that 14.7
percent of all male athletes, 30 percent of all football players, and 5.9 percent of all female athletes
used anabolic steroids. Douglas Lederman, Athletics Notes: Steroid Use at Colleges Is Said to Exceed
Previous Estimates, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 19, 1990, at A28. Because these figures were
derived from athletes being asked to report their opponents' use of steroids, the steroid use may be
overreported. The study's authors believe, however, that a previous NCAA study reporting that 5
percent of all athletes used steroids probably underreported the actual percentage because that study
was based on athletes' self-reporting. Id.
131. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 1990-91 NCAA MANUAL
§§ 18.4.1.5.1-18.4.1.5.2 & 31.2.3.1-31.2.3.5 (1990) [hereinafter 1990-91 NCAA MANUAL].
132. Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-647, § 1902(a), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(104 Stat.) 4851-52 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)).
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able by up to five years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000) and posses-
sion of steroids a misdemeanor (with initial penalties of up to one year in
prison and a fine of up to $5,000). 133 Even vitamins, in high doses, can
have serious side effects.13 1 Pain killers also create a serious problem
when administered to college athletes. Pain is a highly valuable indicator
in diagnosing how serious an injury is, 135 so administration of a pain
killer could hinder an accurate diagnosis of an athlete's injury. In addi-
tion, if an athlete is administered a pain killer and sent back onto the field
or court to resume play, more serious injury could occur. 136 Just as with
therapeutic drugs, athletes are entitled to know and comprehend the
risks, benefits, and alternatives relative to any performance enhancing or
pain killing drug prescribed for them.
2. The Decision to Play An athlete's decision to return to play fol-
lowing illness or injury is often as important as an athlete's decision to
play following an initial screening physical examination or to submit to
therapy or to the administration of drugs. If an athlete, who decides to
return to play and is subsequently injured in a way related to the preex-
isting condition, attempts to hold the college or university or its employ-
ees responsible for the injury, the institution will probably argue that the
133. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(b)(1)(D), 844(a) (West Supp. 1991) (distribution and possession). The
House of Representatives' version of this legislation would have made it a felony for coaches and
trainers to try to persuade athletes to use anabolic steroids. Steroid Bill Approved; NYSP Received
Funding, NCAA NEws, Nov. 5, 1990, at 14.
134. See, e.g., Eeva-Liisa Sainio & Pertt Sainio, Comparison of Effects of Nicotinic Acid or Tryp-
tophan on Tryptophan 2,3-Dioxygenase in Acute & Chronic Studies, 102 ToxICOLOGY & APPLIED
PHARMACOLOGY 251, 256 (1990) (nicotonfc acid: glucose intolerance, jaundice, hyperuricemia);
Jack Z. Yetiv, Clinical Applications ofFish Oils, 260 JAMA 665, 668 (1988) (fish oil: Vitamin A and
Vitamin D toxicity, Vitamin E deficiency, enhanced bleeding); Gerald S. Couzens, The Vitamin
Trap: Megadosing Dangers, NEWSDAY, June 11, 1988, Pt. II, at 5 (vitamin B-6: nerve damage, liver
ailments, limb dysfunction; niacin: itchy skin, irregular heartbeat; vitamin C: kidney stones, gastro-
intestinal distress; vitamin D: kidney damage, joint tissue damage, weakness; vitamin E: phlebitis,
depression, fatigue); Kathi Gannon, The Almighty Garlic" Can it Check Cholesterol, Too?, DRUG
Topics, Sept. 4, 1989, at 39 (niacin: flushing, nausea, vomiting, increases in blood glucose and uric
acid levels); Larry Husten, How to Lower Your Cholesterol, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1988, § 6, Pt. 2, at
33 (niacin: liver and cardiac abnormalities); Jay Siwek, Hazards of Overdosing on Extra Vitamins,
WAsH. PosT, July 10, 1990, at Z21 (vitamin A: liver damage, headaches, dizziness, leg swelling,
itchy skin, hair loss, joint pains; vitamin D: elevated calcium level leading to nausea, weakness, and
confusion; vitamin E: fatigue, weakness, nausea, headache; vitamin C: kidney stones; vitamin B-6:
kidney stones); Richard Woodman, Extra Vitamins Could Be Health Risk Warning, Press Ass'n
Newsfile, Feb. 7, 1990, available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, PANEWS File (vitamin C: kidney
stones; vitamin A: liver damage; Vitamin B-6: nerve damage, depression, fatigue).
135. Harold L. Hirsch, Editor's Comment to Nathaniel Sharfer, Sports Medicine, 9 LAW. MED.
J. 31, 71 (1981).
136. See id; see also JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 8.08, at
995-96 (1979); King, supra note 120, at 699-704.
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athlete assumed the risk of returning to play and, in some instances, may
assert that the athlete waived any potential liability on the part of the
institution.'37 According to general tort law principles, one "who volun-
tarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless con-
duct of the defendant cannot recover for such harm."' 38 In terms of
athletics, the risk that may be assumed includes not only that related to
medical care, but also that related to the inherent dangers of the activity
in which the athlete engages. 139 In order to prevail on a defense of as-
sumption of the risk a defendant must prove that the person alleged to
have assumed the risk [knew] of the existence of the risk and appreci-
ate[d] its unreasonable character,"'" a determination which is made
137. The NCAA takes the position that the athlete and those persons connected with the
school's athletic program share the responsibility for the athlete's safety.
Participation in sports requires an acceptance of risk of injury.
Student-athletes, for their part, should comply with and understand the rules and
standards that govern their sports. Coaches should acquaint the student-athlete appro-
priately with risks of injury and with the rules and practices they are employing to mini-
mize the student-athlete's risk of significant injury while pursuing the many benefits of
sport. The athletics trainer and team physician are responsible for the prevention of
injuries (where possible) and the care of those injuries which do occur. The athletics
program via the athletics administrator is responsible for providing the safest possible
environment. The student-athlete and the athletics program have a mutual need for an
informed awareness of the risks being accepted and for sharing the responsibility for
minimizing those risks.
NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 7.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
139. "An inherent risk is one that occurs during the normal play of a game or activity, as a
direct result of the rules governing that game or activity." GARY NYGAARD & THOMAS H. BOONE,
LAW FOR PHYSICAL EDUCATORS & COACHES 196 (2d ed. 1989).
The issue of assumption of the risk may be clouded in the context in which I consider it because I
am willing to assume for purposes of this Article that the medical diagnosis and treatment of the
athlete's injury have been performed without negligence. See supra note 60. Notwithstanding that
nonnegligent treatment, however, negligence may occur in informing an athlete concerning the risks
of returning to play. In other instances, athletes may allege that even if the risks of a return to play
were explained to them and even if they did understand those risks, the colleges or universities had
an absolute duty to keep the athlete from returning to play. See infra notes 197-200 and accompany-
ing text, for a discussion of athletes' allegations that regardless of their own decisions regarding
return to play, their institutions should have refused them that opportunity. For the purposes of this
Article, the doctrine of assumption of the risk will be deemed applicable to these "nonnegligent"
scenarios, as well as to a traditional negligence context.
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965) (emphasis added); see also Kirk v.
Washington State Univ., 746 P.2d 285, 288 (Wash. 1987) (en bane); 2 ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN
M. WONG, LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES § 4.12-5(d) (1986); NYGAARD &
BOONE, supra note 139, at 20; LINDA A. SHARP, SPORT LAW 2 (1990).
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based on a subjective standard, 141 and "voluntarily accept[ed] the risk."14 2
The doctrine of assumption of the risk is generally cast in one of
four ways: express assumption of the risk, in which the plaintiff has ex-
pressly consented to relieve the defendant of a duty to exercise care in
relation to the plaintiff and expressly agreed to chance injury from a
known or possible risk; implied assumption of the risk resulting from
plaintiff's action in voluntarily entering into a relationship with defend-
ant, knowing that it involves risk; implied assumption of the risk evi-
denced by plaintiff's voluntarily encountering a known risk created by
defendant's negligence; and "unreasonable" assumption of the risk which
occurs when plaintiff does not use the care of a reasonable person under
the circumstances in voluntarily encountering a known risk.143
In terms of the knowledge element of assumption of the risk, in or-
der for the defense to be effective the plaintiff must not only know that
the risk exists but must also appreciate its unreasonable character. 1"
Both are generally questions to be determined by the finder of fact. 4 '
Defining the "risk" which plaintiff knew and appreciated is a recurring
problem in the assumption of risk defense. 1"
In terms of the voluntariness element, a plaintiff's assumption of the
risk is not voluntary if the defendant's tortious conduct has left the plain-
tiff no reasonable alternative course of conduct to avert harm to self or
others or to exercise a right or privilege with which the defendant has no
right to interfere. 47 A plaintiff's protest against a risk and demand for
141. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 496D cmt. c (1965); see also Kirk v. Washington
State Univ., 746 P.2d at 288.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 496E(1) (1965) (emphasis added). See also Sharp,
supra note 140, at 2.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. c (1965); see also Kirk v. Washington
State Univ., 746 P.2d at 288. Although "unreasonable implied assumption of the risk" and contribu-
tory negligence are similar in fact, they are different in theory. Assumption of the risk rests upon the
voluntary consent of the plaintiff to encounter the risk and chance injury while contributory negli-
gence rests on the plaintiff's failure to exercise reasonable care. The two defenses would intersect if
the plaintiff were voluntarily to take an unreasonable risk. The defenses also differ because in an
assumption of the risk defense whether the plaintiff knows, understands, and appreciates the risk is
judged by a subjective standard while in a contributory negligence defense those factors are judged
by an objective, reasonable person standard. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. d
(1965).
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965). The NCAA policy on "Acceptance
of Risk" states that "Any informed consent or waiver by student-athletes.., should be based on an
awareness of the risks of participating in intercollegiate sports." NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HAND-
BOOK, supra note 45, Policy No. 1, § 4.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D cmt. e (1965).
146. Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1198, 1203 (Pa. 1981).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E(2) (1965).
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its removal will not necessarily preclude a defense of assumption of the
risk if after the protest and demand the plaintiff still proceeds to confront
the risk. 4 Assumption of the risk may also be considered to be volun-
tary if a plaintiff is acting under compelling circumstances which have
left no reasonable alternative, so long as the circumstances were not cre-
ated by the tortious conduct of the defendant.149 If the tortious conduct
of the defendant forces a choice of conduct upon the plaintiff but leaves a
reasonable alternative open, an alternative which under the circum-
stances the plaintiff may reasonably be required to choose, the plaintiff's
choice of the risky alternative may be judged to be voluntary. 150 Factors
relevant to determining whether an alternative is reasonable and avail-
able include the "importance of the interest, right, or privilege which the
plaintiff is seeking to advance or protect, the probability and gravity of
each of the alternative risks, [and] the difficulty or inconvenience of one
course of conduct" rather than another.151
A waiver of liability, which is the equivalent of an express assump-
tion of the risk, is an agreement by which the athlete would relieve the
college or university or its employees of liability for injuries or illnesses
suffered by the athlete while playing. A waiver represents a conflict be-
tween contract law, under which competent parties have the right to
make any agreement they choose as long as it is not illegal or does not
violate public policy, and tort law, which attempts to hold persons re-
sponsible for the injuries they cause.1 -2 In order to be legally effective,
waivers or express assumptions of the risk must not violate public policy
or result from fraud, misrepresentation, or duress."'a Waivers of liability
must be the product of equal bargaining power between the parties and
"the language of the waiver must be clear, detailed, and specific."
'15 4
Waivers or express assumptions of the risk are valid only in releasing a
148. Id. at cmt. a.
149. Id. at cmt. b.
150. Id. at cmt. d.
151. Id.
152. GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF AMATEUR SPORTS LAW 397 (1988); HERB APPEN-
ZELLER, SPORTS AND LAW: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, § 2.3(C), at 34-36 (1985). For a discussion of
waivers, in the context of high school athletes with preexisting medical conditions such as cardiomy-
opathy, see Andrew Manno, A High Price to Compete: The Feasibility and Effect of Waivers Used to
Protect Schools from Liability for Injuries to Athletes with High MedicalRisks, 79 Ky. L.J. 867 (1990-
91).
153. WONG, supra note 152, at 397; see also Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d 821 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1972) (detailing the various grounds upon which express assumptions of the risk will be
held to be invalid); APPENZELLER, supra note 152, § 2.3(C), at 35.
154. WONG, supra note 152, at 397; APPENZELLER, supra note 152, § 2.3(C), at 35.
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defendant from liability for negligence related to the particular conduct
in which the defendant engages vis-a-vis the plaintiff; they are not effec-
tive in relation to more culpable conduct such as recklessness or inten-
tional torts.155
The elements supporting a waiver of liability are the same as those
necessary for assumption of the risk in general: knowledge and apprecia-
tion of the risk and voluntary choice to encounter the risk.'5 6 Because
one entering into a waiver of liability must know of and appreciate the
risks involved in the activity undertaken, the waiver represents a
"method of alerting participants to the potential of catastrophic injury as
well as to the serious risks involved in various physical activities."'
' 57
Two sports law scholars suggest that waivers should estimate the physio-
155. WONG, supra note 152, at 397; see also Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d at 824; APPEN-
ZELLER, supra note 152, § 2.3(C), at 35.
156. Assuming that the knowledge and voluntariness elements of a waiver could be met in the
case of the college athlete (but see infra notes 187-223 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
pressures on college athletes which might negate the voluntariness element), arguments could still be
raised concerning the overall validity of the waiver. The athlete might argue that the bargaining
relationship between the college and the athlete is not equal, although were the college to agree to
continue the athlete's scholarship regardless of his or her physical ability to play, the inequality in
the relationship would be mitigated. See infra note 278 for a discussion of current NCAA policy
concerning continuation of athletic scholarships despite player ineligibility due to illness or injury.
The law generally prohibits exculpatory agreements relating to transactions involving the public
interest. It is not clear, however, that engaging in intercollegiate athletics satisfies the "public inter-
est" elements which would negate a waiver of liability. See, e.g., Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d at
824. See also Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963) (setting forth nine
factors, some or all of which define a matter of "public interest" in the context of a waiver of liabil-
ity). Until recently, see infra note 468 and accompanying text, college athletics have not been judged
"a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation" and college athletics, no mat-
ter how interesting to the public at large, is not "a service of great importance to the public, which is
often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public." Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445 (em-
phasis added). This is true notwithstanding the fact that some athletes will argue athletics is a
"practical necessity" if they are to receive a college education. But see infra note 416 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the graduation rates of college athletes. The college or university does
not "hold[ ] [itself] out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it,
or at least for any member coming within certain established standards." Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445.
Finally, because college sports programs do not seem to meet an "essential" standard, as would
services provided by public utilities or common carriers, other factors which could vitiate the waiver
of liability will not do so in the college athletics context. For example, even though the college may
present the college athlete desiring to return to play with a standard, nonnegotiable waiver form and
even though if the athlete returns to play he or she will do so under the control of college employees,
the athlete need not accept the college's terms but rather may choose not to play again. See id. at
445-46. Athletes may well claim, however, that their scholarships are not the only interest they risk
losing if they do not agree to the college's waiver terms. Some may well lose opportunities to engage
in professional sports following their college careers. See infra notes 273-78 and accompanying text
for a discussion of athletes' property interest in future professional careers.
157. ANNIE CLEMENT, LAW IN SPORT AND PHYSICAL AcTIvrrY 179 (1988). Cf. Winterstein
v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d 821 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (holding race car time trials not a matter of
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logical demands of the activity, including a description of cardiorespira-
tory stress associated with the activity; request medical certification;
encourage safe performance; emphasize major standard warnings, major
unique inherent risks of the activity, and other common risks of the ac-
tivity; explain any inherent safety rules or protocol, equipment recom-
mendations and use, and necessary etiquette; solicit and encourage
questions; summarize that the athlete knows, understands, and appreci-
ates the risks of the activity; and be signed, dated, and kept on record.'5"
The authors give the following as a sample "appropriate" warning:
I understand that the dangers and risks of playing or practicing to play
tackle football include, but are not limited to, death, serious neck and spinal
injuries which may result in complete or partial paralysis, brain damage,
serious injury to virtually all internal organs, serious injury to virtually all
bones, joints, ligaments, muscles, tendons, and other aspects of the muscu-
lar skeletal system, and serious injury or impairment to other aspects of my
body and general health and well-being.' 59
The authors add that such a statement might "become a preamble for all
activities, because all activities contain inherent risks."'IW
This warning is certainly specific and thorough. Whether it is effec-
tive in adequately warning the healthy, seemingly invincible young ath-
lete of the dangers associated with athletic activities is another question.
The football warning bears a remarkable resemblance to the general "in-
formed consent" warnings required to be signed by patients before sur-
gery. For example, a typical anesthesia consent form requires patients to
acknowledge that they are aware of the "more common or unusually
serious possible risks which may accompany the anesthesia," including
adverse drug reactions, brain damage, cardiac arrest, nerve injury, distur-
bance of cardiac rhythm, respiratory problems, injury to teeth or dental
work, damage to arteries and veins, sore throat, hoarseness, headache,
minor pain and discomfort, and awareness under anesthesia.16' While
clearly disclosing information to athletes and patients, such warnings
probably do little to aid their understanding of and appreciation for the
risks they are "agreeing" to encounter.
Issues relating to informing adequately a college athlete about medi-
cal care and a subsequent return to play following illness or injury should
"public interest" and waiver of liability executed by driver in favor of race track not invalid as
violation of public policy).
158. NYGAARD & BOONE, supra note 139, at 208-10.
159. Id at 206.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. Consent form on file with author.
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be no different from the informed consent issues relevant to any compe-
tent adult patient agreeing to undergo diagnosis and treatment and then
returning to life's activities. That is not to say that there are no problems
with transmission and comprehension of the necessary information. The
information may be complex; athletes, just as patients, will be of varying
degrees of intelligence and they may be overcome by anxiety or feelings
of denial that prevent them from "hearing" or remembering the informa-
tion conveyed. 
162
Just as with medical patients, however, there are ways to improve
the athlete's comprehension of information. 16 3 For example, the team
physician or athletic representative could provide information in writing
as well as orally concerning medical conditions, treatments, risks, and
alternatives, as well as information associated with return to play deci-
sions.1"' Conversations between physicians or school officials and ath-
letes could be tape recorded so the athlete could hear as many times as
necessary the information and the warnings. Physicians or college offi-
cials could test an athlete's comprehension of the information provided
by requiring the athletes to write in their own words what they under-
stand the information conveyed to mean. Athletes could be accompanied
during such conferences with physicians or school officials by another
adult of their choice who may help them frame questions or later help to
refresh their recollections concerning the information provided. Just as
with medical patients in general, none of these suggestions is guaranteed
to insure that the athlete knows and understands all the information nec-
essary for informed decisionmaking about medical treatment and return
to play. In all probability, however, a combination of these techniques
will enable the athlete to comprehend the information better than will a
general conversation with a physician or school official and an all-pur-
pose, catch-all waiver form.
Equally problematic to the question of whether athletes know and
appreciate the information concerning medical treatment and return to
play is whether, because of age and pressures from within and without,
they can voluntarily choose to accept the risks associated with treatment
and play.
162. See Jones, supra note 49, at 409-12 for a discussion of factors which may inhibit a patient's
understanding of information necessary to make an informed decision concerning medical care.
163. See id. at 412-14, 416-19 for a discussion of suggestions to improve patients' understanding
of information necessary for informed decisionmaking.
164. Ideally, the team physician or trainer would also advise the athlete on basic health issues
such as good nutrition and proper conditioning.
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B. The Decisionmaker: Athlete or Surrogate?
1. The Argument for the Athlete as Decisionmaker Unlike prior
times when the doctrine of in loco parentis was one of the principles regu-
lating the college/student relationship,165 educational institutions and so-
ciety in general, with the support of the law, regard college-age students
as adults with the same rights and responsibilities that attend all
adults.' 66 College students or college-age students are entitled to vote,
marry, enlist in the military, and engage in many other "adult" activities
without the consent of a parent or guardian.167 Outside the context of
college athletics, college- age students are certainly accorded the status of
competent adults in terms of making health care decisions.1 68 The treat-
ment accorded college students, including athletes, in these contexts sup-
ports the position that college athletes should be treated as competent
adults in terms of decisions relating to medical treatment and return to
play.'69 That is not, however, the only reason for doing so.
One of the goals of the educational process is to help the student
mature into a responsible person who will make positive contributions to
society. 7 ' To authorize someone other than the athlete to make deci-
sions in the medical care and return to play context would impact ad-
versely on the student's autonomy. As the Baldwin v. Zoradi Court said,
165. See supra Part III of this Article for a discussion of the doctrine of in loco parentis as it
relates to colleges and students.
166. See, eg., Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 419 n.5 (Utah 1986) ("Neither attend-
ance at college nor agreement to submit to certain behavior standards makes the student less an
autonomous adult or the institution more a caretaker."); see also Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d
135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980); University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744
P.2d 54, 61 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); Campbell v. Board of Trustees of Wabash College, 495 N.E.2d
227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
167. See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d at 139, for an illustrative list of "adult" activities in
which college students may freely participate without the permission of another adult.
168. For example, Living Will or Health Care Proxy Statutes commonly provide that any per-
son 18 years of age or older, if of sound mind and not acting under the undue influence of another, is
competent to execute an advance health care directive indicating how medical treatment decisions
should be made if the person subsequently becomes incompetent. See, eg., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
8-12-1, 16-8-12-2, 16-8-12-6 (Bums 1991) (proxy); MD. HEALTH - GEN. CODE ANN.§ 5-602 (1990)
(living will) (incorporating by reference MD. EST. & TRUST CODE ANN. § 4-101, permitting anyone
18 years or older to execute a will to dispose of property); MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 201D, § 2
(West Supp. 1991) (proxy); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980(1), 2981(2) (McKinney Supp. 1991)
(proxy).
169. See GEORGE W. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS LAW 256 (1986) ("The choice to play injured
rather than sit out the remainder of the season to fully recover is the athlete's choice, not that of the
team, coach, or medical professional.... Under no circumstances should the physician, trainer or
therapist choose for the patient .... ").
170. Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809, 818 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); University of Denver v.
Whitlock, 744 P.2d at 60 (quoting Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d at 419).
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in the context of refusing to impose duties on educational institutions in
relation to students and alcohol, infringing on the students' autonomy
would not be "in the best interests of society.... The transfer of prerog-
atives and rights from college administrators to the students is salubrious
when seen in the context of a proper goal of postsecondary education -
the maturation of the students. Only by giving them responsibilities can
students grow into responsible adulthood." '171
At least two courts have held in the context of students with physi-
cal disabilities that the students or the students and their parents are the
appropriate decisionmakers when deciding whether the students should
be permitted to engage in contact sports. 172 In Wright v. Columbia Uni-
versity, the court entered a temporary restraining order allowing a stu-
dent with sight in only one eye to play college football. In doing so, the
court stated that Wright not only had presented expert evidence that
football did not pose a substantial risk of injury to his sight, but also he
had testified that he seriously considered and appreciated the risks inci-
dent to playing football with impaired vision and he willingly accepted
those risks.173 The court found Wright, who had been an outstanding
high school athlete despite his impaired vision, to be mature and capa-
ble.174 The court also found that Wright and his parents were willing to
release Columbia from any liability should he suffer injury to his sight
while playing football 75 and that the Columbia coaching staff supported
his request to play. 176 While calling Columbia's concern for the student's
sight "laudable," the court nevertheless found that the results of such
concern were inconsistent with the protection afforded Wright by Section
171. Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 818. See also University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744
P.2d at 62 ("[A] conclusion that a special relationship exist[s] between [the student athlete] and the
University sufficient to warrant the imposition of liability for nonfeasance would directly contravene
the competing social policy of fostering an education environment of student autonomy and
independence.").
172. Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Poole v. South Plainfield Bd.
of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980). But see Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir.
1977). Although both Wright and Poole were decided pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1991), the courts in both cases talked of the students'
and their families' decisionmaking rights.
See also Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Pa. 1982), where the court
entered a preliminary injunction to permit a high school student with only one kidney to play foot-
ball. While Grube was also a Section 504 case, the court did not discuss the student's decisionmak-
ing rights, but found instead that the school district had failed to prove that the student's medical
condition disqualified him from participation. Id. at 424.
173. 520 F. Supp. at 793.
174. Id. at 794. Wright had maintained a "B" average at Columbia as a first year student.




504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 17 7
Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education78 involved a former
high school student with only one kidney who sued for damages because
he had been denied the opportunity to take part in the school's interscho-
lastic wrestling program. At the time Poole wanted to wrestle, he clearly
was a minor and his parents were the primary decisionmakers for such
matters. The court found that Poole's decision to wrestle was protected
by Section 504.179 Even though injury to the healthy kidney would have
lead to "grave consequences," the court said, so might other injuries
which could have affected Poole or any other member of the wrestling
team.' As did the student and his parents in Wright, Poole and his
parents had consulted experts - their family doctor, a specialist in
sports medicine, and the wrestling coach at Lehigh University, a tradi-
tional wrestling powerhouse - about the types and frequencies of inju-
ries encountered by wrestlers.'' Poole's parents had also offered to
waive any potential liability of the school district should their son be
injured wrestling.'82 In characterizing the rights and responsibilities of
the parties in Poole, the court said:
This is a young man who, with his parents' support and approval, wishes to
live an active life despite a congenital defect. The Board's responsibility is
to see that he does not pursue this course in a foolish manner. They there-
fore have a duty to alert Richard and his parents to the dangers involved
and to require them to deal with the matter rationally.
Whatever duty the Board may have had towards Richard was satisfied
once it became clear that the Pooles knew of the danger involved and ra-
tionally reached a decision to encourage their son's participation in inter-
scholastic wrestling.'
83
177. Id at 794.
178. 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980).
179. Id. at 951.
180. Id at 953.
181. Id. at 954.
182. Id. at 952.
183. Id at 954. The Second Circuit rejected a Section 504 claim brought by two junior high
school students who wanted to engage in interscholastic athletic competition despite vision
problems. Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977). Even though both students' parents
supported their children's request, the court held that public school officials could exercise their
parenspatriae power over the students and "protectol [their] well-being." Id. at 300. In a subse-
quent suit, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, granted Kampmeier's request to par-
ticipate in athletic competition. Kampmeier v. Harris, 411 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
The court based its decision on N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4409 (McKinney 1981) (repealed 1986) which
provided that a student denied the opportunity "to participate in an athletic program by reason of a
physical impairment" could bring a special proceeding to enjoin the school district's action, and that
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There are strong arguments, then, for allowing athletes to make
their own decisions concerning medical treatment and return to play. In
almost all other contexts they are treated as adults, with the right to
make decisions about the most important issues affecting their lives.
1 4
Furthermore, the exercising of such rights and responsibilities is some-
thing that society wants not only to protect but also to encourage. The
question remains, however, whether the pressures upon college athletes
are so great that the law should carve out an exception to their auton-
omy. That is, should the law say that within the narrow context of deci-
sions relating to some or all illnesses or injuries"'5 and to decisions
the student's petition should be granted if the court "is satisfied that it is in the best interest of the
student to participate in an athletic program and that it is reasonably safe for him to do so." The
supreme court, while having found that the statute's requirements had been met, nevertheless had
denied plaintiff relief because the statute also provided that the school district would be immune
from liability "for any injury sustained by any student participating pursuant to an order granted
under [Section 4409]." 411 N.Y.S.2d at 746. The appellate division held that the legislative grant of
immunity was not to be considered in determining "the best interest of the student." Id. at 746. The
court did not address the issue of the student's or her parent's decisionmaking authority.
184. The one area in which persons aged 18-20 are generally not treated as those aged 21 or
older is in the purchase and consumption of alcohol. That restriction, however, is imposed for pub-
lic safety as well as for individual safety reasons. All states prohibit persons under the age of 21 from
using alcohol. Felicity Barringer, With Teens andAkohoL It's Just Say When, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
1991, § 4, at 1. For representative statutes regulating the sale or delivery to or use of alcohol by
persons under the age of 21, see MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 34A (West 1991) (purchasing,
procuring); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.21(A) (Anderson 1990) (selling); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 1-3-113(L) (1990) (purchasing, possessing, transporting, consuming); id. at § 57-4-203(b)(1),
(2)(A) (1990) (selling, furnishing; purchasing, receiving); VA. CODE ANN. § 4-62(A), (B) (1990)
(selling; purchasing or possessing). The Tennessee Code provides specifically that "Notwithstanding
any laws to the contrary, any person who is eighteen (18) years of age or older shall have the same
rights, duties, and responsibilities as a person who, is twenty-one (21) years of age" except as to the
possession and use of alcohol. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-113(a) (1990) (emphasis added).
185. There are those who argue that regardless of decisions to return to play following most
illnesses or injuries, there are some that are so serious the athlete should be forbidden ever to return
to play. Se4 eg., Hirsch, supra note 135, at 73 (some neurologists believe that migraine headaches
may represent unique convulsive disorders and, therefore, seriously question whether a person who
suffers predictable recurrent migraine headaches should participate in heavy contact sports like box-
ing; persons who have suffered three major concussions should be indefinitely excluded from sports);
McCaffrey et al., supra note 45, at 178 (athletes with some types of cardiac disorders (for example,
hypertrophic cardiomyopathy) should be restricted from all strenuous sports, while those with other
types (for example, coronary artery abnormalities) may, once the abnormalities are corrected, return
to full athletic activity under medical supervision). The American Medical Association guidelines
identify conditions which its drafters believe should disqualify athletes from sports participation.
See AMA GUIDE, supra note 117. Those guidelines relate not only to cardiovascular and neurologi-
cal conditions, but also to conditions of the eyes, ears, respiratory system, liver, skin, spleen, hernia,
musculoskeletal system, kidneys, and genitals. Id. The guidelines also distinguish among levels of
acceptable participation for contact, noncontact endurance, and other sports. The AMA guidelines
have been approved by the New York Department of Education and have been used to disqualify
athletes seeking to participate in interscholastic sports there. See Colombo v. Sewanhaka Cent. High
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relating to return to play following such illness or injury, the athlete
should be declared incompetent to make such decisions and a surrogate
named to make those decisions on the athlete's behalf?
186
2. The Argument for a Surrogate Decisionmaker One legitimate
reason exists for appointing a surrogate to make decisions for college ath-
letes concerning medical treatment and return to play. The pressures on
college athletes, especially those in revenue producing sports at Division
I universities, are so great that any decision the athlete makes must be
suspect as not being truly voluntary. The pressures on the athlete come
from within and from without.
It is not uncommon for athletes to "play hurt." Some do it for the
love of the game. 8 7 Others because "much of [the] athlete's life has been
dedicated to fulfilling an athletic dream" '188 or perhaps a more personal
dream. As one columnist wrote after the death of Hank Gathers,
What comes across consistently and clearly, however, from close
friends from grade school to college was that Gathers had determined early
that basketball would be his route to fame and that he worked feverishly to
follow that road.
Last year, Gathers, when asked how basketball fit into his scheme of
things, said: "I saw basketball as a way of getting out of the neighborhood. I
used to come home from basketball practice after my freshman year in high
school at about 9 or 10 o'clock at night. I'd look up at tall buildings and I'd
say to myself: 'I've got to get out of here. I'm tired of this place. There's got
to be more to life than this place right here.' ,,189
For many, there is surely a feeling of immortality and invincibil-
ity.190 For example, in February, 1990, Joseph Rhett, while a 20 year
old, 6 foot, 8 inch forward for the University of South Carolina basket-
ball team, was diagnosed, after twice passing out, as having a variation of
Sch. Dist. No. 2, 383 N.Y.S.2d 518, 520 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976); Spitaled v. Nyquist, 345 N.Y.S.2d
878, 879 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973). But see Colombo, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (testimony of the chair of the
Committee on the Medical Aspects of Sports of the Medical Society of New York in Colombo that
the AMA guidelines "were archaic and should be revised to eliminate or substantially change the
disqualifying factors listed in [the] Guide."). See in fra notes 346, 445-56 and accompanying text for
further discussion of when certain conditions may justify forbidding athletes to engage in certain
sports.
186. See infra notes 241-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standards which
might be used by a surrogate in making such decisions.
187. King, supra note 120, at 693.
188. Lawrence K. Altman, College Star's Death Puts Team Physicians Under New Scrutiny,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 1, 1990, at C3 [hereinafter Altman, Physicians Under New Scrutiny].
189. Rhoden, supra'note 1, at D27.




arrythmia.' 91 A pacemaker was implanted. 9 2 After acquiring a second
medical opinion, the university allowed Rhett to return to play, 193 wear-
ing a circular foam pad on his chest over the place where the pacemaker
was implanted.' 94 Two weeks after the pacemaker was implanted into
Rhett, Hank Gathers died. Rhett considered leaving basketball because
Gathers' condition "'was the same situation related to the heart.... It
scared me a little bit. But basically I felt - and the doctors told me -
that his situation was different from mine. He was on medication at the
time.' "195 Rhett admits that his condition changed his life, but not
enough to make him give up basketball:
As far as the effect it's had on my life, I realize that life is more impor-
tant. It's made me pay more attention to people. On the court, I think it's
made me play more aggressively, to prove to people that I can play basketball.
Life is more important, but this is something I love to do... [Y]ou
can't live your life in fear. If something happens, it happens.' 96
Athletes themselves admit, frequently after suffering injury, that
they believed themselves to be invincible and that someone else should
have protected them from their own decisions. According to Terry
Cummings, a forward for the San Antonio Spurs professional basketball
team who plays despite a heart problem, "Athletes... don't like the 'no'
word. It is the word that means: You can't play .... To a young,
strong, and presumably healthy athlete enjoying celebrity status, who is
making a difference on his team, and with a glowing future, it is a word
to be avoided." 197
Marc Buoniconti knew that he had suffered a neck injury but re-
turned to football. He maintains that "he was cleared to play despite a
191. William C. Rhoden, One Player's Victory Over Fear, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 1990, at 41.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 43.
195. Id.
196. Id. (emphasis added). Rhett's mother concurred in his decision:
Mary Rhett said that after her son received medical clearance to play this fall, she
told him to look beyond Gathers's death. "Sure Gathers's death shook him up, and
things like that still bother your mind," she said. "But that happens in life. Things
came along that try to defeat you."
"A lot of people come up to me and say, 'If it was my son, I wouldn't let him play.'
But I have no problem with it. We can't live our lives in fear. Nobody's life is tragedy-
free; none of us is promised tomorrow, or this afternoon. You've got to have courage,
otherwise you just sit around in life and just exist. Joe's doing the best he can do."
Id.
197. Eskenazi, supra note 29, § 8, at 1.
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severe neck problem, the seriousness of which was never made clear to
him." '198 Following the accident which left him a quadriplegic, he stated,
"'What I've always said is that a young college player will always want
to play. It's up to the doctors and trainers to stand between the athlete
and the field."" 99  Mark Tingstad, in explaining why he returned to
football after being told that he had a problem with his neck and back
which could result in permanent, severe injury said, "'When you're an
athlete and you're involved in sports with a physical activity, you think
you're impervious, you're talented and you think nothing can happen to
you.' .2oo
In addition to athletes' feelings of invincibility which may lead them
to play hurt or to return to play following injury, media attention may
encourage them to do so, as well. During the 1990 NCAA intercollegi-
ate men's basketball tournament, an article in Sports Illustrated reported:
There was UNLV's Greg Anthony, his jaw wired so tightly shut that mi-
graine pain shot through his head, who helped push the No. 1-seeded Run-
nin' Rebels into the semifinals in the West. Dale Davis led Clemson back
from 19 points in arrears to beat LaSalle and take a place in the East Re-
gional semis, this despite a stress fracture in his left foot.20
1
If personal dreams, feelings of invincibility, and media attention are
not enough to give highly rated college athletes incentive to return to
play too soon or to return when they never should because of serious
198. Id. § 8, at 1-2.
199. Id. § 8, at 1.
200. Id. § 8, at 2. Others tend to agree with the assessments of Buoniconti and Tingstad. Re-
cently, there have been allegations that Cliff Gustafson, baseball coach at the University of Texas,
overuses his pitchers to improve his team's won-loss record. Todd Van Poppel was a high school
baseball star pitcher highly sought after by both professional and college baseball teams. As of late
spring, 1990, Van Poppel was planning to turn down professional offers and attend the University of
Texas. Concerned over Gustafson's reputation for overusing his pitchers, Van Poppel's father dis-
cussed the matter with Gustafson, and later said,
Gustafson's answer was that nobody ever made Dressendorfer [a University of Texas
pitcher whose pitching became ineffective because of tendinitis allegedly caused by
overuse] pitch.... He said he always asks his pitchers if they're O.K. to pitch. He
asked Dressendorfer, and he said he could pitch. But that's weak. It shouldn't be the
kids' decision.
Phil Rogers, The Class of '90: To Earn or to Learn, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 4, 1990, at 54, 60.
Todd Van Poppel was himself hit by a batted ball while pitching in a high school baseball game.
Although injured he stayed in the game three more innings. "'I should have come out of that game
right away,' he said later. 'I thought my hand was O.K., and I wanted to win. But I'm a kid, and
nothing like that ever happened to me before.' "Id. at 60. Van Poppel ultimately accepted an offer
to play for the Oakland Athletics. Murray Chass, Reeling Padres Transform from Contenders to
Rebuilders, N.Y. TIMEs, July 22, 1990, § 8, at 3.
201. Alexander Wolff, Reaching for the Stars, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, March 26, 1990, at 22,
25-26.
COLLEGE ,4 THLETES
illness or injury, the lure of professional sports contracts is an incentive.
Those college football and basketball players drafted by professional
teams could secure contracts paying them millions of dollars over a sev-
eral year period.20 2 In Gathers' case he is reported to have broken down,
sobbing in the locker room following his December collapse.2 °3 When
comforted by a friend, Gathers reportedly said, "'You don't understand.
I just blew the NBA.' "2I Gathers was also reported to be depressed
because he had been told by Los Angeles Clippers Coach Don Casey that
he would be chosen somewhere between tenth and fifteenth in the 1990
NBA draft.2"5 Gathers had counted on being taken among the top nine
players, which would have meant more money for his family.20 6 Accord-
ing to one sports writer, "He decided to work even harder in an effort to
reach that select group. Whether he also further reduced his Inderol
[sic] dosage - and whether, in any event, this had any bearing on his
death - is uncertain." 207 Ironically, if Gathers had left basketball after
his initial collapse in December, 1989, he probably could have collected
the proceeds from a $1 million disability policy he had taken out with
Lloyd's of London the previous spring when he decided to stay at Loyola
Marymount for his senior year. The policy was designed to compensate
him should his career end because of injury; it did not cover death.20 8
All of the internal pressures affecting athletes' desire - or need -
to play while hurt can only be exacerbated by the pressures from outside
202. During the 1989-90 NBA season, player-salaries averaged $900,000, up from $750,000 the
year before. Sam Goldaper, N.B.A. Has Money to Burn in Lean Time, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1990,
§ 8, at Sll. Three dozen players earned more than $2 million per season. Id. Derrick Coleman, the
number one pick of the N.B.A. draft commanded a five year, $15 million contract, and Bo Kimball,
Hank Gathers' teammate at Loyola Marymount, the number eight draft pick, signed a four year
contract worth $7.25 million. Id. The salary situation is virtually the same in professional football.
In the 1990 National Football League draft, Jeff George, a junior leaving school one year early, was
drafted number one by the Indianapolis Colts and signed to a six year contract worth $15 million,
making him, at that time, the third highest paid player in the NFL. Douglas S. Looney, Suddenly
No. 1, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, April 30, 1990, at 50, 51. The number six pick in the draft, Mark
Carrier, was signed by the Chicago Bears to a $3.5 million, five year contract. Peter King, Inside the
NFL Draft, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, April 30, 1990, at 56, 57. Currently, average annual player
salaries for four professional team sports are $900,000 (basketball), $594,000 (baseball), $304,000
(football), and $211,000 (hockey). Stat of the Day, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1991, at D2.
203. SmithDeath of a Dream, supra note 1, at 11.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 12.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 11.
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sources. 20 9 Successful revenue producing athletic programs are impor-
tant to universities as a whole. Colleges and universities earn huge sums
based upon post season tournament play.210 And, television coverage
has become an increasingly important source of college sports revenue.
For example, the NCAA has entered into a $1 billion contract with CBS
in return for granting CBS rights to broadcast the NCAA basketball
tournament over seven years.2"' Much of that money will go to individ-
ual colleges and universities.2 2 Notre Dame University, traditionally
one of the nation's football powerhouses, signed a $38 million contract
with NBC giving that network the exclusive right to televise Notre
Dame's home football games over the following five years.213 The more
successful a school's football or basketball program, the more television
209. Tommy Chaikin, a former college football player who suffered severe side effects from
using anabolic steroids reported that although he accepted responsibility for his steroid use,
part of the trouble comes from things outside of me - the pressures of college football,
the attitudes of overzealous coaches and our just-take-a-pill-to-cure-anything society.
I was young and felt nothing bad could happen to me.... [C]ollege athletes feel
tremendous pressure to succeed. Some guys have parents who are pushing them real
hard. Other guys are just very competitive and have great pride. Nobody wants to sit on
the bench and be a failure.
Chaikin, supra note 130, at 85, 88.
210. The Universities of Michigan and Illinois, Duke University, and Seton Hall University
each earned approximately $1.23 million as the four finalists in the 1989 NCAA basketball tourna-
ment. Martin J. Greenberg, College Coaches at the Bargaining Table - Employment Contracts, THE
SPORTS LAWYER, Fall 1989, at 1 (citing Patrick McManamon, PALM BEACH POST, April 30, 1989,
at 8C). The Big Ten Conference and the Big East Conference earned $4.5 million and $3.7 million,
respectively, for their teams' participation in that tournament. Id. at 1-2. Twenty-four College
Football Association teams earned a combined $33 million for post-season bowl appearances in
1989. Id. at 2.
211. Wolff, supra note 201, at 26. See also Willian C. Rhoden, $1 Billion Just Isn't What it Used
to Be, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1990, at B8.
212. Douglas Lederman, NCAA Budget Panel Backs Plan for Sharing TV Money, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., July 18, 1990, at A38. See also Douglas Lederman, Athletics Notes: NCAA Panel
Backs Scheme for Dividing $1-Billion TV Bonanza, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 5, 1990, at A38.
In the first year of the contract, $64 million was to be distributed to Division I colleges and confer-
ences based on formulas rewarding colleges for the breadth of their sports programs and rewarding
conferences for the performance of their members in basketball tournaments for the six previous
years; $8 million was to be distributed to Division I colleges for academic support for athletes; $45
million was to be used to support a range of NCAA programs including increased funding for Divi-
sion II and III championships, catastrophic injury insurance for all NCAA athletes, and a fund for
needy Division I athletes. Id. For a detailed breakdown of NCAA payments to Division I colleges
and universities from the television contract money during the 1990-91 academic year, see N.C.A.A.
Committee Proposes Plan for Basketball Revenue, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1990, at D24; N.CA.A.
Payments to All Division I Colleges Based on Breadth of Sports Programs, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Sept. 25, 1991, at A44.
213. Craig Neff, Expansion and Divisions, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 11, 1990, at 11.
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exposure the team receives and, accordingly, the more money it makes.
A recent report indicated that the nation's major college football confer-
ences, inspired by contracts such as that between Notre Dame and NBC,
are "raiding" other conferences and attempting to draw nonconference
schools into "super-conferences," giving those conferences and those
schools a larger network television audience and more television reve-
nue.2" 4 Widespread television coverage also enhances an institution's
ability to recruit prized high school athletes.
Coaches, individually, may pressure their star athletes to "play
hurt" or to return to play too soon following illness or injury.215
Coaches, too, feel pressure from their institutions to develop highly suc-
cessful (in terms of won-loss record) revenue producing sports pro-
grams,2 16 and many reap great personal benefits from these programs.
2 17
214. William C. Rhoden, Big College Football Leagues Are Trying to Get Bigger Still, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 1990, at 1. This report predicted that there would eventually be formed three major
football conferences to coincide with the three major television networks, CBS, ABC, and ESPN,
which regularly televise college football games. Id.
215. See SHARP, supra note 140, at 12.
[Tihe relationship which exists between a coach and a player is so psychologically pow-
erful that a coach's praise is a very intense driving force. Thus, a coach who rewards
unsafe [or unhealthy] play by praising a player, in effect, mandates the repetition of that
behavior at a later opportunity. It is, therefore, nonsensical to argue that the player[s]
understood fully the risks of engaging in that behavior when the issue of "voluntarism"
is the critical factor to address. A coach's rewards dictate behavior in a psychological
sense and a player's only real choice is to please the coach. Because of the nature of the
relationship, coaches must immediately sanction players for engaging in dangerous ac-
tivities, regardless of whether the dangerous practice results in a competitive advantage
for the team.
Id.
216. WONG, supra note 152, at 13. The Job Related Almanac lists NCAA basketball coach as
the 15th most stressful job out of 260 ranked. Greenberg, supra note 210, at 1 (citing BASKETBALL
WKLY., May 2, 1989, at 4). At the beginning of the 1988-89 college basketball season, 39 of the
NCAA's 294 Division I schools (13.4 percent) had new head coaches. The previous year, 66 of the
Division I schools (22.8 percent) had new coaches. During the 1980's, there were 384 coaching
changes in Division I schools. Id.
217. See, eg., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 181 n.1 (1988).
The trial court found that Tarkanian as head basketball coach, is annually paid (in
lieu of his salary as a professor) $125,000, plus 10% of the net proceeds received by
UNLV for participation in NCAA-authorized championship games, plus fees from bas-
ketball camps and clinics, product endorsements, and income realized from writing a
newspaper column, speaking on a radio program entitled 'THE JERRY TARKANIAN
SHOW,' and appearing on a television program bearing the same name.
That compensation was "entirely contingent on [Tarkanian's] continued status as the
Head Basketball Coach at UNLV." As a tenured professor alone, he would have earned
about $53,000 a year, the court found.
Id. (citations omitted).
By the time he announced his retirement from the head coaching position at UNLV, to be effective
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Finally, college athletes - and their parents - may be subject to
pressure from athletic "boosters." Following Hank Gathers' death, his
brother, Derrick, testified in a deposition that Hank had received as
much as $50,000 from Albert Gersten, a Loyola Marymount booster for
whose father the college's sports arena is named. 218 Derrick Gathers and
his mother, Lucille, also testified that Gersten had helped to subsidize a
$1,050 per month apartment and a car for Hank when Hank had dis-
cussed leaving Loyola Marymount for the NBA following his junior
year.219 Finally, Lucille Gathers testified that while Hank was attending
Loyola Marymount on a full basketball scholarship, holding no outside
employment, he gave her a living room set, a watch, a VCR, and $2,000
cash. Gersten was the source of the gifts. 22
0
The "trickle down" effect as it affects college athletes is real: colleges
pressure coaches to produce winning programs, athletes to perform, doc-
tors to heal injuries quickly;221 coaches pressure athletes and doctors;
at the end of the 1991-92 basketball season, Tarkanian was earning $203,976 per year from the
university, making him Nevada's highest paid state employee. See William C. Rhoden, A Final
UN.L. V Season is Reported for Tarkanian, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1991, at B12. Coaching "pack-
ages" such as that described by the Supreme Court in Tarkanian may amount to 50-75 percent of a
coach's overall compensation. Greenberg, supra note 210, at 3. For example, in one year Bobby
Cremins of Georgia Tech is reported to have earned a university'salary of $95,000, but overall
compensation of $320,000; Hugh Durham of Georgia, $75,000 and $225,000; Lute Olson of Ari-
zona, $130,000 and $40,000; and Norm Sloan of Florida, $99,000 and $200,000. Id. at 2. A pri-
mary source of that outside income is the sneaker contract. Gerald Eskenazi, Once a Canvas Shoe,
Now a Big-Time Player, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1990, § 1, at 1, 26 (more than 100 college coaches
receive fees from athletic shoe companies ranging from $5,000 to "six figure[s]," including John
Thompson of Georgetown University, reportedly the highest paid at $200,000 per year, and Jim
Valvano, formerly of North Carolina State University, $150,000 per year). Rick Pitino, basketball
coach at the University of Kentucky, earns an annual salary of $100,000 from the university, yet the
job is "actually worth more than three times that amount, enhanced in part by Pitino's six-figure
sneaker deal." Id. at 26. Eskenazi quotes an agent who has negotiated deals with sneaker companies
for both coaches and players as saying, "'[s]o before a coach even comes to the school, he already
has a television or radio deal, and his sneaker contract .... This way, the university can tell the
faculty it isn't paying all this money to the coach. But the university - through the athletic depart-
ment - actually negotiated his contract.'" Id. See also Steven G. Poskanzer, Spotlight on the
Coaching Box: The Role of the Athletic Coach Within the Academic Institution, 16 J.C. & U.L. 1, 2-3,
6-7, 15, 18-20 (1989) for further discussion of coaches' compensation packages and pressures placed
upon coaches to win.
218. Smith, A Bitter Legacy, supra note 11, at 63, 68, 70; Marianne Lavelle, From Court to
Court, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 1991, at 1, 24.
219. Smith, A Bitter Legacy, supra note 11, at 68, 70.
220. Lavelle, supra note 218, at 24. If these allegations prove true, Loyola Marymount could be
forced to forfeit every basketball game from the 1989-90 season and to return the $800,000 the
college collected when the team advanced to the Final Eight of the NCAA Tournament. Smith, A
Bitter Legacy, supra note 11, at 70.
221. See infra notes 228-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of the physician
in treatment and return to play decisions.
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other players, wanting their teams to be successful, pressure peers to
"play hurt"; injured players, themselves, apprehensive that they will lose
their spot in the starting lineup or their stage to perform for the profes-
sional scouts, play when hurt and urge physicians to do whatever is nec-
essary to help them perform. 222 "It is... debatable as to whether or not
the usual disciplinary authority of the coach, the pressure of school
spirit, the probable odium attached to a refusal to play, both by ...
fellow-players and... school mates, might not... rob' 223 an athlete of
volition in terms of decisions relating to return to play after illness or
injury.
Perhaps a physician can disclose to an athlete relevant information
about the athlete's medical condition, suggested treatment, and the bene-
fits, risks, and alternatives, not only to the proposed treatment but also to
a return to play. Perhaps, too, an athlete can comprehend that informa-
tion and appreciate the risks involved in returning to play in a manner
sufficient to make an informed decision. Still, the concern is legitimate
that the pressures on the athlete are so great that the "voluntariness" of
any decision to return to play is suspect. In resolving the question, how-
ever, of whether a surrogate would be a better decisionmaker than an
athlete, even given the problems with the athlete as decisionmaker, it is
important to consider the advantages and disadvantages attached to
those who could serve as a surrogate and the standards by which a surro-
gate would decide whether the athlete could return to play.
2 24
C. The Surrogate as Decisionmaker
1. Who Should Be the Surrogate? The logical choices of a surro-
gate decisionmaker for a college athlete would be the athlete's parent(s),
coach, physician, or a specially appointed "athlete advocate."
An athlete's parents or guardians would clearly be the most obvious
choice to act as surrogate decisionmaker in terms of health care decisions
and return to play. In most instances they know their children and have
their children's best interests in mind more than any other person.
Throughout the child's life, the parents have acted as surrogate deci-
222. Cf. Morley Ben Pitt, Malpractice on the Sidelines: Developing a Standard of Care for Team
Sports Physicians, 2 COMM./ENT. 579, 586, 588-90 (1980) (discussing the same issues as they relate
to the professional athlete).
223. Martini v. Olyphant Borough Sch. Dist., 83 Pa. D. & C. 206, 211 (1952). Although Mar-
tini involved a high school football player, the court's language is surely applicable to many college
athletes as well.
224. See Section VI, infra, for a proposed resolution to the question of whether the athlete or a
surrogate should make the ultimate decision concerning return to play.
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sionmakers so it is only natural that they continue to do so. The diffi-
culty, of course, with allowing parents to act as surrogate decisionmakers
is that they might vicariously be affected by some of the same pressures
affecting the athlete - for example, the desire to see the child succeed or
the lure of financial remuneration if the child is a professional pros-
pect.225 Once again, then, the decision may not be entirely "voluntary,"
even if made by the athletes' parents.
Coaches are candidates to be substitute decisionmakers because
they, too, usually know their athletes well and have the athletes' best
interests at heart. Some coaches and athletes have almost a parent-child
relationship. Coaches are inappropriate as substitute decisionmakers,
however, because of the inherent conflict of interest present when they
need their star athletes to play and play at peak performance 2 26 in order
to enhance the team's chances of winning and, accordingly, the coach's
reputation and all that is associated with that reputation.227
The third logical substitute decisionmaker would be the physician
treating the athlete.228  Despite the physician's ethical obligations in
225. See Altman, Physicians Under New Scrutiny, supra note 188, at C3, for an indication that
some pressure on team physicians comes from athletes' parents. See also Chaikin, supra note 130, at
88; Lavelle, supra note 218, at 24; Smith, A Bitter Legacy, supra note 11, at 68, 70. Smith also
reports that following Gathers' death, bad feelings developed between the Gathers family and Bo
Kimble, Gathers' friend and teammate, because the Gathers family, needing money, wanted to sign
a movie deal for $70,000, but Kimble refused to sign the necessary documents to allow the deal to go
forward. Id. at 66.
226. See Altman, Physicians Under New Scrutiny, supra note 188, at C3. See also Altman,
Doctors Negligent, supra note 4, at 43, reporting that Paul Westhead, Hank Gathers' basketball
coach allegedly asked Gathers' cardiologist to reduce Gathers' medication because it was making
him sluggish and interfering with his performance on the court.
227. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of pressures on coaches that
in turn lead to pressures on college athletes.
228. The NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook provides that during NCAA championship
competition:
The student-athlete's team physician [or, in the absence of a team physician, the NCAA
tournament physician] shall examine the injured party and make a recommendation to
the student-athlete, to his or her coach, and to the chair of the governing sports commit-
tee (or a designated representative) as to the advisability of continued participation or
disqualification.
NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 45, Policy No. 5 (emphasis added); see also 1990-
91 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 131, § 31.1.7. Although the policy frames the physician's evalua-
tion of the student as a "recommendation," the policy further provides that "[t]he chair of the
governing sports committee (or a designated representative) shall be responsible for the administra-
tive enforcement of the medical recommendation if it involves disqualification." NCAA SPoRTS
MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 45, Policy No. 5; see also 1990-91 NCAA MANUAL, supra note
131, § 31.1.7, (indicating that a "recommendation" of disqualification is, in reality, a decision to
disqualify). Finally, the policy provides that "when a student-athlete is removed or withheld from a
competition or practice because of injury or illness, clearance for that individual to return to activity
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treating athletes as patients, several problems are present when the physi-
cian is the surrogate decisionmaker. The first is the physician's status and
his or her relationship with the athlete. While in theory the physician
has a physician-patient relationship with the athlete, as with any other
patient, the realities of the physician's employment situation may indi-
cate otherwise. Generally, the athlete has not chosen any particular phy-
sician. Either the physician is an employee of the college or university or
more likely, especially for smaller institutions, the physician is an in-
dependent contractor hired for a limited time to perform preparticipation
physicals, attend home games, and accept referrals.229 This type of "as
is solely the responsibility of the team physician or that physician's designated representative."
NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 45, Policy No. 5.
Sports law commentators are of a divided opinion on the question of whether physicians or ath-
letes should be the final decisionmaker on the issue of an ill or injured athlete's return to play. See,
e.g., King, supra note 120, at 698-700.
Athletes, who because of age or mental capacity are not legally capable of giving valid
consent, should be afforded the same protection as nonathletes. They should not be
approved for participation when similar activities would be contraindicated for
nonathletes. Athletes legally capable of consenting should not be authorized by a team
physician to participate in a sport in at least the following situations. First, when there
are significant risks of harm from participation, the athlete should not be approved by
the team physician for participation irrespective of what the athlete may ostensibly want.
Secondly, when there is a question as to the athlete's lucidity or capacity for sound
judgment, the physician should not approve participation when a similar level of activity
would be contraindicated for a nonathlete.
The foregoing compromise may strike some as excessive medical infringement on an
athlete's autonomy. But it must be remembered that it is the primary responsibility of
the team physician to safeguard the health of the patient. Moreover, even if the athlete is
indeed a free person, it does not follow that the team physician should abdicate profes-
sional responsibilities to promote health by condoning the taking of unnecessary serious
risks.
Id. at 698-700. See also NYGAARD & BOONE, supra note 139, at 341 ("The physician representing
the school should have the authority to disqualify any athlete from participating and should not be
overruled by any other physician. The institution must give the physician and other members of the
sports medicine team total support for any medical decisions that are made."). But see Charles V.
Russell, Legal and Ethical Conflicts Arising from the Team Physician's Dual Obligations to the Ath-
lete and Management, 10 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 299, 318 (1987) (disagreeing with King, supra, and
arguing that certain factors make athletes unique, justifying different treatment of athletes and
nonathletes with same or similar injuries; factors include athletes' physiology and degree of cardio-
vascular and musculoskeletal conditioning, athletes' knowledge about their own bodies and their
ability to determine the magnitude of risk associated with athletic participation, and athletes' experi-
ential background in recovering from previous injuries); SCHUBERT, supra note 169, at 256 ("The
choice to play injured rather than sit out the remainder of the season to fully recover is the athlete's
choice, not that of the team, coach, or medical professional.... Under no circumstances should the
physician, trainer or therapist choose for the patient ....").
229. The physician is an independent contractor if he or she is not under the control of the fee
paying institution. BERRY & WONG, supra note 140, § 4.13-I at 305; WEisTART & LOWELL, supra
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needed" relationship may not in many instances provide physicians with
the information - medical or otherwise - they may acquire and use in
making recommendations for patients when they work with patients on a
long term basis.230 And, since few team physicians are "sports medicine
specialists," they may not understand the psychology of the athlete "de-
termined to play at all costs."23'
A second problem which may arise were the physician to be the
surrogate decisionmaker is the conflict of interest between the college or
university which pays the physician's fee and the athlete receiving the
care.232 College or university officials through, for example, coaches,
athletic directors, or trainers, could pressure physicians to prescribe spe-
cific treatments or return athletes to play before they are ready because
they want their star athletes in action in order to improve the team's
performance and, accordingly, the school's reputation and revenue pro-
ducing opportunities.233 Physicians are subject to pressures from others
- families, 2 34 boosters, 235 and athletes, themselves, 236 - to treat athletes
quickly and return them to play. And, physicians, themselves, are often
fans of the team and want the team to succeed.237
Overall, then, despite their professional obligations to their patients,
team physicians may not know the athletes well, may have at least the
appearance of divided loyalties between those who pay their salaries and
those whom they serve, and may be subject to pressures from a number
of sources, including the patients, to treat athletes and return them to
play expediently, rather than effectively.
note 136, § 8.08 at 992. Altman reports that at every level of play, team physician is a part-time job,
the responsibilities of the team physician are loosely defined, and the physicians themselves do not
know who has the ultimate responsibility for decisions concerning who is fit to play. Altman, Physi-
cians Under New Scrutiny, supra note 188, at C3.
230. In many instances, the physician will not become involved with the athlete until after an
injury has occurred. Pitt, supra note 222, at 587.
231. Altman, Physicians Under New Scrutiny, supra note 188, at C3.
232. WONG, supra note 152, at 380; RAYMOND E. YASSER, TORTS AND SPORTS 51-52 (1985);
Russell, supra note 228, at 303, 316-17.
233. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of colleges' and universities'
efforts to produce revenue through major athletic competition.
234. Altman, Physicians Under New Scrutiny, suprs note 188, at C3.
235. Id.
236. Id.; see also James H. Davis, "Fixing" the Standard of Care: Motivated Athletes and Medi-
cal Malpractice, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 215, 217-19 (1988); Russell, supra note 228, at 318. In
fact, many players will "shop around" until they find a physician who will clear them to return to
play. Altman, Physicians Under New Scrutiny, supra note 188, at C3. See also Altman, Doctor's
Warning, supra note 20, at C3.
237. BERNIE PARRISH, THEY CALL IT A GAME 74-77 (1971).
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One powerful incentive for the physician not to treat the athlete ex-
pediently rather than effectively would, of course, be the threat of a mal-
practice action against the physician if the athlete were to suffer
subsequent injury or illness which could be connected to the physician's
treatment of the athlete. That incentive could, however, cause the physi-
cian to treat the athlete too conservatively or to make decisions concern-
ing return to play based on fear of liability rather than on the medical
condition, capabilities, and best interests of the athlete. The team physi-
cian does not appear to be an appropriate substitute decisionmaker.
The final possible substitute decisionmaker would be an "athlete ad-
vocate" employed by the university to work with athletes and to help
protect their interests. In theory, the concept of the advocate sounds
good. In the health care and return to play context, the advocate could
help athletes understand their conditions and the various risks, benefits,
and alternatives associated with treatment and return to play.238 The
advocate could gather all information relevant to the decisions being
made - medical information concerning the athlete's condition and pro-
posed treatment, the risks of a return to play, the athlete's wishes - and
could make the decision which would best serve the athlete's interests.
239
In reality, however, the advocate is not necessarily any better
equipped or any less pressured than the athletes themselves, or any of the
other potential surrogates. No one knows the athlete as well as the ath-
lete does. No one understands the medical information as well as the
physician. Although the advocate, by definition, must work with athletes
238. Even if the athletes do not possess decisionmaking power, it is in the athletes' best interests
to understand their medical condition and proposed treatment regimen. Medical patients who un-
derstand their conditions and therapies are more cooperative in their own care, leading to faster,
more effective recovery and fewer malpractice actions against treating physicians. George J. Annas,
Avoiding Malpractice Suits Through the Use of Informed Consent, 1977 LEGAL MED. ANN. 219, 226-
27 (and sources cited therein); Lawrence D. Egbert et a., Reduction of Postoperative Pain by Encour-
agement and Instruction of Patients, 270 NEw ENG. J. MED. 825, 825-27 (1964); Joel F. Handler,
Dependent People, the State, and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 999, 1005-08 (1988). For further discussion of the effects of disclosure and non-
disclosure of information on factors such as patient compliance and recovery, see also 1 PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 61, at 99-102, 119; Charles W. Lidz et al., Barriers to
Informed Consent, 99 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 539, 540 (1983); Hyman B. Muss et al., Written
Informed Consent in Patients with Breast Cancer, 43 CANCER 1549, 1555-56 (1979); Don A.
Rockwell & Frances Pepitone-Rockwell, The Emotional Impact of Surgery and the Value of In-
formed Consent, 63 MED. CLINICS OF N. AM. 1341, 1342, 1345-46. 1348, 1349 (1979); Barbara
Stanley et al., The Elderly Patient and Informed Consent, 252 JAMA 1302, 1305-06 (Sept. 14, 1984);
John F. Wilson, Behavioral Preparation for Surgery: Benefit or Harm?, 4 J. BEHAV. MED. 79, 96-97
(1981).
239. See infra notes 241-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standards which
could be employed by surrogates in making these decisions.
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free from pressures imposed by the employer (the university) or by any of
the university's employees (coaches, athletic directors or trainers), aca-
demic advisors or tutors in relatively the same position have been pres-
sured or punished in the past for causing athletes to become ineligible for
play.2
40
Ideally, any of these persons chosen as a surrogate decisionmaker
for ill or injured athletes would enter into a consultative process with the
others. Parents, coaches, physicians, advocates, all with the same theo-
retical goal of serving the athlete's best interests, should share informa-
tion and concerns in an attempt to reach the most appropriate result.
They should also, of course, consult with the athlete.
Assuming that a surrogate is appointed to make decisions for the
athlete concerning medical care and return to play, by what standard
should the surrogate be guided?
2. What Should Be the Standard? Surrogate decisionmakers have
traditionally been authorized to apply one of two standards, one subjec-
tive, the other objective, in making decisions for those unable to make
decisions for themselves. Both standards are problematic when applied
to the college athlete presumed competent for every decisionmaking sce-
nario except that concerning medical treatment and return to play.
A subjective, substituted judgment standard is frequently applied in
surrogate decisionmaking situations, particularly if there is evidence of
the decision the incompetent would make if competent to decide.2 41 In
fact, the purpose behind the substituted judgment standard is to effectu-
ate the decision the incompetent would have made if competent.242 Fac-
tors to be considered by the substitute decisionmaker include the
incompetent's preferences (expressed while competent) concerning the
decision to be made; the incompetent's religious beliefs; the impact of any
decision on the incompetent's family; the probability of adverse side ef-
fects of any treatment chosen; the consequences if a decision is made to
decline treatment (or return to play); the prognosis with a particular
treatment (or a decision to return to play).243
These factors could certainly all be ascertained and weighed in the
240. See, eg., Kemp v. Ervin, 651 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (affirming, with modified
punitive damages, jury verdict in favor of university English teacher fired from her position for
criticizing university for unfair, favorable treatment afforded athletes).
241. See, eg., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (N.J. 1985).
242. Id. See also Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431
(Mass. 1977).
243. In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 57 (Mass. 1981).
[Vol. 40
COLLEGE A THLETES
surrogate's attempt to decide what treatment and play decisions the ath-
lete would make if competent to do so, but such a weighing process
would be unnecessary. Most instances of incompetency in which the
substituted judgment approach has been followed have involved cases in
which incompetents were either physically2' or mentally24 incapable of
communicating their preferences to the surrogates. In the case of the
college athlete that is clearly not true. The athletes are capable of expres-
sing their precise wishes concerning return to play. It is rather because
we do not trust the athlete's decisionmaking abilities that we have turned
to a surrogate decisionmaker. In that case, perhaps an objective, reason:-
able person approach to substitute decisionmaking would be appropriate.
The purpose behind the objective substitute decisionmaking stan-
dard is to serve the best interests of the incompetent, based not on what
the incompetent would have wanted, but rather on what the reasonable
person acting under the same or similar circumstances would have cho-
sen.246 The objective approach is basically a weighing of the benefits and
burdens associated with the various alternatives available to the deci-
sionmaker.247 Applying the best interests standard to the college athlete
is problematic, however, because the objective standard is generally held
to be appropriate where the surrogate is unable to determine what the
incompetent's preferences would have been.24 That is clearly not the
case with college athletes who can tell surrogates exactly what they want.
The objective standard is further problematic in instances where the "in-
competent's" wishes are known. The purpose behind substitute decision-
making is, in part, to recognize that incompetents, like those who are
competent, have rights of self-determination and autonomy that deserve
to be exercised, by others, if not by the person himself or herself.249
There is something incongruous about saying we will allow a substitute
244. See, e-g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (elderly patient in near comatose condi-
tion unable to communicate with surrogate decisionmaker).
245. See eg., In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981) (mental illness); Superin-
tendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (mental retardation).
246. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 430 (rejecting an
objective approach to substitute decisionmaking). See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH:
DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 136 (1983).
247. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1232.
248. Id at 1232.
249. But see Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990) (rejecting
the argument that those who are incompetent have the same right to autonomous decisionmaking as
those who are competent precisely because those who are incompetent cannot "make an informed
and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right").
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decisionmaker to exercise a college athlete's right of self-determination
and then ignoring the express wishes of the athlete.
The true difficulty with college athletes and decisionmaking is, of
course, not that the athletes are incompetent, but that we do not trust the
decision they might make. In the health care context, health care provid-
ers and institutions frequently have disagreed with decisions that compe-
tent adults have made.250 Traditionally, the law has recognized four
"compelling state interests" that could be advanced against competent
adults' decisions concerning their own medical care: preserving life,
preventing suicide, protecting the interests of innocent third parties, and
preserving the integrity of the medical profession.25 1 With the exception
of protecting the interests of innocent third parties, generally minor chil-
dren who will be left dependent if their parent or guardian should die,252
the courts have come to give precedence to the rights of competent adults
to make decisions concerning their own bodies and their own health care,
even if such decisions would result in death.25 3 Those decisions, how-
ever, might be distinguishable from the situation of the relatively
healthy254 college athlete. In those cases where courts have found a com-
petent adult's medical treatment decision sufficiently important to over-
ride the state's or the medical profession's interest in preserving life, the
patients have generally been near death or suffering from terminal or
intolerable physical conditions.2 55 The continued exceptions to these de-
250. See, e.g., In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir.), rehg en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), and cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (compe-
tent adult's request to have blood transfusion withheld); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr.
297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (competent adult's request to have artificial feeding tubes withdrawn); Satz
v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affid, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (competent
adult's request to have respirator removed).
251. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162; Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
252. This rationale could be applicable if the college athlete has minor children. For example,
Hank Gathers was the father of a seven year old son. Lederman, Second Lawsuit Filed, supra note
16, at A38.
253. See, eg., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 297; Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at
162.
254. Healthy, that is, but for the athlete's preexisting medical condition at issue.
255. See, ag., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 297 (patient suffering from cerebral
palsy; quadriplegic; in constant pain; unable to consume enough nutrients to sustain herself without
being tube fed); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), af'd, 379 So. 2d 359
(1980) (elderly patient suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis; unable to move; very short life
expectancy even with assisted respiration). To the extent it is relevant to the college athlete maling
treatment and return to play decisions, courts have tended to hold that a (non)treatment decision
resulting in a patient's death is not suicide, either because the death results not from the decision but
from natural processes, or because the patient had no intent to die, but rather an intent not to
continue living under present conditions. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162-63.
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cisions, however, are the cases in which patients who are Jehovah's Wit-
nesses refuse blood transfusions.256 There, even though the patients are
often not suffering from terminal or intolerable conditions, the courts
have supported the patients' wishes to decline treatment, even in the face
of death.25 7
One of the questions for the law, then, will be to determine whether
the state's overriding interest in the preservation of life would prohibit a
college athlete from effectuating a decision25 8 which could lead to perma-
nent injury or death, or whether the athlete cases will be treated similarly
to the Jehovah's Witnesses cases in which the competent adult's decision
will be respected notwithstanding the possible outcome of the decision. 59
The final question in relation to the surrogate decisionmaker is
whether the surrogate should be held responsible if the athlete is injured
subsequent to the surrogate's decision to allow the athlete to return to
play.
3. Liability of the Surrogate Three possibilities exist for imposing
liability on the surrogate if a medical treatment or return to play decision
results in subsequent injury to the athlete: the surrogate could be immune
from liability for injuries resulting from any decision; the surrogate could
be held strictly liable for any such injuries; or the surrogate could be
judged by an objective standard and be held liable for subsequent injuries
only if he or she failed to exercise reasonable care in making the decision.
While a decision to hold a surrogate immune from liability could
induce more persons to be willing to be surrogates and could facilitate
their decisionmaking, immunity may remove the incentive necessary to
exercise great care in making the decision. While we would hope that the
surrogate, regardless of the standard employed to make the decision,
would act only in the best interests of the athlete, immunity from liability
may make the outside pressures from the athlete, the athlete's family, the
college or university and its employees and supporters, harder to resist.
Strict liability, of course, raises the opposite problem. If a surrogate
256. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Littleton v. The Honorable Francis Poitrast,.No. 85-7 (Mass. Jan. 21,
1985); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990).
257. See cases cited supra note 256.
258. Or having a decision effectuated if it were to be made by a surrogate.
259. The Jehovah's Witnesses cases, although based in part on religious principles and First
Amendment rights, are not distinguishable on that basis. If competent adults have the right to have




were to be held liable for subsequent injury to an athlete even though the
surrogate used all due care in making the decision, few persons would
choose to be surrogates and those who did might be very reluctant ever
to authorize an athlete to return to play. The logical solution to the
question of surrogate liability, then, would be to hold the surrogate to a
reasonable person standard. That standard would encourage a surrogate
to use care in gathering information concerning the athlete's medical
condition, athletic activities, and other matters relevant to the decision,
in discussing that information in a thoughtful manner with others -
parents, school officials, and the athlete - who could aid in the decision-
making process, and in reaching a decision that would serve the athlete's
health and athletic interest. The standard would not be so strict, how-
ever, that it would discourage the surrogate from ever authorizing the
athlete to return to play.
Before offering a proposal to answer the questions of who should be
the ultimate decisionmaker when an ill or injured athlete needs medical
treatment and wants to return to play, and under what circumstances, if
any, should an athlete be denied the opportunity to compete, I will ad-
dress the issue of the athlete's recourse if he or she or the surrogate de-
cides that a return to play is appropriate and the college or university
says "No."
V. ATHLETES' RECOURSE WHEN SCHOOLS RESIST A
RETURN TO PLAY
The college athlete denied the opportunity to return to play follow-
ing an illness or injury could proceed to seek reinstatement on two theo-
ries supported by federal law: a right to play based on the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution" and a right to be free from discrimi-
nation based on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973261 and/or
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.262 Athletes might also have
260. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A number of cases brought by athletes challenging their
exclusion from intercollegiate sports programs have been based on Section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See, eg., Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975);
Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn.
1972). In the Section 1983 cases, the athletes have alleged that their college or university, usually in
conjunction with the NCAA, has taken action depriving them of rights secured by the United States
Constitution. See infra notes 264-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state actor re-
quirement of § 1983 as it is applied to colleges and universities and the NCAA and infra notes 272-
84 and accompanying text for a discussion of property and liberty interests claimed by college ath-
letes in relation to their playing intercollegiate sports.
261. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1991).
262. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1991).
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state law remedies263 available to them, but for the purpose of this Arti-
cle, I will focus on the athletes' potential federal remedies.
A. A Constitutional Right to Participate
Those athletes who have claimed a constitutional right to participate
in intercollegiate athletics generally confront two difficult issues. The
first is whether the defendant college or university or the NCAA, in pre-
cluding the athletes from participating, is acting under color of state
law.2 The second is whether the athletes' interest in participating in
intercollegiate athletics rises to the level of a constitutionally protected
interest.
If a student athlete is denied the opportunity to participate by a state
college or university, the state actor question is clear: the provisions of
Section 1983 apply. 65 If the college or university is a private entity, Sec-
tion 1983 will not apply without implication of another state actor.2 66
263. See, eg., Kampmeier v. Harris, 411 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (child with vision
in only one eye denied opportunity to participate in interscholastic athletic program, despite asser-
tion of right to participate pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Kampmeier v.
Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977), later granted that opportunity pursuant to state statute).
264. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (emphasis added). Athletes have pursued § 1983 actions both in an attempt
to enjoin a college or university from precluding their participation in athletic competition and in
damages actions following such preclusion. See, eg., Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.
1975) (injunctive relief); Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940 (D. Kan. 1987)
(damages); Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602 (D.
Minn. 1972) (injunctive relief). The Supreme Court has clearly stated that the "under color of law"
requirement of a § 1983 action is to be treated the same as the "state action" requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
265. Assuming, of course, that the athlete's desire to participate is a constitutionally protected
interest. See infra notes 272-84 for a discussion of the protectable nature of the athlete's interest.
266. Before the state actor status of the NCAA was ultimately decided by the United States
Supreme Court in NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), and some courts were holding the
NCAA to be a state actor, it was unclear whether a private college following NCAA regulations
would itself be considered a state actor because of its NCAA membership and compliance with
NCAA regulations. See Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1032 n.10 (5th Cir. 1975). At least two
authors argued that private colleges should have been so considered. Alex M. Johnson & James F.
Ritter, The Legality of Testing Student-Athletes for Drugs and the Unique Issue of Consent, 66 OR. L.
REV. 895, 915 (1987). Johnson and Ritter argued that:
The NCAA's primary purpose is to ensure uniformity among member schools with
respect to the rules and regulations which govern intercollegiate athletics. This uniform-
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Until 1982, the federal courts tended to hold that the NCAA was a state
actor. 67 Since 1982, when the United States Supreme Court decided a
trilogy of state action cases,265 the courts have held the NCAA not to be
a state actor.2 69 Finally in 1988, the United States Supreme Court itself
ity rationale suggests that private colleges are bound by the same constitutional limits as
state colleges, irrespective of the NCAA's or private colleges' state action status. It is
exceedingly difficult to envision an athletic conference existing on a regional or national
basis in which private colleges follow one set of rules and public colleges another, based
on their state actor status.
Id (citations omitted).
267. See, e-g., Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding based on sub-
stantial and pervasive entanglement through state institutions' dominant membership and participa-
tion in NCAA - one half of NCAA members are state or federally supported; public institutions
provide majority of NCAA's capital; majority of members on NCAA governing council and com-
mittees are state members). See also Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028. Parish was decided on the
basis of facts indicating that:
[S]tate-supported educational institutions and their members and officers play a substan-
tial, although admittedly not pervasive, role in the NCAA's program. State participa-
tion in or support of nominally private activity is a well recognized basis for a finding of
state action. [State and federal governments are interested in] all aspects of this coun-
try's educational system .... [and the college athletic system] is now beyond the effective
reach of any one state .... [Tihe NCAA by taking upon itself the role of coordinator and
overseer of college athletics... is performing a traditional governmental function.
*.. [S]tates [should not be able to] avoid the restrictions placed upon them by the
Constitution by banding together to form or to support a "private" organization to
which they have relinquished some portion of their governmental power.
Id. at 1032-33 (citations and footnotes omitted).
The Parish court found it to be irrelevant that public and private educational institutions join the
NCAA "voluntarily." Id. at 1032 n.10. See also Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 422 F. Supp.
1158, 1159 (D. Minn. 1976) (holding based on "pervasive influence" exercised on NCAA affairs by
numerous state supported university members), rev'd on other grounds, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977),
Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885, 894 n.4 (D. Colo. 1976) (holding based on state
entanglement theory); Rodney K. Smith, Eligibility and Disciplinary Rules in Amateur Athletics, in
LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMIATEUR SPORTS § 11.03(5)(a) at 11-19 (Gary A. Uberstine ed.,
1988).
268. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982);
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). In all three cases, the Court examined the relationship
between private institutions or persons and the state to determine whether the extent of the private
actors' involvement with the state made them state actors. For an example of the application of the
Court's 1982 state action cases in the context of college athletes, see infra note 269. See also Smith,
supra note 267, at § 11.03[5][a]; WONG, supra note 152 at 142-43; Johnson & Ritter, supra note 266,
at 909-16.
269. See, eg., Arlosoroffv. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1984) ("no precise formula to
determine whether otherwise private conduct constitutes 'state action' "; question is whether "con-
duct is fairly attributable to the state"; fact that NCAA was providing a public service in overseeing
nation's intercollegiate athletic programs, providing order for conduct of programs, and enforcing
uniform rules of eligibility not enough to constitute state action; regulation of athletics is not func-
tion "traditionally exclusively reserved to the state"; NCAA's status as private actor also not altered
because half of its members are public institutions and half of its resources come from public institu-
tions; it is still a voluntary association of public and private institutions; if the state in regulating or
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held the NCAA not to be a state actor.27° While it is true that the deci-
subsidizing a function does not order or cause the action complained of, the function is not one
traditionally reserved to the state and there is no state action); McDonald v. NCAA, 370 F. Supp.
625, 632 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (state institutions cannot direct the NCAA to do anything; NCAA exist-
ence is separate and apart from state educational system; state's intercollegiate athletic program does
not depend on NCAA for recognition, existence, maintenance; voluntary concurrence of state in
decisions of organization such as NCAA does not make organization's acts "state action"). The
court in McDonald also explained:
The conclusion to be drawn from the Supreme Court's consideration of ostensibly
private action as state action requires more than an analysis of what an organization
does, i.e., its functions. What must appear is that the state must be so inextricably in-
volved in the "private" action or must be able to so control the "private" action that this
activity necessarily becomes the functional equivalent of an act of the sovereign.
Id. at 630. See also Smith, supra note 267, § 11.03(5)(b) at 11-20.
270. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). For more in-depth discussion of the courts'
decisions relating to whether the NCAA is a state actor, see WONG, supra note 152, at 141-42;
Smith, supra note 267, § 11.03(5)(b), at 11-20; Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REv. 137, 187-88, 192-
95 (1989); Jose R. Riguera, Note, NCAA v. Tarkanian: The State Action Doctrine Faces a Half-Court
Press, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 197, 202-25 (1989).
Following the Court's decision in Tarkanian, Congress and several state legislatures have consid-
ered legislation which would declare the NCAA to be a "state actor" and would require the NCAA
to afford "due process" in investigating allegations of wrongdoing by colleges and universities and in
imposing penalties if such wrongdoings were proved. See Douglas Lederman, Athletics Notes: Bill
Introduced in Congress Would Require NCAA to Provide Due Process, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May
15, 1991, at A34; Tarkanian, atfHearing, is Critical of N.CA.A., N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1991, at BI5.
The State of Nebraska has enacted legislation, the Nebraska Collegiate Athietic Association Proce-
dures Act, requiring that:
Every stage and facet of all proceedings of a collegiate athletic association, college, or
university that may result in the imposition of a penalty for violation of such associa-
tion's rule or legislation shall comply with due process of law as guaranteed by the Con-
stitution of Nebraska and the laws of Nebraska.
1990 NEB. LAWS 397, § 3. The Act further provides that "No collegiate athletic association shall
impose a penalty on any college or university for violation of such association's rule or legislation
.." id. at § 4, or "for failure to take disciplinary action against an employee or student for violation
of such association's rule or legislation ... " id. at § 5, unless the due process requirements of the
Act are met. The Act makes any penalties imposed by any collegiate athletic association subject to
judicial review, id. at § 9, and it provides legal remedies to any college or university or any college
or university student or employee "aggrieved" by a collegiate athletic association's violations of the
Act, id. at §§ 6, 7, 8.
The legislatures of Florida and Illinois have adopted legislation which is even more specific than
the Nebraska law in terms of the due process rights to be accorded educational institutions and
athletes subject to investigation and sanction by college athletic associations. 1991 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. ch. 91-260 (West); 1991 Ill. Legis. Serv. ch. 144 (West). The statutes provide, for example, that
no penalty may be imposed without a formal hearing; that findings must be made in writing and
supported by clear and convincing evidence; that persons or institutions charged with misconduct
are entitled to have counsel present, to question and cross-examine witnesses, and to present a de-
fense; and that hearings shall be public unless the party charged objects. 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
ch. 91-260, § 4(1), (2), (4), & (8) (West); 1991 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-462, para. 2904, § 4(a), (b),
(d) & (h) (West). Both statutes also provide that findings made pursuant to a hearing and penalties
imposed on an institution or an individual shall be reviewable in circuit court. 1991 Fla. Sess. Law.
Serv. ch. 91-260, §§ 4(11) & 5(3) (West); 1991 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-462, para. 2904, § 4(j) &
170 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
sion related to the NCAA's threatened sanction of a state university if it
refused to suspend one of its coaches, there is no reason to believe that
the court would not reach the same decision were the case more directly
related to an athlete.2
Assuming that the defendant institution in any action brought by an
athlete is held to be a state actor, the athlete must still prevail on the
question of whether participation in intercollegiate athletics is a constitu-
tionally protected interest. 27 2  The courts have split on that question.
para. 2905, § 5(c) (West). Under either statute, an athletic association, as defined in the statute,
which violates the terms of the act may be subject to both money damages and equitable remedies.
1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 91-260, § 9 (West); 1991 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-462, para. 2909, § 9
(West).
For a fourth example of state legislation establishing procedural rules which must be followed by
a collegiate athletic association investigating and sanctioning educational institutions and individu-
als, see 1991 Nev. Stat. ch. 55. Like the other statutes, the Nevada statute provides for court review
of association determinations, 1991 Nev. Stat. ch. 55, § 14, and legal and equitable relief should the
athletic association violate the statute, 1991 Nev. Stat. ch. 55, § 12. The NCAA has filed suit in
federal court in Nevada challenging the constitutionality of the Nevada statute. NCAA Sues in Ne-
vada, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 13, 1991, at B9.
271. The NCAA does not deal directly with athletes or athletic personnel. Rather, it imposes
its rules and regulations affecting athletes and personnel on member institutions, and sanctions the
institutions rather than the individuals if its rules are violated. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at
183-84. See also BERRY & WONG, supra note 140, § 1.22-2 at 15. For example, if an athlete is
academically ineligible to play according to NCAA eligibility rules but the school permits the athlete
to play, the NCAA will sanction the school, not the athlete. Likewise, were there to be developed an
NCAA policy concerning return of athletes to play after illness or injury and the member institution
did not impose that rule upon its athletes, allowing them to return to play regardless of the NCAA
rule, the institution, rather than the athlete would suffer sanctions.
272. "The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). In terms of property interests the Supreme Court has said:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an ab-
stract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He
must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient
institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives,
reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law - rules or understandings that secure
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Id. at 577.
The Court defined "liberty" broadly - not just as freedom from restraint, but also as the ability
to contract, to engage in an occupation, to acquire knowledge, to marry, to raise children, to worship
God, "'and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men.'" Id. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). The
Court in Roth held that renewal of a one year teaching contract did not implicate liberty or property
interests. In addressing the liberty question, the Court found that the nonrenewal would not damage
Roth's reputation or standing in the community, nor would it impose a stigma or disability foreclos-
ing him from the freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. Id. at 573. On the
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Some courts have found that because participation in intercollegiate ath-
letics may lead to a professional sports career and because such participa-
tion is an important part of a college athlete's overall educational
experience, the right to participate is a protected property interest.
273
Other courts have found that an athlete's future professional sports op-
portunities274 are "too speculative" to create a property interest in the
athlete's continued participation in intercollegiate sports.27  Even if the
"professional prospects" argument alone were to be accepted by the
courts, it would apply in only a limited number of circumstances.2 76 Ap-
parently no court has had to decide whether the loss of an athletic schol-
arship would constitute a protectable property interest, because in all the
cases brought by athletes declared ineligible to participate, for whatever
property claim, the Court found Roth had no entitlement, as the Court had defined it, to a renewable
contract. Id. at 578.
273. See, eg., Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 422 F. Supp. 1158, 1161 (D. Minn. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977); Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of
Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602, 604 (D. Minn. 1972). See also William G. Buss, Due
Process in the Enforcement ofAmateur Sports Rules, in LAW AND AMATEUR SPORTS 1, 14 (Ronald
J. Waicukauski, ed., 1982).
274. Including the asserted rights to appear in post season tournament play or to appear on
television to enhance those prospects.
275. See, eg., Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1034 (5th Cir. 1975); Colorado Seminary v.
NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976). Statistics support these courts' conclusions. Only 8
percent of the college athletes who participate in major collegiate football and basketball programs
are drafted by professional teams each year and only 2 percent ever sign professional contracts.
Edward Hill, Pressures on the Black College Athlete, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1983, § 5, at 2. In real
numbers, of the thousands of college basketball players eligible to be drafted by the NBA each year,
a maximum of 54 will be drafted and only 35-40 rookies will remain on active rosters. Charles
Grantham, It's Time to Give College Players a Cut, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 1990, § 8, at 10. The
average professional career for athletes is four years. Ira Berkow, The Buses that Haul in Players,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1990, § 1, at 41.
See also Hysaw v. Washburn University of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940 (D. Kan. 1987) (no claim of
entitlement based on contract theory because players' scholarships remained in effect despite their
disqualification); Williams v. Hamilton, 497 F. Supp. 641 (D.N.H. 1980) (no claim of entitlement
arising under state law to confer property right in opportunity to participate in intercollegiate
soccer).
276. Professional opportunities are available for a small number of male college athletes in foot-
ball, basketball, baseball, ice hockey, and to a limited extent, golf and tennis. Professional opportu-
nities for women are even more limited, primarily to tennis and golf. Furthermore, athletes in
nonteam sports like tennis and golf are not dependent upon a professional league draft. Rather, they
play their way into the professional sport. While intercollegiate competitions and coaching may
sharpen their skills, they may attempt to play on the pro circuits whenever they choose. Indeed,
some tennis professionals have not yet finished junior high school! In 1990, Jennifer Capriati at age
14 became the youngest player ever seeded at Wimbledon, only weeks after playing into the
semifinals at the French Open. Robin Finn, No Easy Path Over This Grass, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
1990, § 8, at 2. Although she lost in the quarterfinals at Wimbledon to 21 year old Steffi Graf,
Capriati won 42 matches and 1 tournament in 1990. George Vecsey, Capriati Comes Up Big Against
a Sizable Foe, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at B9.
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reason, the athletes have not been deprived of their scholarships despite
their lack of eligibility.2 77 It is unlikely that college athletes on scholar-
ship would be deprived of their scholarships were they to suffer a career
ending injury or illness." While most of the eligibility cases have ad-
dressed the constitutional question in terms of whether the opportunity
to participate is a "property" interest, at least some authors would ad-
277. See, eg., Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981);
Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d at 1034 n.17; Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940,
944 (D. Kan. 1987). The athletes in Colorado Seminary argued that because they were scholarship
athletes (as opposed to "walk-ons") they had a "right" to play. The court rejected that argument as
well. Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. at 895 n.5.
278. The NCAA prohibits the awarding of financial aid to student athletes for more than one
academic year at a time. 1990-91 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 131 § 15.3.3.1. While an institution
may not assure an athletic prospect that it will automatically continue the financial aid past the one-
year period if the athlete is injured and unable to compete, "an institutional representative may
inform the prospect of the regular institutional policy related to renewal or continuation of aid past
the one-year period for recipients who became ill or injured during their participation." Id.
§ 15.3.3.1.2. A staff member may also "inform a prospect that the athletics department will recom-
mend to the financial aid authority that the prospect's financial aid be renewed each year for a period
of four years and may indicate that the authority always has followed the athletics department's
recommendations in the past." Id. § 15.3.3.1.1. The prospect must also be informed, however, that
renewal of the athletic scholarship will not be automatic. Id.
The NCAA regulates the number of athletic grants-in-aid to be utilized by each sport at each
Division I and Division II institution. (Division III institutions may not award athletes financial aid
based on athletic ability. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 1991-92 NCAA
GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGE-BOUND STUDENT-ATHLETE 11 (1991)). The NCAA provides incentive
to colleges and universities to continue financial aid for athletes who are precluded from playing
because of illness or injury by providing that if
the player apparently never again will be able to participate in intercollegiate athletics
[he or she] shall not be considered a counter beginning with the academic year following
the incapacitating injury or illness.
Id. § 15.5.1.4. A counter is an individual who is receiving institutional financial aid that is counta-
ble against the aid limitations established in a sport by the institution's membership division. Id.
§ 15.02.2.
In my research for this article I have found no case references to an athlete's losing his or her
financial aid despite ineligibility for illness or other reasons. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of
Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1348; Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1034 n.17; Hysaw v. Washburn
Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 944. See also Altman, Doctor's Warning, supra note 20, at C3
(Tony Penny would have continued to receive his athletic scholarship at Central Connecticut State
University had his heart disease prevented him from returning to play). I did find media references
to athletes who lost their athletic scholarships because of their criminal activity. See, ag., Douglas
Lederman, Issues About Preferential Treatment ofAthletes Raised on 2 Campuses Following Crime by
a Basketball Star, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 18, 1991, at A41; Douglas Lederman, Court Orders
2nd Hearing for U. of Washington Athlete, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 18, 1991, at A41, A42.
Representative Tom McMillen (D-MD) has introduced a bill in Congress which would prohibit
colleges and universities from withdrawing athletic scholarships during an athlete's enrollment at the
institution (fo a period of up to 5 years), unless an athlete fails to perform at an academically
successful level, violates the institution's rules, or is convicted of a felony or drunk driving. A Bill to
Change the NCAA, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 31, 1991, at A24.
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dress it as a "liberty" interest.279 Schubert, Smith, and Trentadue argue
that the courts' reluctance to view participation in athletics as a liberty
interest could change
given the rise in popularity and importance of sporting activity as a form of
expression, the desire or interest of many athletes in participating in sports
as a means of obtaining a scholarship for educational purposes, or... the
desire of athletes to use participation at the collegiate level as a stepping
stone to a professional contract or coaching position.280
Similarly, Buss regards an athlete's potential professional career as a pro-
tected liberty interest.281 The issue, as Buss defines it, is not the statisti-
cal chances that any given athlete will have a professional career, but
rather the opportunity for that athlete to succeed professionally.282
If the Supreme Court's liberty interest analysis from Roth were ap-
plied to the college athlete context, the important question would be
whether denying athletes the opportunity to engage in intercollegiate ath-
letics because of a preexisting medical condition would harm their repu-
tation or impose a stigma or disability that would foreclose their freedom
to take advantage of other employment opportunities.8 3 Even if such
opportunities were foreclosed, it might be hard to determine whether
they were foreclosed by the college's decision to preclude the athlete
from playing or by the athlete's preexisting medical condition.284
Finally, if colleges and universities were found to be state actors,
and college athletes found to possess protectable property or liberty in-
terests, the athletes' challenges to their ineligibility would presumably be
based either on the substance of the decision denying them the opportu-
nity to participate or the procedure through which the decision was
reached. A challenge to the substance of the institution's decision would
be analogous to the medical treatment scenario in which a patient
279. See, eg., SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 169, at 67; Buss, supra note 273, at 11-14.
280. SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 169, at 67. But see Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka,
690 F. Supp. at 945 (finding no liberty interest in continued opportunity to play football despite
contention of players that former coach dissuaded coach at another college from recruiting them to
play there).
281. Buss, supra note 273, at 11-12.
282. Id. at 12-13. For more detailed discussion of whether a college athlete's desire to partici-
pate in intercollegiate sports is a protectable property or liberty interest, see BERRY & WONG, supra
note 140, § 1.32-2, at 60; WEisTART & LOWELL, supra note 136, at 20-25, 93-107; WONG, supra
note 152, 154-55; Frank J. Remington, NCAA Rule Enforcement Procedures, in LAW OF PROFES-
SIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 12.10(2), at 12-12-15 to 12-16 (Gary A. Uberstine ed., 1988).
283. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972).




chooses a specific type of treatment or no treatment at all and the health
care provider seeks to override that decision. The patient's - and here
the athlete's - right to self-determination and autonomy are not abso-
lute and may be overridden by a compelling interest advanced by the
state actor.2 s5
If the challenge is to the procedure by which the institution reached
its decision to preclude the athlete from further play, standard proce-
dural due process rules would apply.2 6 The athlete would be entitled to
notice of the institution's intent to make a decision on the athlete's eligi-
bility and to a meaningful opportunity to be heard on that issue.28 7 The
athlete would not necessarily be entitled, however, to a full adversarial
hearing on the question. Rather, in determining "what process is due" in
any given situation, the court would apply a balancing test, weighing
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requisites would entail.288
If the law entitles athletes to procedural due process protection, by
definition the right to play will constitute a protected property or liberty
interest and, therefore, be judged to be of great individual importance.28 9
The institution's interest may also be judged to be great, because the
school may not want to jeopardize its students' health or lives or its own
reputation by allowing an athlete to risk greater harm by returning to
play.290 The institution would also have some administrative interests in
285. See supra notes 250-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of patients' rights to self-
determination and autonomy and competing state interests. I leave further discussion of this issue to
the substantive discussion of my proposal infra Part VI.
286. Federal regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in the postsecon-
dary education context do not contain procedural standards. In the elementary and secondary edu-
cation context, however, the regulations do provide procedural safeguards in identifying, evaluating,
and placing handicapped persons. 34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.36 (1990). Those stan-
dards include a requirement of notice to the person's parents or guardian and an opportunity for the
parent or guardian to examine relevant records. The regulations also provide for an impartial hear-
ing with the opportunity to participate by the parents or guardian, representation by counsel, and a
review process. 34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.36 (1990).
287. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 349 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
267-68 (1970).
288. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 263-71).
289. See supra notes 272-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the property and liberty
interests which may attach to the athlete's desire to participate in intercollegiate competition.
290. See infra note 425 and accompanying text for further discussion of the institution's interest
in refusing a request by a previously ill or injured athlete to return to play.
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keeping hearing requirements to a minimum, but administrative conven-
ience is not an acceptable reason for overriding a fundamental right.29'
The consideration of whether additional procedures will enhance
the accuracy of the decisionmaking process will be important in deter-
mining how much process is due the athlete who desires to return to
play. At a minimum, athletes would probably be entitled to a statement
explaining the institution's decision and at least a summary of the evi-
dence upon which the institution based its decision.29 2 Athletes would
probably also be given the opportunity to gather and present evidence,
including reports from their own medical experts, to support the request
to return to play.293 The institution and the athlete may disagree over
whether the athlete should be afforded an actual hearing before an impar-
tial decisionmaker where the athlete would be represented by legal coun-
sel. They may also disagree over whether the athlete would be given the
opportunity to cross-examine the sources of the information upon which
the institution based its decision.
Whether the athlete would be entitled to the trappings of a full ad-
versarial hearing would depend on the court's determination of how im-
portant such a hearing would be to the accuracy of the institution's
decision, and how administratively burdensome it would be to the insti-
tution.294 In making the determination as to accuracy, a comparison to
the Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v. Eldridge295 seems appropri-
ate. The issue before the Court in Mathews was whether the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment required an evidentiary hearing prior to
termination of a claimant's Social Security Disability benefits. The ques-
tion of continued eligibility for benefits in the Social Security context, like
the determination in the student-athlete context, was based on a medical
assessment of the worker's physical or mental condition.
This is a more sharply focused and easily documented decision than the
typical determination of welfare entitlement. In the latter case, a wide vari-
ety of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility
and veracity often are critical to the decisionmaking process. Goldberg
291. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972).
292. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 346.
293. See id
294. For more extensive discussion of the procedural due process protections accorded college
athletes, albeit primarily in the disciplinary context, see Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of
Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602, 608 (D. Minn. 1972); SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 169,
at 70-73; Smith, supra note 267, § 11.03[7][b] at 11-39 to 11-42; WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note
136, § 1.28, at 96-106.
295. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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noted that in such circumstances "written submissions are a wholly unsatis-
factory basis for decision."
By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue disability benefits will
turn, in most cases, upon "routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports
by physician specialists," concerning a subject whom they have personally
examined. In Richardson [v. Perales] the Court recognized the "reliability
and probative worth of written medical reports," emphasizing that while
there may be "professional disagreement with the medical conclusions" the
"specter of questionable credibility and veracity is not present." To be sure,
credibility and veracity may be a factor in the ultimate disability assessment
in some cases. But procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of
error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of
cases, not the rare exceptions. The potential value of an evidentiary hear-
ing, or even oral presentation to the decisionmaker is substantially less in
this context than in Goldberg.296
The Mathews Court acknowledged that factors other than medical diag-
nosis might be important to the decisionmaker's determination
297 of
whether the worker could engage in substantial or gainful employment,
but stated that such information was "amenable to effective written
presentation.
29
Colleges may well argue that information offered by athletes rele-
vant to the question of whether they should be permitted to play notwith-
standing the status of their health is similarly "amenable to effective
written [as opposed to oral] presentation." That information would pre-
sumably relate to the athlete's medical condition; his or her athletic his-
tory, including how long the athlete had engaged in this or a similar
sport since having this condition; the documented experience of others,
especially athletes in a same or similar sport, with the same condition;
this athlete's history of recovery from other illnesses or injuries; the ath-
lete's treatment and conditioning plans; and his or her understanding of
the nature of the condition and the risks of a return to play. While much
296. Id. at 343-45 (footnote and citations omitted). In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court decided
that because credibility and veracity were issues before the decisionmaker in a termination of welfare
rights case, the claimants' due process rights entitled them to an oral, as opposed to written, presen-
tation of evidence, and to the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against them.
397 U.S. 254, 268-70. The Court also held that the claimants were entitled to retain counsel (though
counsel need not be provided for them) and that they were entitled to an impartial decisionmaker.
Id at 270-71.
297. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 344 n.28 (factors included worker's age, educational
level, work experience). See also Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985) (showing
of reasonable probability of harm to handicapped employee by position sought "cannot be based
merely on employer's subjective evaluation or, except in cases of a most apparent nature, merely on
medical reports"; determination to be based on person's medical history and work history).
298. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 344 n.28.
[Vol. 40
COLLEGE ATHLETES
of that information would be amenable to written presentation,29 9 some,
especially that relating to the athlete's understanding of his or her medi-
cal condition and the risks of returning to play, would be more appropri-
ately presented orally, with a chance for questions and elaboration.
In terms of the administrative burdens of more formal proceedings,
the athlete's argument is probably strong. Cases involving colleges or
universities refusing an athlete the right to compete for medical reasons
are small in number. Furthermore, since the athlete's scholarship may
be continued regardless of the institution's decision concerning return to
play,30° no extra cost or savings will be implicated.
A college athlete who has been denied the opportunity to return to
play following illness or injury by a college or university may challenge
the institution's decision on constitutional grounds. Problems, however,
relating to whether the institution is a state actor, whether the athlete has
a constitutionally protected interest in returning to play, and whether the
institution's procedure and decision violate procedural due process prin-
ciples make it far from certain that the athlete will prevail on such a
claim. An action brought pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973301 or the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990302 may be
more likely to provide the athlete with relief.
B. A Statutory Right to Participate
1. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973303 Section 504 pro-
vides that:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States,
as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance .... 304
Section 706(8)(B) of the Act defines "individual with handicaps" as "any
person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record
of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impair-
299. For example, information on the athlete's medical diagnosis or the documented experience
of others similarly situated.
300. See supra note 278 for a discussion of NCAA policy and illustrative cases concerning con-
tinuation of athletic scholarships despite player ineligibility.
301. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
302. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1991).




ment. ' '30 5 For purposes of Section 504 "the term 'program or activity'
means all of the operations of ... a college, university, or other post-
secondary institution, or a public system of higher education... any part
of which is extended Federal financial assistance.
' 30 6
Federal agencies have adopted regulations effectuating Section 504.
For example, both the Department of Education 3 7 and the Department
of Health and Human Services30 8 have enacted regulations designed to
implement Section 504 as it applies, inter alia, to postsecondary educa-
tion. Both sets of regulations state generally that "[a] recipient, in pro-
viding any aid, benefit, or service, may not, directly or through
contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the basis of the handi-
cap: (i) Deny a qualified handicapped person the opportunity to partici-
pate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service."309 More specifically,
in terms of athletic activities, both sets of regulations provide that:
No qualified handicapped student shall, on the basis of handicap, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or otherwise be
subjected to discrimination under any academic, research, occupational
training, housing, health insurance, counseling, financial aid, physical edu-
cation, athletics, recreation, transportation, other extracurricular, or other
postsecondary education program or activity to which this subpart
applies.
310
Finally, the regulations state in terms of athletic opportunities that:
In providing physical education courses and athletics and similar pro-
grams and activities to any of its students, a recipient to which this subpart
applies may not disacriminate [sic] on the basis of handicap. A recipient
that offers physical education courses or that operates or sponsors intercol-
legiate, club, or intramural athletics shall provide to qualified handicapped
students an equal opportunity for participation in these activities.
31 1
There can be little doubt that an athlete who has suffered a serious
injury or illness and is precluded from playing because of that condition
is an "individual with handicaps" as defined by Section 504 and its im-
305. 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
306. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(b)(2)(A) (1988) (emphasis added). This section of the statute was added
in 1988, Pub. L. 100-259, § 4(2), to clarify that all parts of the institution are bound by the terms of
the statute if any part of the institution receives federal financial assistance, rather than only those
departments or areas that receive federal assistance directly.
307. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.1.10; 104.41-.47 (1990).
308. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1.10; 84.41-.47 (1990).
309. 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(1)(i) (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1)(i) (1990).
310. 34 C.F.R. § 104.43(a) (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.43(a) (1990) (emphasis added).
311. 34 C.F.R. § 104.47(a)(1) (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.47(a)(1) (1990).
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plementing regulations, 312 although there may be disagreement as to
312. According to the terms of Section 504 and its implementing regulations, an "individual
with handicaps" is "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or
(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1991); see also
34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(1) (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(1) (1990).
(i) "Physical or mental impairment" means (A) any physiological disorder or condi-
tion, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including
speech organs; cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lym-
phatic; skin; and endocrine; ....
(ii) "Major life activities" means functions such as caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.
(iii) "Has a record of such an impairment" means has a history of, or has been mis-
classified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities.
(iv) ".Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a physical or mental im-
pairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by a
recipient as constituting such a limitation; (3) has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward
such impairment; or (C) has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (j)(2)(i) of
this section but is treated by a recipient as having such an impairment.
34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2) (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2) (1990) (emphasis added).
Section 504 and the regulations do not include "playing" on the list of "major life activities" used
in defining "handicapped person." Nevertheless, athletes could argue that "playing" is analogous to
"working" and, therefore, that they do satisfy the "substantial limitation" definition of "handi-
capped person." Athletes, however, have generally failed in their claims for workers' compensation
due to athletic related injuries. See, eg., State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 314
P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957) (eligibility for workers' compensation arises out of employer-employee con-
tractual relationship; although student on athletic scholarship earned 70 cents per hour working on
college farm 20 hours per week, no evidence to establish that at time student athlete was killed in a
football game he was under contract for hire to play football or even that playing football was related
to his employment by the college); Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170
(Ind. 1983) (eligibility for workers' compensation arises out of employer-employee contractual rela-
tionship; in determining whether that relationship exists, primary consideration is intent that con-
tract of employment existed; NCAA prohibits college athletes from taking "pay" for athletic
performance and Internal Revenue Service does not tax athletic scholarships as income); cf Van
Horn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (although court
said not all student athletes are institutional employees, court found on specific facts of case college
and football player in employer/employee relationship, allowing suit for death benefits after student
killed in plane crash on way home from away game); University of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423
(Colo. 1953) (workers' compensation claim allowed where court found tie between performance on
football team and players' eligibility for paying jobs on campus).
Furthermore, even if the athlete's condition does not substantially limit a "major life activity" as
defined by the statute and regulation, the college's refusal to allow the athlete to return to play would
constitute "regarding [the athlete] as having an impairment" (treating the athlete as if such a limita-
tion existed), therefore satisfying the third definition of "individual with handicaps."
A Department of Health, Education, and Welfare interpretation issued in 1978 does address the
question of minors (elementary and secondary school students) who have lost an organ, limb, or
appendage and wish to participate in contact sports. 43 Fed. Reg. 36,035 (1978). The interpretation
provides that "Students who have lost an organ, limb, or appendage but who are otherwise qualified,
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whether it is the preexisting condition or the fear of future injury that
creates the handicapping condition. Only the rare college or university
does not receive any federal assistance.313 The question that would arise,
then, in terms of the athlete who desires to return to play and the institu-
tion that refuses that request, is whether the athlete is "an otherwise
qualified individual ' 314 and is therefore entitled by Section 504 to return.
Any analysis of the phrase "an otherwise qualified person" must be-
gin with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Southeastern
Community College v. Davis.315 There, in a case involving a hearing dis-
abled applicant's challenge to a college's nursing program requirements,
the Court defined "an otherwise qualified person" as "one who is able to
meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap. ' 316 In so
holding, the Court acknowledged that Section 504 "does not compel edu-
cational institutions to disregard the disabilities of handicapped individu-
als or to make substantial modifications in their programs to allow
may not be excluded by recipients from contact sports. However, such students may be required to
obtain parental consent and approval for participation from the doctor most familiar with their
condition." Id (emphasis added). The discussion following the interpretation emphasizes that "A
recipient cannot assume that such a child is too great a risk for physical injury or illness if permitted
to participate in contact sports." Id. (emphasis added). Although the interpretation is written in
language applicable to elementary and secondary school students, the "coverage" section of the
interpretation provides that "This policy interpretation applies to any public or private institution,
person, or other entity that receives or benefits from HEW financial assistance." Id.
Clearly, then, this policy interpretation should apply to those college athletes who lose an organ,
limb, or appendage and want to engage in contact sports. The interpretation does not, however,
address questions relating to other types of injuries (e.g., neurological or musculoskeletal) or illness
(e.g., cardiomyopathy). It also leaves open for interpretation the question of "otherwise qualified."
See infra notes 314-31, 352-70 for a discussion of the term "otherwise qualified."
313. Some students at almost all colleges and universities receive some federal financial aid.
314. The regulations implementing Section 504 use the term "qualified handicapped person"
rather than "otherwise qualified individual."
The Department believes that the omission of the word "otherwise" is necessary in order
to comport with the intent of the statute because, read literally, "otherwise" qualified
handicapped persons include persons who are qualified except for their handicap, rather
than in spite of their handicap. Under such a literal reading, a blind person possessing all
the qualifications for driving a bus except sight could be said to be "otherwise qualified"
for the job of driving. Clearly, such a result was not intended by Congress. In all other
respects, the terms "qualified" and "otherwise qualified" are intended to be
interchangeable.
34 C.F.R. pt. 104, app. A at 403; 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A at 362.
315. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). This analysis focuses primarily on "otherwise qualified handicapped
individual" in the education context. See infra notes 352-70 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the concept in the context of employment.
316. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. at 406 (emphasis added). In adopting
this definition of "otherwise qualified," the Court rejected a definition which would have included
"those who would be able to meet the requirements of a particular program in every respect except
as to limitations imposed by their handicap." Id.
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disabled persons to participate." ' 7 It only requires, the Court said, that
students not be excluded from participating in the federally funded pro-
gram because they are handicapped. 18
Although the Court made clear that Section 504, unlike Section
501319 and Section 503320 of the Rehabilitation Act, is concerned with
antidiscrimination rather than with affirmative action,321 it also neverthe-
less indicated that Section 504 might require educational institutions to
make some "accommodation" for handicapped individuals. 322 While not
setting forth a precise standard for determining what that accommoda-
tion might entail, the Court said that an institution's refusal to put in
place technological advances which would not impose "undue financial
and administrative burdens" on the institution might be judged to be
"unreasonable and discriminatory. 323 The Court also stated, however,
that an institution need not make "substantial modifications,"3 24 and
that Southeastern Community College's unwillingness to make "major
adjustments" in its nursing program did not "reflectfl any animus against
handicapped individuals. 325
The Court further clarified its accommodation requirement in Alex-
ander v. Choate,326 when it said that "while a grantee need not be re-
quired to make 'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifications to
accommodate the handicapped, it may be required to make 'reasonable'
ones." 32 7 If Southeastern Community College v. Davis and Alexander v.
Choate are read together, it appears that "otherwise qualified individual"
does not mean " 'one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements
317. Id. at 405.
318. Id.
319. 29 U.S.C.A. § 791 (West Supp. 1991).
320. 29 U.S.C.A. § 793 (West Supp. 1991).
321. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. at 410-11. Sections 501 and 503 re-
late, respectively, to federal employment and federal contractors and contain specific affirmative
action requirements.
322. Id. at 413.
We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal to extend affirmative action
and illegal discrimination against handicapped persons always will be clear. It is possi-
ble to envision situations where an insistence on continuing past requirements and prac-
tices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped persons of the
opportunity to participate in a covered program.
Id. at 412.
323. Id. at 412-13.
324. Id. at 410, 413.
325. Id. at 413.
326. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
327. Id. at 300.
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in spite of his handicap[,]' "328 but rather one who is able to do so once
the federal assistance recipient has made "reasonable accommodation"
for the handicapped individual.
The regulations implementing Section 504, as promulgated by the
Departments of Education and Health and Human Services, define
"qualified handicapped person" to mean "With respect to postsecondary
... services, a handicapped person who meets the academic and technical
standards requisite to admission or participation in the recipient's educa-
tion program or activity. '329 The appendices to the regulations further
state that "The term 'technical standards' refers to all nonacademic ad-
missions criteria that are essential to participation in the program in
question.
330
Any college or university wishing to preclude an athlete previously
ill or injured from returning to play and wishing to avoid a charge of
discrimination pursuant to Section 504 may be expected to argue that the
athlete is not "otherwise qualified" to take part in intercollegiate activi-
ties because his or her physical condition prevents him or her from meet-
ing all of the program's requirements even with any reasonable
accommodation the institution could make. Because athletes must pass
physical examinations before being cleared to play, the handicapping
condition in these cases will relate to the fear that the athletes, having
once passed such examinations, will suffer further injury if they return to
play. 3
31
While in the employment context there is substantial precedent con-
cerning the term "otherwise qualified" and the requirement of "reason-
able accommodation, '332 there is little precedent to aid in addressing
these issues in the education/athletic context. While at least four courts
have addressed the question of whether an educational institution might
violate Section 504 were it to preclude an athlete with a disability from
328. Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1261-62 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis, 442 U.S. at 406) (emphasis in the Brennan Court's opinion).
329. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(3) (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3) (1990).
330. 34 C.F.R. pt. 104, app. A at 403 (1990); 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A at 362 (1990).
331. The physical examination could be considered a "technical standard ... essential to the
participation... in question," which the athlete must pass in order to be a "qualified handicapped
person." 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(3) (1990); 34 C.F.R. pt.104, app. A at 403 (1990); 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(k)(3) (1990); 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A at 362 (1990). I would require that the physical exami-
nation be related to the performance of the sport and be consistent with the activity and safe per-
formance. Cf 29 C.F.R. § 32.14(b) (1990) (setting forth job qualification requirements in
employment context).
332. See infra notes 352-70 and accompanying text.
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participating in the institution's athletic program,333 only one of those
cases dealt with a college athlete.334 The student athletes prevailed in
three of the cases,33 but all of the cases are limited in terms of what they
add to the analysis of the issues raised here.
In Grube v. Bethlehem Area School District,336 in an action for in-
junctive relief, the court found no "substantial harm" was likely to result
to a seventeen year old student with only one kidney who wanted to play
football.337 The court held, therefore, that Grube was likely to prevail on
the merits of his Section 504 claim were the case to go to trial. The other
elements for granting a preliminary injunction having been met, the
court granted the injunction permitting Grube to play.338
In Wright v. Columbia University,339 Columbia had refused a college
sophomore with sight in only one eye the opportunity to play football,
arguing that participation in contact sports could put him at risk of los-
ing his sight entirely. While such motives were "laudabl[e]," the Wright
court wrote, they "derogate from the rights secured to plaintiff under
Section 504, which prohibits 'paternalistic authorities' from deciding that
certain activities are 'too risky' for a handicapped person."34  Upon
hearing the evidence presented on behalf of Wright, including the testi-
mony of an expert witness that playing football created no "substantial
risk" to Wright's remaining sight,341 the court entered a temporary re-
straining order allowing Wright to play.
In Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education,342 the court denied
a motion for summary judgment by the Board of Education in an action
for damages brought by a former high school student who had been pre-
cluded from taking part in the school's wrestling program because he had
only one kidney. In determining whether Poole should have been per-
mitted to wrestle, the court noted that while an injury to his healthy
kidney could have had "grave consequences," so might other injuries
333. Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist.,
550 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Poole v. South Plainfield Bd of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980).
334. Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
335. Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. at 418; Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520
F. Supp. at 789; Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. at 948.
336. 550 F. Supp. 418.
337. Id. at 425.
338. Id.
339. 520 F. Supp. at 789.
340. Id. at 794.
341. Id. at 791, 793.
342. 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980).
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that could have affected him or other members of the wrestling squad.3 43
"Life has risks[,]" the court said, and "[t]he purpose of § 504... is to
permit handicapped individuals to live life as fully as they are able, with-
out paternalistic authorities deciding that certain activities are too risky
for them." 3"
Although the decisions in Grube, Wright, and Poole all lend support
to the claims of the athlete with a preexisting health condition who seeks
to return to play, the results of the cases are not entirely satisfactory in
analyzing the issue. One important distinguishing fact is that in all three
cases the athletes had already had successful athletic careers, without the
feared injuries, after developing their conditions. In the case of athletes
like Hank Gathers or Marc Buoniconti that is not necessarily the case.
Certainly Buoniconti sought to return to play without prior experience
with the condition. It is unclear how long before his first collapse Gath-
ers had played basketball while affected with cardiomyopathy. Second,
the conditions affecting Grube, Wright, and Poole would not be fatal, or
permanently crippling, even if the worst case scenario occurred. 4a
Third, for some types of heart disease or some neurological disorders,
stronger evidence than was presented in any of these cases might exist
concerning the likelihood and severity of potential injury.346 Finally,
while the courts' language in both Wright and Poole concerning Section
504's protection of the students' rights to make autonomous decisions
free from the "paternal[ism]" of the institutions 347 indicates that in the
student athlete context autonomy may be absolute, the Wright court also
considered as part of its analysis that there was no "substantial risk" to
the student from his requested athletic participation. 341
It is possible, of course, that a court considering the case of a stu-
dent athlete with cardiomyopathy or a risk of severe neurological impair-
343. Id. at 953.
344. Id at 953-54.
345. Even if Grube or Poole had suffered damage to his remaining kidney, each could survive
long term on kidney dialysis and subsequent kidney transplant. While those situations, as well as
Wright's potential blindness, are serious disorders, they are not as debilitating as total paralysis or
death.
346. Almost all of these cases are decided on a motion for injunctive relief. The evidence pro-
duced at such hearings may not be as complete as that which would be offered if preliminary relief
were to be denied and the case were to go on for trial. See supra note 185 and accompanying text
and infra notes 445-56 and accompanying text for discussions concerning the likelihood of cata-
strophic injury or death's occurring if persons with certain conditions engage in contact sports.
347. Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. at 794; Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490
F. Supp. at 954.
348. Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. at 793.
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ment seeking relief pursuant to Section 504 could adopt the absolutist
aspect of the courts' decisions in Wright and Poole and declare that the
decision is one for the athlete and not for the institution to make.349
There is clear precedent in the employment context, however, allowing
employers, despite Section 504, to deny positions to employees who are
at risk to themselves because of the combined effects of their preexisting
medical conditions and the requirements of their jobs. ° Such authority
is persuasive in the college athlete context as well.
In order to prevail in an action brought pursuant to the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, claimants must prove that 1) they are "handicapped
individuals" under the Act; 2) they are "otherwise qualified" for the posi-
tion; 3) they were excluded from the position solely by reason of the
handicap; and 4) the program or activity in question receives federal fi-
nancial assistance.35' In the employment context, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations relating to the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 define "qualified handicapped person" as one "who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the position in question without endangering the health and
safety of the individual or others .... 352 Labor Department regulations
further provide that "to the extent job qualifications tend to exclude
handicapped individuals because of their handicap, they [must be] re-
lated to the performance of the job and [be] consistent with business ne-
cessity and safe performance. ' 3 3 An accommodation is "reasonable"
unless it "would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [the em-
ployer's] program." 3 4 Factors important in determining whether an ac-
commodation would impose an undue burden on the employer include
the size of the program in terms of number of employees, number and
type of facilities, and the size of the budget; the type of operation, includ-
349. Some commentators would adopt this view as well. See SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 169,
at 256.
350. There is also precedent allowing an employer to deny employment to one whose preexist-
ing condition could cause injury to others. See eg., Chiari v. League City, 920 F.2d 311, 317 (5th
Cir. 1991); Serrapica v. City of New York, 708 F. Supp. 64, 73 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 888 F.2d 126 (2nd
Cir. 1989); Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1988), af'd., 865 F.2d 592 (3rd Cir.
1989). Presumably, were an athlete's preexisting condition to pose a risk to other athletes (for exam-
ple in archery or cheerleading), the courts might allow an institution to refuse the athlete an oppor-
tunity to play notwithstanding Section 504.
351. Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983); Doe v. New York
Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774 (2d Cir. 1981).
352. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f) (1990).
353. 29 C.F.R. § 32.14(a) (1990).
354. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a) (1990).
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ing composition and structure of the work force; and the nature and cost
of the accommodation.355 The courts have adhered closely to the regula-
tions in analyzing claims brought by persons alleging loss of employment
opportunities in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.356
Pursuant to the EEOC regulations, 357 the courts clearly permit em-
355. Id. at § 1613.704(c) (1990).
356. See, eg., Chiari v. League City, 920 F.2d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 1991) (in determining if a
claimant is "otherwise qualified," court must consider whether the claimant could perform the es-
sential functions of the job and, if not, whether any reasonable accommodation could be made by the
employer to help the claimant perform those functions); Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423
(9th Cir. 1985) (same); Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230, 232 (3d Cir. 1983)
(accommodation is unreasonable if it would necessitate modifying essential nature of program or if it
would impose undue burdens, such as extensive costs, on the recipient of federal funds; court cau-
tioned against overly broad definition of "essential nature" of the program which could, by defini-
tion, exclude many or most handicapped persons); Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694
F.2d 619, 621-22 (9th Cir. 1982) (business necessity requirement ofjob qualification that could serve
to exclude handicapped persons from employment must be narrowly construed; not to be "confused
with mere expediency"); Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 310 (5th Cir. 1981)
(physical criteria used to justify exclusion from employment must be "job related," that is, "that
persons who suffer from the handicap plaintiff suffers and who are, therefore, unable to meet the
challenged standards, cannot safely and efficiently perform the essential functions of the position in
question"; if question of reasonable accommodation raised, employer must show accommodation
which would enable applicant to perform essential functions of job adequately and safely would
impose undue burden on employer).
357. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(0 (1990) (" 'Qualified handicapped person' means with respect to
employment, a handicapped person who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the position in question without endangering the health and safety of the
individual or others. .. .") (emphasis added). The definition of "qualified handicapped person" relat-
ing to employment in the regulations issued by the Departments of Education and Health and
Human Services do not include a reference to the safety of the individual or others. (" 'Qualified
handicapped person' means: (1) With respect to employment, a handicapped person who, with rea-
sonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question; .... 34 C.F.R.
§ 104.3(k)(1) (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1990)). Although the EEOC regulations were devel-
oped pursuant to Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, which requires affirmative action on the part
offederal employers in employing handicapped persons and the Education and Health and Human
Services regulations were developed pursuant to Section 504 which prohibits discrimination against
handicapped persons by federal financial aid recipients, but does not require affirmative action, see
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410-11 (1979), that difference alone would
not seem to justify the difference in including harm to individuals or others within the definition of
"qualified handicapped person" in one set of regulations and not in the others. The Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) regulations predated the EEOC regulations by almost a year.
The source of the DHHS (then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) regulations was 42
Fed. Reg. 22,677 (1977). The source of the EEOC regulations was 43 Fed. Reg. 12,295 (1978). For
further discussion of the rule making history of these regulations, see infra notes 412-13.
While recognizing the difference in terms of "risk of harm to sell" posed by the different sets of
regulations, the Chiari court nevertheless indicated that the "personal safety requirement" applicable
to Section 501 based regulations should be applicable to Section 504 based regulations as well.
Chiari v. League City, 920 F.2d 311, 316. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on the
Mantolete court's description of the Section 501 and Section 504 definitions as being similar except
to the extent that the former imposed an affirmative action requirement on employers while the
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ployers to consider risk of harm to the handicapped applicant from the
employment in question.358  The courts have not used any single stan-
dard, however, in determining how serious or how imminent a risk of
harm must be before an employer is permitted to refuse an applicant
employment because of it. Several courts have indicated that a "signifi-
cant risk '359 or a "substantial likelihood" 36° of personal injury could jus-
tify the exclusion of a handicapped person from a federally assisted
program. The courts have not made clear whether that risk can be satis-
fied by a possibility of its occurrence or must rise to a probability of
occurrence. In Doe v. New York University,361 the court held that the
university could take into account "any appreciable risk" that such harm
could occur, and that the risk need not amount to a 50 percent
probability of occurrence. 362 The court in Mantolete v. Bolger,363 how-
latter did not. Id. at 317 (citing Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d at 1421). The Chiari court concluded,
therefore, that "under section 504, an individual is not qualified for a job if there is a genuine or
substantial risk that he or she could be injured or could injure others, and the employer cannot
modify the job to eliminate that risk." IdL at 317. The majority opinion in Mantolete did not address
the precise question of whether the personal safety requirement of Section 501 would also apply to
Section 504 cases (Mantolete itself was a Section 501 case), but Judge Rafeedie, in concurrence,
wrote to "make clear" that the court's decision applied only to Section 501 cases and that whether
such requirements applied to Section 504 cases involving private employers was still an open ques-
tion. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d at 1425 (Rafeedie, J., concurring).
358. See, eg., Chiari v. League City, 920 F.2d 311, 317; Serrapica v. City of New York, 708 F.
Supp. 64, 73 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 888 F.2d 126 (2nd Cir. 1989); Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505, 518
(E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 865 F.2d 592 (3rd Cir. 1989). This analysis differs from Title VII cases in
which the Supreme Court has held that risk of injury to the applicant or employee alone is not a
sufficient reason for denying that person employment. See, eg., International Union, UAW v. John-
son Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1205-06 (1991); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977).
359. Chiari v. League City, 920 F.2d at 316, 317 (affirming district court's decision granting
summary judgment to defendant city in Section 504 action brought by construction inspector fired
because of physical limitations due to Parkinson's Disease; court decided "significant risk of personal
injury" can disqualify a handicapped individual from a job if the employer cannot eliminate the risk
and "under section 504, an individual is not qualified for a job if there is a genuine substantial risk he
or she could be injured... and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that risk.").
360. Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (ruling in favor of defendant United
States Postal Service on Section 501 claim brought by applicant denied position because of hyperten-
sion; court found "substantial likelihood" applicant's hypertension coupled with position's "rigorous
physical requirements" could cause him damage from heart attack, stroke, or organ failure). See
also Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 777 (2d Cir. 1981) (reversing entry of preliminary
injunction against defendant university on Section 504 claim brought by student seeking readmission
to medical school; court identified "crucial question" in determining whether student was "otherwise
qualified" to be readmitted as whether there was a substantial risk that her mental disturbance
would recur, resulting in behavior harmful to herself or others).
361. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
362. Id. at 777.
363. 767 F.2d 1416, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985) (remanding the district court decision on Section 501
claim brought by applicant with epilepsy who was denied employment with the United States Postal
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ever, stated that an "elevated risk of injury, without more," would not
justify a refusal to hire an otherwise qualified handicapped person.3 6
Rather, the court held, "The question is whether, in light of the individ-
ual's work history and medical history, employment of that individual
would pose a reasonable probability of substantial harm. '365
The other question courts have considered in determining whether
risk to the individual is sufficient reason to justify refusing employment
to a handicapped person is how "imminent" the risk of injury must be.
If the risk of injury is immediate, employers are justified in refusing em-
ployment to handicapped employees.366 But what if the employee is ca-
pable of performing today without risk, yet could face risk of personal
injury in either the short term or long term future?
The court in Bentivegna v. United States Department of Labor367
cautioned against allowing "remote concerns" for a handicapped em-
ployee's long term health to justify a decision not to hire the employee:
"Any qualification based on the risk of future injury must be examined
with special care if the Rehabilitation Act is not to be circumvented eas-
ily, since almost all handicapped persons are at greater risk from work-
Service for consideration of whether plaintiff was "qualified handicapped individual" in light of stan-
dard articulated by the court, and if so, whether reasonable accommodation could be made to enable
her to perform the job she sought).
364. Id. at 1422.
365. Id. (emphasis added). A number of state courts have addressed the risk of personal injury
question pursuant to state law. See, eg., Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n,
175 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (finding in favor of employee whose low back
scoliosis made him susceptible to back injury in job which required heavy lifting, because employer's
evidence showed no more than "possibili," employee might endanger health "sometime in the fu-
ture," a conjecture insufficient to justify refusing employment to handicapped person protected by
state equal employment opportunity law); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bureau of Labor, 600 P.2d
452, 453 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming Department order that employer discriminated against per-
son with history of heart attack and cardiac problems applying to be heavy appliance salesperson;
test is whether employee can perform job without risk of incapacitating himself or herself); Bucyrus-
Erie Co. v. State Dep't of Indus., 280 N.W.2d 142, 149-50 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming Depart-
ment decision in favor of employee with back problems; ability to perform job efficiently includes
"ability to perform without a materially enhanced risk of death, or serious injury to the employee or
others in the future"; employer must establish reasonable probability that because of employee's
physical condition, the position sought would be hazardous to the employee's health and safety);
Chicago & North western R.R. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 283 N.W.2d 603, 608 (Vis. Ct.
App. 1979) (upholding Commission ruling in favor of employee because employer may have shown
possibility but not reasonable probability that employee's epilepsy would pose health or safety haz-
ard to him in position as welder; court acknowledged that if possibility became actuality it would be
disastrous, but said that foresight deals with reasonable probabilities).
366. See, e.g., E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1103 n.16 (D. Haw. 1980).
367. 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982).
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related injuries."'368 The Bentivegna court did not hold, however, that a
"non-imminent risk of injury" could never justify denying employment
to a handicapped applicant, but indicated that any such condition should
be "more directly tied to increased risk of injury"369 and" 'be consistent
with business necessity and safe performance'" of the job.37
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990371 The Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) may well provide college athletes
with a preexisting medical condition, who desire to return to play in the
face of institutional refusal, a remedy as strong as, if not stronger than,
that provided by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The ADA is
modeled on the Rehabilitation Act, yet extends further in its coverage.
While the Rehabilitation Act applies, in terms of employers, to federal
employers372 and federal contractors 373 and, in terms of antidiscrimina-
tion in general, to entities receiving federal financial assistance,374 the
ADA applies to employers "engag[ing] in an industry affecting com-
merce" with fifteen or more employees; 375 "public entities," referring to
368. Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
369. Id. at 623 n.3.
370. Id. at 621 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 32.14(b) (1990)). Accord E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497
F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980):
The decision of the Assistant Secretary can be read as holding that risk of future
injury because of a physical or mental condition can never be the basis for rejecting a
qualified handicapped individual, irrespective of the likelihood of injury, the seriousness
of the possible injury or the imminence of the injury. Such a holding is clearly contrary
to the law. If, for example, it was determined that if a particular person were given a
particular job, he would have a 90% chance of suffering a heart attack within one
month, that clearly would be a valid reason for denying that individual the job, notwith-
standing his status as a qualified handicapped individual. [It might be that such a condi-
tion would prevent the individual from being capable of performing the job and thus
would remove him from the category of qualified handicapped individual.] A job re-
quirement that screened out such an individual would be consistent both with business
necessity and the safe performance of the job. Yet, it could be argued that the individual
had a current capacity to perform the job, and thus was a qualified handicapped individ-
ual.
The Court has no doubt that in some cases a job requirement that screens out quali-
fied handicapped individuals on the basis of possible future injury, could be both consis-
tent with business necessity and the safe performance of the job.
Id. at 1104 (footnote text in brackets).
371. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1991).
372. 29 U.S.C.A. § 791 (West Supp. 1991).
373. 29 U.S.C.A. § 793 (West Supp. 1991).
374. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1991).
375. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A) (West Supp. 1991). Until July 26, 1994, this section of the
statute applies to employers whose industry affects commerce and who employ at least 25 employees.
Id. § 12111.
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State and local governments, including those that do not receive Federal
financial assistance;376 and "public accommodations," including, "if the
operations of such entities affect commerce," "undergraduate, or post-
graduate private school[s], or other place[s] of education.
377
College athletes playing for public colleges and universities would be
protected against discrimination pursuant to the public services provi-
sions of the ADA3 78 and those playing for private institutions by the
public accommodations provisions. 79 Both contain general sections
prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities.380  As with
376. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131(1)(A) (West Supp. 1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,694 (1991). The public
services sections of the ADA are intended to fill in the "public sector gaps" left by the Rehabilitation
Act. Wendy E. Parmet, Discrimination and Disability: The Challenges of the ADA, 18 L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 331, 333 (1990).
377. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181 (7)(J) (West Supp. 1991). See also 56 Fed. Reg. 35,552 (1991).
"Commerce" is defined as "travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication -
(A) among the several States; (B) between any foreign country or any territory or possession and any
State; or (C) between points in the same State but through another State or foreign country." 42
U.S.C.A. § 12181(1) (West Supp. 1991). This definition is the same as that established by Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits racial discrimination in public accommodations. 56
Fed. Reg. 35,547 (1991). As the comments accompanying the Department of Justice regulations
which implement the public accommodations section of the ADA note, "[b]ecause of the integrated
nature of the national economy, the ADA and this final rule will have extremely broad application."
Id
378. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12134 (West Supp. 1991).
379. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181-12189 (West Supp. 1991).
380. The public services provision states that "[s]ubject to the provisions of this subchapter, no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participa-
tion in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West Supp. 1991).
"[Qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with a disability who, with
or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices.., or the provision of
auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12131(2) (West Supp. 1991).
The public accommodation provision of the ADA states that "[n]o individual shall be discrimi-
nated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facili-
ties, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12182(a) (West Supp. 1991). The statute further provides:
It shall be discriminatory to subject an individual or class of individuals on the basis
of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly or through contractual,
licensing, or other arrangements, to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class
to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of an entity.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1991). More specific prohibitions preclude a public
accommodation from
(i) [imposing or applying] eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an
individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and
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Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the relevant question in ADA ac-
tions brought by college athletes against colleges and universities who
precluded them from play will be whether the institution may assert po-
tential harm to the athlete as a defense to the discrimination claim.
Neither the statutory sections relating to public services3 8 nor the
regulations implementing those sections of the statute382 address the
question of risk of harm to an individual with a disability who seeks to
participate in a public entity's services or programs. The Department of
Justice commentary accompanying the regulations, however, states that
equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
tions, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered;
(ii) [failing] to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures,
when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity
can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature
of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations;
(iii) [failing] to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with
a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than
other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity
can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the
good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would
result in an undue burden ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i), (ii), (iii) (West Supp. 1991). The ADA's definition of "disability,"
is the same as the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "individual with handicaps." 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12102(2) (West Supp. 1991) (ADA); 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1991) (Rehabilitation
Act). The statute's and regulations' reference to "disability" rather than "handicap" was done in an
attempt to use "up-to-date" terminology when referring to those with disabilities. 56 Fed Reg.
35,698 (1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,548 (1991). The change in language is not intended to change the
substance of the definitions. 56 Fed Reg. 35,698 (1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,548 (1991).
Much of the ADA and its implementing regulations is based on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
Pub. L. No. 102-25, 105 Stat. 75 (1991). 56 Fed. Reg. 35,696 (1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (1991).
Still, a number of important distinctions between the regulations implementing the two acts are
evident. For example, the public services and public accommodations regulations expand upon the
definition of "physical or mental impairment." 56 Fed. Reg. 35,717 (1991) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 35.104(l)(ii)); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,593 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(iii)).
Furthermore, the EEOC Regulations expand on the definitions of "substantially limits," "reasonable
accommodation," and "undue hardship." 56 Fed. Reg. 35,735 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,735, 35,736 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)); 56 Fed.
Reg. 35,736 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)). Both the ADA and the implementing
regulations make clear, however, that in general nothing in their provisions "shall be construed to
apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29
U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title." 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12201(a) (West Supp. 1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,593 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 36.103(a));
56 Fed. Reg. 35,716 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 35.103(a)); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734 (1991) (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)).
381. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12134 (West Supp. 1991).
382. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,716-35,723 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101-35.190).
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if the "essential eligibility requirements" provision of Section 12131(2)383
raises "questions of safety," the principles established in the regulations
implementing the public accommodations section 384 of the statute will
apply.385 The regulations implementing the public accommodations sec-
tions of the ADA do specifically address the question of risk, but only
risk to others, not risk to the disabled individual.38 6 Furthermore, the
Justice Department commentary on the regulations provides that "[a]
public accommodation may not exclude persons with disabilities on the
basis of disability for reasons other than those specifically set forth in this
part.' 387 Even were the college or university allowed to claim risk of
injury to the athlete as a valid reason to preclude him or'her from athletic
participation, such preclusion would be permissible only if the institu-
tion's making reasonable modifications to its practices or procedures, 88
or providing "auxiliary aids or services,13 89 to enable the athlete to par-
ticipate would "fundamentally alter the nature' 390 of the athletic activ-
ity, or would result in an undue burden to the institution.391
383. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131(2) (West Supp. 1991).
384. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181-12189 (West Supp. 1991).
385. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,701 (1991). The public accommodations regulation referred to is found at
56 Fed. Reg. 35,595-35,596 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 36.208).
386. Section 36.208 of the regulations provides:
(a) This part does not require a public accommodation to permit an individual to
participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and
accommodations of that public accommodation when that individual poses a direct
threat to the health or safety of others.
(b) Direct threat means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot
be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures, or by the provision
of auxiliary aids or services.
56 Fed. Reg. 35,595-35,596 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 36.208) (emphasis to "of others"
added).
387. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,557 (1991) (emphasis added).
388. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1991).
389. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 1991). Although the regulations and the
commentary interpreting the regulations treat "auxiliary aids and services" almost entirely in terms
of communication, the statute itself is not so limited. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,597 (1991) (to be codified at
28 C.F.R. § 36.303); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,565-35,568 (1991). An athlete could argue, therefore, under the
express terms of 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii), that a college.or university should be required to
supply him or her with protective equipment, such as a flak jacket or protective eyewear, unless to do
so would fundamentally alter the nature of the sport or impose an undue burden on the institution.
390. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), (iii) (West Supp. 1991).
391. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1991). Similar standards would be applied
to public colleges or universities in light of the public services statute's definition of "qualified indi-
vidual with a disability":
The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices,... or the
provision of auxiliary aids or services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
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While these provisions would seem to provide colleges and universi-
ties with no defense392 to a discrimination action brought by a previously
ill or injured college athlete denied the opportunity to return to play,
another section, at least as it is interpreted by the Justice Department,
may provide a defense.393 That section states that "A public accommo-
dation may impose legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for
safe operation. Safety requirements must be based on actual risks and
not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals
with disabilities. '394 While the language of that regulation also sounds
like a "risk to others" criterion, the Justice Department's interpretation
of the rule may suggest otherwise:
A public accommodation may, however, impose neutral rules and cri-
teria that screen out, or tend to screen out, individuals with disabilities, if
the criteria are necessary for the safe operation of the public accommoda-
tion. Examples of safety qualifications that would be justifiable in appropri-
ate circumstances would include height requirements for certain
amusement park rides or a requirement that all participants in a recrea-
tional rafting expedition be able to meet a necessary level of swimming pro-
ficiency. Safety requirements must be based on actual risks and not on
speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with
disabilities.
3 95
While it may be argued that the swimming proficiency requirement is
necessary to the safety of all occupants in the raft,3 96 the amusement
park height requirement would seem geared to the safety of the person
desiring to go on the ride.3 97 Given the overall purposes of the ADA,3 98
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public
entity.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12131(2) (West Supp. 1991).
392. No defense other than an inability to make reasonable modifications or provide auxiliary
aids or services.
393. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,596 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(b)).
394. Id.
395. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,564 (1991).
396. If someone who could not swim were to fall out of the raft, the guide's attention would be
diverted from the operation of the raft (and hence the safety of others in the raft) while trying to save
the person who could not swim.
397. Again, though, even if the institution could prevail on this argument it would be required
to make reasonable modifications to its programs or to provide auxiliary aids or services to the
athlete unless to do so would fundamentally alter the nature of the program or would cause the
institution an undue hardship. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131(2), 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), (iii) (West Supp. 1991).
398. The purposes of the ADA include providing "a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities" and "clear, strong, consis-
tent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42
U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1991). Equally applicable to the "risk to self" question are
Congress' findings that "individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrim-
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and the strong objection by disabled persons and their advocates to any
provisions relating to risk of injury to the disabled themselves399 this lan-
guage may constitute scant support for a college or university's argument
that it should have a right to prevent certain athletes from exacerbating
their preexisting conditions.
Colleges and universities charged with discrimination under the
ADA may seek to draw an analogy to the employment provisions of the
statute similar to that which they might draw in the Rehabilitation Act
context. Even though much of the ADA and its implementing regula-
tions relating to employment' are modeled after the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 and its implementing regulations relating to employment,40'
there are important differences between the two. For the purposes of
analyzing the question of whether risk to an employee himself or herself
is sufficient reason for allowing an employer to refuse to employ a handi-
capped or disabled individual, the differences in the definitions of
"qualified handicapped person,"'"' 2 under the Rehabilitation Act, and
"qualified individual with a disability," 3 under the ADA, are signifi-
cant. While the Rehabilitation Act regulations define "qualified handi-
capped person" as one "who, with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion, can perform the essential functions of the position in question with-
out endangering the health and safety of the individual or others, ' '404 the
ADA provision contains no mention of risk to anyone in its definition of
"qualified individual with a disability." 5 The ADA does make a "di-
ination, including... overprotective rules and policies," and "the Nation's proper goals regarding
individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(5), (8) (West
Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
399. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,731 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10); Steven A. Holmes, U.S.
Rules Will Let Employers Reject Disabled Over Safety Issues, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1991, at A17.
400. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111-12117 (West Supp. 1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734-35,739 (1991) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-1630.16).
401. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 791, 793, 794 (West Supp. 1991); 29 C.F.R. §§ 32.1-32.12 (1990); 29
C.F.R. § 1613 (1990).
402. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(0 (1990).
403. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West Supp. 1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,735 (1991) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)).
404. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(0 (1990) (emphasis added).
405. The ADA defines
"qualified individual with a disability" [as] an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employ-
ment position that such individual holds or desires. For the purposes of this title, con-
sideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are
essential ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West Supp. 1991). "Qualified individual with a disability means an individ-
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rect threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace" a
defense to a charge of employment discrimination under the Act.4 6 The
regulations implementing the employment provisions of the ADA add
threat to the individual himself or herself as part of the defense to a
charge of employment discrimination." 7
The regulatory provisions allowing threat to the individual to be a
defense to an allegation of employment discrimination attempt to cir-
cumscribe that defense much more tightly than has been done in the
Rehabilitation Act regulations. For example, the ADA regulations spe-
cifically provide that:
The determination that an individual poses a "direct threat" shall be based
on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely
perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based
on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical
knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. In determining
ual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related
requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position." 56 Fed. Reg.
35,735 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)).
406. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(b) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). Specifically, the ADA provi-
sion on defenses to a charge of employment discrimination states:
(a) In general
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that an alleged
application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or tend
to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been
shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance
cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, as required under this
subchapter.
(b) Qualification standards
The term "qualification standards" may include a requirement that an individual
shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(a), (b) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). "Direct threat" is defined as "a
significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommoda-
tion." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(3) (West Supp. 1991).
407. The regulation states:
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination... that an alleged application of
qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screens out or tends to screen out
or otherwise denies a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to
be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be
accomplished with reasonable accommodation ....
56 Fed. Reg. 35,738 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(1)). The regulations further
provide that "[t]he term 'qualification standard' may include a requirement that an individual shall
not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others in the workplace." 56 Fed.
Reg. 35,738 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2)) (emphasis added). Finally, "direct
threat" is defined as "a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or
others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation." 56 Fed. Reg. 35,736
(1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)) (emphasis added).
1992]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be consid-
ered include:
(1) The duration of the risk;
(2) The nature and severity of the potential harm;
(3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and
(4) The imminence of the potential harm. 
408
In essence, the drafters of the ADA regulations have included within the
regulations the interpretations the courts have been asked to make pursu-
ant to the Rehabilitation Act." 9 For example, the interpretative guide-
lines accompanying the regulations indicate that an employer may assert
risk to the individual only if "performing the particular functions of a job
would result in a high probability of substantial harm to the individ-
ual."'410 Such an assessment
must be strictly based on valid medical analyses and/or on other objective
evidence. This determination must be based on individualized factual data
... rather than on stereotypic or patronizing assumptions and must con-
sider potential reasonable accommodations. Generalized fears about risks
from the employment environment ... cannot be used by an employer to
disqualify an individual... with a disability.41'
The college or university attempting to draw an analogy from the
college athletics context to the employment context for the purposes of
using risk to the individual as a defense to a charge of discrimination
faces two problems. First, the ADA itself and the regulations imple-
menting it are inconsistent. In passing the statute Congress did not in-
clude risk of harm to the individual as a defense to a charge of
discrimination. That provision was added to the regulations only by the
EEOC. Therefore, litigation may arise even in the pure employment con-
text concerning whether risk to the individual is a permissible factor for
an employer to consider in denying a disabled person a job. Second, the
Justice Department, drafting regulations to implement the public services
and public accommodations sections of the ADA, chose not to add harm
to the individual to the statutory definition of "direct threat." It could be
408. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,736 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)) (emphasis added).
409. See, eg., Chiari v. League City, 920 F.2d at 316-17 (significant risk of personal injury);
Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d at 1422 (reasonable probability of substantial harm); Strathie v. De-
partment of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 231-32 (3d Cir. 1983) (essential nature of program); Bentivegna
v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621, 623 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) (requirement to "'be
consistent with business necessity and safe performance' " (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 32.14(b) (1982)) and
should be "more directly tied to increased risk of injury"); Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 926
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (substantial likelihood of injury); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088,
1104 (D. Haw. 1980) (risk of future injury).




argued that the difference between the EEOC and Justice Department
regulations merely tracks the historical differences between the EEOC
and the Departments of Health and Human Services and Education reg-
ulations concerning the Rehabilitation Act. If that is the case, the Justice
Department used as a model the first set of regulations adopted to imple-
ment the Rehabilitation Act,4" 2 regulations which clearly predated the
EEOC's regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act.413 In any
event, colleges and universities have no direct authority either under the
ADA or its implementing regulations to refuse an athlete the opportu-
nity to return to play based on a risk of future injury to himself or
herself.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the public services
and public accommodations provisions of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act appear to provide college athletes with their best remedy if a
college or university prohibits them from playing because of a preexisting
illness or injury. Should, however, the autonomy language in some Sec-
tion 504/college athlete cases and the silence of the Education, Health
and Human Services, and Justice Departments' regulations on the risk to
personal safety be read to provide college athletes with an absolute right
to participate in intercollegiate competition? Or, should an institution's
concern for its athletes' safety and for its own integrity allow colleges
(and courts) to draw an analogy to those employment-related regulations
which permit concern for personal safety to be a factor in determining
whether one is "qualified" to participate in an activity or service covered
by the Acts?
When the issue is Whether a college athlete, previously diagnosed as
ill or injured, wishes to return to competition, the ultimate questions be-
come who should make that decision and who should bear responsibility
for any adverse consequences resulting from that decision? The final sec-
tion of this Article proposes an answer to those questions.
412. The comments accompanying the regulations implementing the public services portion of
the ADA indicate that the first regulations implementing Section 504 were issued in 1977 by the
former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) (now the Department of Health and
Human Services). 56 Fed. Reg. 35,694 (1991). In 1978, pursuant to an Executive Order, HEW
"issued its coordination regulation for federally assisted programs, which served as the model for
regulations issued by the other Federal agencies that administer grant programs." Id. HEW's coor-
dination authority and the coordination regulation were transferred to the Justice Department in
1980. Id.
413. The source of 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(0 including risk to the health or safety of the individ-
ual within the definition of "qualified handicapped person" was 43 Fed. Reg. 12,295 (1978).
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VI. THE DECISIONMAKER AND THE DECISION: A PROPOSAL
As the analysis in Part IV illustrated, there are a number of reasons
why a surrogate decisionmaker is not preferable and probably would be
no more effective than the college athlete in making decisions concerning
the athlete's medical treatment and return to play. Each possible surro-
gate is subject to pressures similar to those affecting the athlete. No sur-
rogate can know the athlete as well as the athlete knows himself or
herself. And, the traditional principles applicable to substitute decision-
making are generally inapposite to the situation affecting the college ath-
lete judged competent for all other purposes except that of medical
decisionmaking. These are not the only reasons, however, why surrogate
decisionmakers should not be authorized to make treatment and return
to play decisions for athletes.
For almost all purposes, college students and their peers not attend-
ing college are treated as competent adults. College athletes should be
treated no differently. There is no other instance in which the law singles
out any group of students for special, parentalisti0 a14 treatment. Even
given the pressures on athletes to play, the law should not create an ex-
ception. In the past, special treatment - i.e., less demanding admissions
standards,a"5 less rigorous course loads and majors, homogeneous living
environments - have done athletes no favor. The athletes have often
414. I use the word parentalistic rather than paternalistic for reasons I outlined in an earlier
article:
As I use these words, I mean to convey a policy or practice of regulation by one person
(or entity) of another, based on the belief that the authority figure, rather than the indi-
vidual affected, can better determine what is in the best interests of the individual af-
fected and can better make decisions for and protect that individual. While, historically,
paternalism may not have been inaccurate, given that most perceived authority figures in
either the public or private realm were (white) men, the meaning to be conveyed has
always connoted the relationship between a parent-figure and a child-figure. Therefore,
parentalism is both accurate (in terms of the meaning I wish to convey) and gender-
neutral.
Cathy J. Jones, Sexist Language: An Overview for Teachers and Librarians, 82 LAw LiaR. J. 673,
679 n.18 (1990).
415. According to a survey conducted by the Chronicle of Higher Education, football players
and male basketball players in schools with "big time" sports programs are more than six times as
likely as other students to receive special treatment in the admissions process. Douglas Lederman,
Special Admissions Treatment for Athletes Widespread at Big-Time-Sports Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., May 1, 1991, at Al. Twenty-seven percent of the football and male basketball players and 18
percent of all athletes admitted to Division I-A schools for the Fall, 1989 semester were "special-
authority admissions" ("students who [were] accepted even though they failed to meet the college's
regular standards"), compared to 4 percent of all first year students at those schools. Id. Thirteen of
73 colleges reported that the proportion of athletes admitted under special standards was at least ten
times the number of special admissions for other students. Id. at A31.
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left colleges and universities uneducated and poorly equipped to deal
with life's realities.416 Athletes will not be well served in terms of matu-
416. See, eg., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. III. 1990) (dismissing suit by a
Creighton University basketball player based on educational malpractice claim). In Ross, a student
athlete alleged that Creighton University failed to provide him with an education, instead only main-
taining his basketball eligibility. The cause of action was rejected by the court, although it was
undisputed that before Ross entered Creighton he had scored nine points out of a possible 36 on the
American College Test (the average student at Creighton scored 23.2 points), he was advised to
register for courses such as ceramics, marksmanship, and the theories of basketball, track and field,
and football, and after four years he had earned only 96 of the 128 credits required to graduate,
maintaining a "D" average. His reading skills were those of a seventh-grader and his overall lan-
guage skills those of a fourth-grader. Id. See also Denson v. Steubenville Bd. of Educ., No. 85-J-31,
1986 WL 8239 (Ohio Ct. App. July 29, 1986) (rejecting claim of educational malpractice brought by
former student upon allegation that school system promoted him each year because he was a good
athlete and without teaching him to read or write). For a discussion of courts' failure to recognize a
cause of action for educational malpractice, see generally Catherine D. McBride, Educational Mal-
practice: Judicial Recognition of a Limited Duty of Educators Toward Individual Students, U. ILL. L.
REv. 475 (1990). See also Edmund J. Sherman, Good Sports, Bad Sports: The District Court Aban-
dons College Athletes in Ross v. Creighton University, 11 Loy. ENr. L.J. 657 (1991) (analyzing
educational malpractice in college athletics context and arguing that judicial adoption of an educa-
tional malpractice cause of action for college athletes would motivate NCAA to protect student
athletes' right to an education).
According to an Associated Press survey, two-thirds of the college athletes drafted in Spring,
1990 by the professional football and basketball leagues failed to graduate from college. Douglas
Lederman, Athletics Notes" Low Graduation Rate Found for Pros' Draftees, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Aug. 1, 1990, at A30. Of the 54 athletes drafted by the National Basketball Association, 26 received
their degrees. Id. Of the 331 players drafted by the National Football League, 127 received their
degrees. Id. Of the 204 football players who did not receive their degrees, 82 were within one
semester of doing so. Scouting and spring training camp activities, however, encourage college ath-
letes to cut short their academic careers during the spring term. Id.
A Chronicle of Higher Education survey reported, however, that recruited athletes in NCAA
Division I schools graduate at a higher rate (56 percent within 5 years of their 1984 enrollment date)
than students who were not athletes (48 percent). Douglas Lederman, College Athletes Graduate at
Higher Rates Than Other Students, but Men's Basketball Players Lag Far Behind, a Survey Finds,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., March 27, 1991, at Al. Two-thirds of all women athletes had graduated
within 5 years of their enrollment date, although only 47 percent of the football players and only 39
percent of the male basketball players had done so. Id. At Division I-A schools, those at the highest
level of competition, the graduation rates for athletes were lower than in Division I schools overall
- 51.1 percent for all athletes, 42 percent for football players, and 32 percent for male basketball
players, as compared to 50.3 percent for all students. Id. Even though overall the graduation rates
for athletes are higher than those for students in general, more than 50 Division I schools (including
21 of the 96 Division I-A schools) graduated fewer than one-third of their athletes within five years
of their enrollment. Id. at A38. The general graduation rates for Division I-AA schools were gener-
ally skewed by "academically elite" institutions like the Ivy League schools. Such "elite" universi-
ties make up one-third of the total schools in Division I-AA and have a graduation rate of 90
percent. Id. women athletes also pulled up the graduation rates of athletes in general. Id. Some
college administrators have criticized the results of this survey, noting that it is no longer the norm
for students to graduate in four or five years, especially in urban areas where students are employed
and often commute long distances to class. Douglas Lederman, College Officials Worry that Gradua-
tion-Rate Data May Be Misread and Misused, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., March 27, 1991 at A38.
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ration, living skills, or personal dignity and integrity if they are treated as
incompetent for the purposes of making decisions concerning medical
care and return to play. College athletes should have the same rights and
bear the same responsibilities concerning those decisions as any other
competent adult would have and bear.417
Believing that a college athlete should have the same rights and re-
sponsibilities as any other competent adult concerning these decisions
does not mean, however, that changes could not be made in college ath-
letics to make the atmosphere more conducive to appropriate decision-
making. In terms of the disclosure of information, those responsible for
making such disclosures (physicians, athletic trainers, and other health
care providers) must give the athlete clear, understandable information
concerning the athlete's medical condition, proposed treatment, and the
risks, benefits, and alternatives associated with that treatment, and con-
cerning the risks of a return to play.418 The information should be con-
veyed not once, but several times, over a period of time. If possible, the
disclosure should be accompanied by brochures, videotapes, or other
means of communication which would aid the athlete in understanding
the medical condition and the various alternatives available, including
the alternative of leaving the sport entirely. The athlete should be en-
couraged to bring a family member or friend to the disclosure sessions to
provide support and to help frame questions and clarify information.
The athlete must be encouraged to ask questions about any issue relating
to the condition, treatment, or return to play. The information provider
should test the athlete's comprehension of the information in an effective
They also noted that the survey counted as "not graduating" students (including athletes) who left
school in good standing or who transferred to another school and did subsequently graduate. Id.
417. There also is not a very satisfactory solution to the surrogate decisionmaker issue. None of
the potential decisionmakers appear to be any better equipped overall than the athlete to make treat-
ment and return to play decisions. If a better alternative than the athlete cannot be found, it is hard
to justify infringing on an athlete's autonomy and self-determination just because we believe there to
be weaknesses in decisionmaking by the athlete. Furthermore, we do not infringe on the decision-
making rights of other young, college-age persons, such as models, rock stars, orprofessional athletes
who live under intense pressure and might also make decisions which could jeopardize their health
or their careers.
418. As Sharp suggests, athletic participants need full information concerning the rules of the
activity in which they are engaging so they can make truly informed decisions concerning their
participation. Information providers should not assume players already know or understand the
information. Written warnings about the specific risks inherent in the activity, tailored to the partic-
ular aspects (and, I would add, dangers) of each activity must be given to all participants. Sharp,
supra note 140, at 13-14. As Sharp notes, whether or not a written waiver of liability is effective in
excusing one from liability, it does serve the purpose of providing specific information, in writing, to
the athlete. Id. at 28.
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manner and if the athlete appears not to have understood the information
provided and the ramifications of various decisions he or she might
make, the information giver must reinform the athlete, perhaps with ad-
ditional information or perhaps in different words.
In the general health law context, health care providers claim that it
is difficult to provide information about conditions, treatments, and alter-
natives in a way which is understandable and in a way which will ade-
quately alert the patient to the ramifications of certain decisions the
patient might make. In the college athlete context, information provid-
ers may find it even more difficult to provide information concerning
risks of return to play. Because of athletes' belief in their invincibility
and immortality, they may not take seriously the risk of returning to play
following, for example, a diagnosis of heart disease or a cervical injury.
Athletes may simply refuse to "hear" such information, denying that it
could happen to them.419 That failure to "hear" does not mean that such
information should not be provided to athletes. Indeed, it means that the
information should be provided seriously and in detail. Athletes should
be required to view videotapes or read about athletes like Hank Gathers
and Marc Buoniconti. They should be required to learn about life with
heart disease or quadriplegia. This all sounds quite dramatic and in fact
may scare the athletes, some to the extent that they choose not to return
to play.4'0 Others will continue to deny that anything like quadriplegia
or death could happen to them and will return to play, perhaps when
they should not. But some may give the matter of further injury or ill-
ness serious, informed thought and make a decision to return to play or
not based in part on that information.
In addition to providing the information concerning medical condi-
tion and treatment and return to play in a manner conducive to compre-
hension and informed decisionmaking, colleges and universities should
419. See supra notes 190-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of athletes and their feel-
ings of invincibility.
420. "Therapeutic privilege" is a defense to an action brought against a physician for failure to
inform a patient adequately concerning the patient's medical condition and proposed treatment.
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788-89 (D.C. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1972);
Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1103 (Kan. 1960); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (R.I.
1972). The defense of therapeutic privilege may be invoked, however, only where disclosure would
impact adversely on the patient's overall condition and care; it may not be invoked simply because
the physician fears that if adequate disclosure is made the patient, because of fear or other reasons,
will decline the suggested therapy. Likewise, information concerning the possible adverse results of
a return to play following illness or injury may not be withheld from an athlete merely because the
athlete may be risk averse and choose not to play again. In fact, there is probably no reason which
would support a failure to disclose such information to the athlete. See cases cited supra.
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provide an atmosphere for decisionmaking in which the athlete will feel
comfortable choosing not to return to play. Probably little can be done to
relieve the pressures to achieve athletes impose on themselves. The drive
to be the best, the desire to build a better life through athletic achieve-
ment will probably remain. It is also unlikely that the lure of profes-
sional contracts with the attendant remuneration will change, although
perhaps college athletes should be reminded ofhow few are ever chosen
to play in professional leagues.42 None of this means, however, that the
college or university and its employees cannot modify the college-gener-
ated, external pressures on the athlete. The NCAA should require, and
colleges and universities should make clear, that if a scholarship athlete
becomes medically ineligible to play, the athlete will retain his or her
scholarship.422 Furthermore, the college or university should make
available, either through the university or through independent contrac-
tors, psychological support services to help athletes deal with the disap-
pointment and depression accompanying the illness or injury and the
inability to return to play, and counselling concerning an active life (and
career) apart from the sports to which the athletes had dedicated
themselves.
Finally, and most difficult, colleges and universities, their support-
ers, and society at large, must decrease their emphasis on winning at all
costs. The theory of amateur athletics is healthy enjoyment of the sport
rather than winning or losing.423 The reality, however, is quite different.
Almost everyone who is interested in sports, from Little League through
professional football, has favorite teams and favorite athletes. We like
our athletes to excel and our teams to win. When they do not, we clamor
for the trade of a player, the replacement of a coach. The same is true for
college athletics, especially football and basketball. From late August
until early April, college football and basketball fill the sports pages of
our newspapers and the screens of our televisions. We have loyalties as
alumni/ae of colleges and universities, as residents of states or cities, or
421. See supra notes 275-76 for a discussion of how few college athletes are drafted by profes-
sional sports teams and how few of those actually sign professional contracts.
422. See supra note 278 for a discussion of current NCAA policy and illustrative cases concern-
ing continuation of athletic scholarships despite player ineligibility.
423. The NCAA's principle of amateurism states: "Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an
intercollegiate sport and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the
physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is
an avocation .. " 1990-91 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 131 § 2.6. The Olympic Creed provides
that "[t]he most important thing in the Olympic Games is not to win but to take part, just as the
most important thing in life is not the triumph but the struggle. The essential thing is not to have
conquered butto have fought well." 20 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 719 (1990).
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simply as "fans." For many people, part of their personal success is
based on their favorite college teams' won-loss record, bowl appearances,
and tournament results.4 24 And college athletes know all of this. As fans,
we mourn the loss of a Hank Gathers or the injury to a Marc Buoniconti.
We do it, I hope, out of concern and compassion for the athlete as a
person rather than out of loss for the "team." Nevertheless, a change of
attitude from one of pride in winning and disappointment in losing to
love of the game for the game, respect for the participants as persons
rather than as running backs or point guards, concern for both their
physical and academic health, might make an athlete's decision of
whether to return to play easier and more voluntary.
I am not naive enough to think that changes in the pressures on
college athletes - internal or external - will occur soon, if they ever
occur at all. And that leaves me with the final dilemma: what of the
college athlete who knowingly and voluntarily decides to return to play
in the face of serious injury or death?
According to the proposal I have made, the athlete, as a competent,
autonomous adult has the right to make that decision. That does not
mean, however, that the college or university should always be obligated
to facilitate that decision.42 The major obstacles, of course, to a col-
lege's refusing to allow a previously ill or injured player to return to play
424. Following Hank Gathers' death, his neighborhood priest said, "'a lot of us lived vicari-
ously through Hank .... We were all desperately hoping he would make it. Not too many come
through this environment and do.'" Smith, A Bitter Legacy, supra note 11, at 66.
425. See, eg., Bucyras-Erie Co. v. State Dep't of Indus., 280 N.W.2d 142, 149 (Wis. 1979)
(legislature, in proscribing discrimination against physically handicapped individuals, did not intend
to force employers into position of facilitating handicapped individuals' further injury or aggravation
of original handicap). Generally, courts have held in the health care context that patients have no
right to demand certain types of treatment even though they have made informed choices as autono-
mous adults to elect such treatment, see, eg., People v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919 (Cal. 1979) (criminal
prosecution of health care providers who prescribed and distributed laetrile to cancer patients who
had knowingly and voluntarily sought such treatment), and that health care institutions have no
obligation to participate in effectuating certain decisions made by patients if to do so would violate
the institution's mission. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (states may
prohibit the use of public employees and public facilities to perform or assist in performing abortions
not necessary to save a woman's life); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626
(Mass. 1986) (hospital not required to terminate patient's nutrition and hydration at guardian's re-
quest even though request is legally permissible). Under limited circumstances, I would grant col-
leges and universities a similar privilege. But see Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986) (public hospital may be required to permit patient to remain until death following
removal of life support systems); In re Requena, 517 A.2d 886 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986), aft'd,
In re Requena, 517 A.2d 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (under certain circumstances private
hospital may be required to permit patient to remain until death following removal of life support
systems even though another health care facility is available and willing to admit patient while she
dies).
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are Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973426 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990.427 If the college authorized physician, act-
ing reasonably under the circumstances,428 determines that an athlete
with a preexisting injury or illness is not fit to return to play,429 that
athlete may well not be "qualified. ' 430 Therefore, denial of further op-
portunity to play, at least while the athlete is "symptomatic,"' 43' would
426. 29 U.S.C.A § 794 (West Supp. 1991).
427. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1991).
428. Physicians making clearance decisions may well be subject to suit, both by athletes for
whom clearance is refused, see text accompanying supra note 24, and by those who are cleared to
return to play and then suffer injury, see text accompanying supra notes 15, 16 & 31. In order to
prevent physicians from being overly cautious (strictly liable) or not cautious enough (immune from
liability), physicians' decisions to clear or not clear athletes for a return to play should be judged by a
reasonable medical practitioner (or specialist) standard.
429. The NCAA's Committee on Competitive Safeguards and Medical Aspects of Sports has
affirm[ed] the right of an institution to require joint approval from the physician most
familiar with the student-athlete's condition and the institution's specific athletics pro-
gram in question (and parental consent in the case of a minor), before permitting any
impaired student-athlete to participate. Conversely, atypical conditions (handicaps) will
be rightful reason for medical disqualification of a student-athlete by the institution only
when those atypical conditions present unusual risk of further damage or disability to
the individual and/or other participants.
NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 45, Policy No. 3.
430. The athlete would clearly be considered to be a "handicapped person" or an "individual
with a disability" pursuant to the statutory and regulatory definitions of those terms. 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1991); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j) (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (1990); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12102(2) (West Supp. 1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,593 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 36.104); 56
Fed. Reg. 35,717 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 35.104). See supra notes 312, 314, 329-31, 380
and accompanying text, for a more detailed discussion of the definitions of "individual with handi-
caps" or "individual with a disability" as they apply to an athlete with a preexisting condition.
The athlete who fails to pass a physical examination would, at least on a threshold level, not be a
"qualified handicapped person," because he or she could not meet the Section 504 regulations' "tech-
nical standards requisite to... participation in the recipient's.., activity." 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(3);
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3). That athlete also would not be a "qualified individual with a disability"
pursuant to the public services sections of the ADA because the athlete who fails the physical could
not meet "the essential eligibility requirements for the ... participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131(2) (West Supp. 1991). And, the athlete who fails
the physical would probably not be found to be discriminated against pursuant to the ADA's public
accommodations provision because passing the physical may be considered an appropriate eligibility
criterion "necessary for the provision of the... services .... privileges, [or] advantages ... being
offered." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1991).
431. I choose the characterization "symptomatic" to describe the athlete who is not cleared for
play in order to distinguish between an athlete whose current physical condition would preclude
playing (based on a failed physical examination) and an athlete whose medical condition is "under
control" but whose future health is in doubt. For example, I would characterize a basketball player
suffering from an as yet uncontrolled arrhythmia as being symptomatic and unable to pass a physical
exam required for basketball participation. Once the condition is controlled by medication the
player would be able to pass a physical, but the effect of strenuous activity on his or her future health
would be unclear. Similarly, a football player who suffers a musculoskeletal injury and is in traction
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not violate Section 504 or the ADA.
Refusal of the physician to clear the athlete to return to play out of
fear of personal injury to the athlete would raise two questions. First, is
the fear of risk of personal injury to athletes themselves sufficient justifi-
cation to allow a physician and, consequently, the institution to refuse an
athlete the opportunity to return to play? Second, even if, at the thresh-
old level, an athlete does not meet the strict regulatory definition of
"qualified handicapped person"432 or "qualified individual with a disabil-
ity"433 is the institution able to make reasonable accommodation which
would permit the athlete to return to play?434 The two questions are
intertwined.
Unlike the Section 504 EEOC regulations relating to employ-
ment, 35 the Section 504 Education and Health and Human Services reg-
ulations relating to employment4 36 and to postsecondary education,437 do
not contain any provision indicating that safety concerns are a part of the
regulations' definition of "qualified handicapped person." Similarly, the
ADA regulations relating to public services and public accommodations
do not specifically mention the safety of the individual affected as a factor
to be considered in whether a disabled person may be denied services.438
Of four courts which have considered Section 504 claims by athletes with
preexisting medical conditions, 439 only one found that the preexisting in-
could not pass a physical and, therefore, would be ineligible to play. He could pass the physical,
however, once his condition healed and his mobility was restored. On a threshold level, he then
would be eligible to compete, although the risk of future injury because of the earlier condition
would remain.
432. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(3) (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3) (1990).
433. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131(2) (West Supp. 1991).
434. Case law, beginning with Southeastern Community College v. Davis, established that rea-
sonable accommodation must be made by the institution in order to enable the handicapped person
to take part in the program. 442 U.S. 397, 411-13 (1979). See also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287, 300 (1985). This requirement is explicit in the ADA. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131(2) &
12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1991).
435. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f) (1990).
436. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.11-104.14 (1990); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.11-84.14 (1990).
437. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.41-104.47 (1990); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.41-84.47 (1990).
438. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,592-35,604 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.101-36.608); 56 Fed.
Reg. 35,716-35,723 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101-36.190). The EEOC regulations
implementing the ADA do make concerns for safety of the disabled individual a defense to a dis-
crimination claim in certain instances, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,738 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.15(b)), but the employment section of the ADA itself makes only risk to the safety of others a
defense to a claim of employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(b) (West Supp. 1991).
439. Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist.,
550 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980).
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jury made the student not qualified to engage in athletics.' The other
three courts did not specifically address the question of whether any risk
of personal injury would ever serve to disqualify athletes from Section
504 coverage. And, two of the courts441 used such strong "personal au-
tonomy" language in describing the rights of the athletes to participate
that those decisions could be construed as indicating that decisions to
play always lie with the athletes and that any institution attempting to
block such a decision would violate Section 504. There are good reasons,
however, not to read those cases in such an absolute manner and instead
to promote a policy which, under limited circumstances, would permit
institutions to refuse athletes the opportunity to return to play notwith-
standing their personal decisions.
In both Grube,4 2 and Wright,"3 the courts indicated that there was
no substantial risk of injury to the athletes from continued participation
in athletics. Such an acknowledgement can be read to imply that if there
were a substantial risk of injury, that risk would become relevant in de-
ciding whether an athlete with a preexisting injury could return to play.
In Grube and Poole,4' the court discussed the protective equipment
which could be worn by the athletes to prevent exacerbation of their pre-
existing conditions. Again, by implication, these cases can be read to
indicate that if reasonable accommodation through the use of safety
equipment can protect an athlete from further injury, that accommoda-
tion is an appropriate consideration in deciding whether an institution
violates Section 504 in refusing an athlete permission to play.
I would incorporate into the definition of "qualified handicapped or
disabled person" for purposes of participation in postsecondary athletic
events the requirement that participation by the previously ill or injured
athlete not pose a substantial risk of irreversible serious bodily injury or
death to the athlete. I would also require that any criteria used to dis-
qualify a student athlete from participation be related to the athlete's
expected performance and be consistent with skills necessary for safe per-
formance." As part of the qualified handicapped or disabled person
440. Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296.
441. Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789; Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. ofEduc., 490 F.
Supp. 948.
442. Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418.
443. Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789.
444. Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948.
445. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 32.14(b) (1990) ("to the extent job qualifications tend to exclude handi-
capped individuals because of their handicap, they [shall be] related to the performance of the job
and [be] consistent with business necessity and safe performance.").
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standard, I would enforce the reasonable accommodation requirement
set forth in Southeastern Community College v. Davis and Alexander v.
Choate."6 Finally, for any scholarship athlete denied the opportunity to
continue to play because of illness or injury, I would require the college
to honor its scholarship commitment to the student throughout what
would have been the student's eligibility period.
Bearing in mind that Section 504 and the ADA exist to provide
disabled individuals with the widest array of opportunities possible, I
would urge that my standard be strictly construed. I would not allow
disqualification for any potential illness or injury which could be substan-
tially prevented through "reasonable accommodation." The Section 504
regulations in the employment context' 7 provide appropriate guidelines
for determining what constitutes "reasonable accommodation," and
whether the accommodation would constitute an undue hardship to the
institution. Those standards, modified to meet the college athletic con-
text, would include acquiring or modifying equipment, while considering
the overall size of the program, including the number of participants, the
number and type of facilities, and the size of the budget; the type of oper-
ation, including the composition and structure of the activity and team;
and the nature and cost of the accommodation needed.
On the question of substantial likelihood of harm to the athlete, as
the degree of seriousness of harm increases, the probability of occurrence
could diminish and an athlete could still be found "unqualified" to com-
pete. All conditions would be judged on a case-by-case basis," rather
than according to some blanket standard like the AMA Guidelines." 9
For example, an athlete with hypertrophic cardiomyopathy who had ex-
perienced ventricular tachycardia and was denied the opportunity to re-
turn to play basketball would not be able to prevail on a Section 504 or
ADA claim against the institution. While the athlete would clearly be
handicapped or disabled,a5 ° he or she would not be otherwise qualified to
play basketball, both because of the substantial likelihood that he or she
446. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411-13 (1979); Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985).
447. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (1990); 34 C.F.R. § 104.12 (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1990). The
ADA regulations relating to reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are substantially the
same as the 504 regulations. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,594 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 36.104);
56 Fed. Reg. 35,735-35,736 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o), (p)).
448. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985); Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp.
505, 517 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
449. See supra notes 117 & 185 and accompanying text for an explanation and discussion of the
AMA guidelines.
450. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1991); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j) (1990); 45 C.F.R.
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could suffer serious injury or death if he or she engaged in strenuous
athletic activity4 ' and because no reasonable accommodation could be
made to prevent that occurrence.45 2 Not all heart disease, however,
would disqualify an athlete from participation. An athlete who had had
coronary artery abnormalities which had been corrected would be per-
mitted to play.4" 3 Athletes with mitral valve prolapse or dysrhythmia
may or may not be allowed to play, or may be allowed to participate in
some activities but not others, depending on the symptoms accompany-
ing the disorder.4" 4
Other conditions would be judged the same way.45 5 If an athlete
suffers an injury like that suffered by Mark Tingstad, and expert medical
opinion cautions that if the athlete is injured again paralysis could result,
the institution is justified in denying the athlete the opportunity to play
and to reinjure himself or herself. There would seem to be no reasonable
accommodation which could be made to prevent an appreciable risk of
paralysis from occurring through participation in a contact sport. For
other conditions, although there exists an appreciable risk of injury due
to further play - kidney dysfunction, blindness, injury to a hearing im-
paired athlete who is not aware of a body or an object coming his or her
way - reasonable accommodations - flak jackets, protective eyewear,
hearing aids - may aid the athletes in preventing injury.456 Inevitably
§ 84.3(j) (1990); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12,131(2) (West Supp. 1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,593 (1991) (to be
codified at 28 C.F.R. § 36.104); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,717 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 35.104).
451. McCaffrey et al., supra note 45, at 178.
452. Even if the university were to provide a defibrillator and personnel trained to use it at court
side, that equipment would not be eflfective in preventing the injury before it happened, as would, for
example, a flak jacket worn by a field hockey player to protect her against kidney injury.
Furthermore, an institution could probably successfully claim that the expense of a defibrillator
and personnel trained to use it would pose an undue financial hardship on the university, therefore
making its purchase "unreasonable." While some schools maintain a defibrillator in their training
rooms, it is not considered standard equipment. Almond & Hudson, supra note 13. According to
Chip Schaefer, head trainer at Loyola Marymount University, the university purchased its defibril-
lator primarily because of Hank Gathers. Id. He noted, however, that the university plans to keep
the equipment because it can be used not only for players but also for spectators. Id.
453. McCaffrey et al., supra note 45, at 178.
454. Id at 180-81.
455. The EEOC regulations implementing the ADA provide that whether an individual "poses
a 'direct threat' shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to
safely perform the essential functions of the job." 56 Fed. Reg. 35,735- 35,736 (1991) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)) (emphasis added). The regulations cite as appropriate factors for making
that assessment "(1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3)
The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm."
Id. These factors would be equally appropriate for determining a college athlete's ability to perform
safely.
456. Some question may arise as to the responsibility of the institution to pay for the protective
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there will be cases where athletes return to play and then suffer serious
injury or death related to the preexisting illness or injury. Some of those
athletes or their representatives will sue the physicians and the colleges.
Whether or not an action for that injury would lie may depend on the
reason the athletes were permitted to return to play.
If the institution permitted the athlete to return to play because of a
good faith, nonnegligent application of Section 504 or the ADA, the in-
stitution should not be liable. An analogous situation arose in Interna-
tional Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.457 There, the Court
indicated in dicta that because Title VII bans sex-specific fetal protection
policies, if the employer fully informs a woman of a workplace hazard to
equipment. Pursuant to the "reasonable accommodation" standard, the institution would not be
required to pay if that payment would place an undue financial burden on the institution. Whether
the financial burden would be "undue" would be determined by factors such as the size of the
program, the revenue earning capacity of the institution's athletic programs, and the overall athletic
budget. In some instances, the athletes themselves may pay for or help to pay for the equipment.
The NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook states:
In instances where the absence or nonfunction of one of a set of paired organs consti-
tutes the specific impairment. . ., serious consideration of the risks and benefits of ath-
letic participation must be weighed by student-athletes, their parents (in the case of a
minor), the team physician, and the institution. This discussion, and the subsequent
process by which the decision for or against medical qualification to participate is made,
should take into account the following factors:
1. The probability of injury to the remaining organ.
2. The state of the art in protective equipment and the capability of such equipment
to prevent injury to the remaining organ.
When the decision is made to allow the impaired student-athlete to compete, a prop-
erly executed document of understanding and waiver concerning injury to the remaining
organ should be signed.
NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 45, Policy No. 3.
Current NCAA policy permits an institution to pay for medical expenses related to: "permanent
disability that precludes further athletics participation"; "protective eyewear (e.g., goggles) for stu-
dent-athletes who require visual correction in order to participate in intercollegiate athletics";
"[e]xpenses for medical treatment ... incurred by a student-athlete as a result of an athletically
related injury"; and, "[m]edication and physical therapy utilized by a student-athlete during the
academic year to enable the individual to participate in intercollegiate athletics, regardless of whether
the injury or illness is the result of intercollegiate competition or practice. ... 1990-91 NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 131 § 16.4.1 (e), (f), (h), (i) (emphasis added). NCAA policy prohibits institu-
tional payment for "[s]urgical expenses to treat a student-athlete's illness or injury that was not a
result of practice for or participation in intercollegiate athletics at the institution"; or "[m]edical or
hospital expenses incurred as the result of an injury while going to and from class, or while partici-
pating in classroom requirements (e.g., physical education) ...." Id. § 16.4.2(b), (c) (emphasis
added). The policy, therefore, would clearly permit the institution to pay for protective eyewear for
an athlete with vision problems, id. § 16.4.1(f), or inderal for an athlete with a heart condition, id.
§ 16.4.1 i). It is unclear, however, whether the college could (let alone would) pay for other protec-
tive gear such as the flak jacket worn by Mark Seay because of a shooting incident or Richard Poole
because of a congenital defect. '
457. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
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her fetus and does not otherwise act negligently "the basis for holding an
employer liable [for damage to the fetus] seems remote at best."4 8 Fur-
thermore, the Court said, were state tort law to conflict with Title VII,
Title VII would preempt state law.45 9 The same result should apply in
the Section 504-ADA/student athlete context. If the educational institu-
tion and its employees fully inform the athletes of their medical condi-
tions and the risks of returning to play and otherwise act without
negligence, the athletes should not be able to hold the institution liable in
tort.
4 6 °
The key to an institution's liability, then, is whether the institution
or its employees acted negligently. In most instances, negligence in diag-
nosis aside, the issue will be whether the institution and its employees
sufficiently informed4 61 the athletes about their medical condition and
the risks of returning to play, and adequately supported them in making
the decisions concerning treatment and play. Liability on the part of the
institution and its employees should be judged by a reasonableness
standard.462
458. Id. at 1208.
459. Id. at 1209.
460. The resolution of the liability question should be no different simply because Title VII does
not, but Section 504 does permit employers to take into account risk to an individual employee's
safety when making an employment decision. See supra notes 350, 352, 357-70. Section 504 requires
that recipients of federal financial assistance not discriminate against handicapped individuals. It
does not require recipients to prohibit those individuals from taking part in the program, even at risk to
themselves, should the individuals choose to do so. Presumably, the same will be true pursuant to the
ADA.
461. My reference to "sufficiently informed" includes not only disclosing information in a man-
ner designed to inform the athlete of his or her medical condition, treatment, and risks, benefits, and
alternatives attendant to them, but also testing the athlete's comprehension of that information to
ensure that the athlete understands the information necessary for informed decisionmaking.
462. Davis argues that highly motivated college athletes are not like other medical patients.
They believe pain is to be endured; they opt for radical treatment to keep them playing in the pres-
ent, overlooking future consequences; they view their opportunities to perform and excel as limited;
and, they fear that being sidelined will adversely impact their economic well-being. All of these
factors influence what they look for in medical care. Therefore, it would be unfair to hold physicians
treating them to the standard of care traditionally used to judge physician conduct. Davis, supra
note 236, at 217-19, 225.
According to Davis, medical malpractice actions are based on the reasonableness of the physi-
cian's conduct in treating a patient who will follow the physician's advice. Generally, the more con-
servative the treatment, the more likely the finder of fact is to find it reasonable. Id. at 225.
Athletes, however, may not accept "conservative" treatment and may demand more. Id. Davis
would "rephrase" the duty of the physician treating college athletes to one of "provid[ing] the facts
necessary for the athlete to make an informed decision regarding the risks that are assumed in under-
going a mutually agreeable course of treatment." Id. at 230-31. He believes that:
The determinative issue in future medical malpractice cases between motivated ath-
letes and sports medicine personnel should be whether the athletes were provided the
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This proposal is, at best, a compromise. On the one hand, college
athletes are treated identically to their peers - as competent adults -
given decisionmaking rights which they are expected to exercise and for
which they should be held responsible.463 In return, they give up the
opportunity to have others make certain important decisions and then
take responsibility for those decisions should adverse results occur. They
gain, in all but limited circumstances, the right to have enforced their
autonomous decisions concerning the treatment and care of their bodies
and their athletic careers.
Colleges, too, gain and lose under this proposal. They gain some
necessary information with which to make an informed decision. The information in-
cludes all relevant data on the injury itself and all of the facts concerning the available,
acceptable courses of treatment. The emphasis is on all information and facts. This
requires the practitioner to realize his limitation and to seek additional consultations
upon any uncertainty. Unlike the non-athlete, the nature of the motivated athlete pros-
cribes any exceptions to the practitioner's duty of full disclosure of information.
Once given the relevant information, the athlete must assume the consequences of his
choice of treatment. This standard puts the initial burden on the provider to ensure that
the diagnosis is correct and that all of the options for treatment are explored. The bur-
den then shifts to the athlete to choose a "fix" or a "cure." This standard penalizes the
individual who maltreats an athlete but allows physicians the necessary leeway when
their patients reject treatment that would be prescribed for a non-athlete with the same
medical problem.
I at 237. I do not believe that Davis' and my position are different in any way except "label."
Davis advocates a "different" standard of care for physicians who treat athletes because of the spe-
cial nature of the "motivated athlete." I would apply the traditional standard of reasonable care
under the circumstances being mindful that the special nature of the athlete - willingness to "play
hurt," fear for his or her economic future, pressure from others, belief in immortality and invincibil-
ity - is one of the circumstances which the physician must take into account in reasonably treating
and advising the athlete.
463. Cf John Thompson, Students Must Bear Weight of Education, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1990,
§ 8, at 7 (arguing that student athletes must bear responsibility for acquiring an education, just as
their non-athlete peers do):
Why can't we ask the student athletes who graduate without having learned how to
read, what they were doing when they should have been cracking the books? Certainly
there is no excuse for such a thing happening. Parents, professors, coach and school
each must be held accountable for their failure, but doesn't the individual also have to
bear the primary responsibility?
Somewhere along the way shouldn't that student have said "Stop! I'm being cheated
of the education everyone around me is getting?" If they were being denied anything
else they felt was rightfully theirs there would certainly be a hue and cry, so why not
when education is the issue? We expect students who are not athletes to pursue educa-
tion aggressively, why not expect the same of the student athlete? Why not demand the
student athlete take on this responsibility?
See also Thomas H. Murray, Drug Testing and Moral Responsibility, PHYsiciAN & SPoRTS MED.
Nov. 1986 at 47-48 (arguing that athletes should not be screened routinely for recreational or street
drug use because such screening without cause sends a message to athletes that they are not and
cannot be responsible adults).
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freedom from liability in athletic injury cases as long as they do not act
negligently. That is, the college will stand in the same relationship to the
injured athlete as it stands to the injured biology student who becomes
intoxicated on a field trip and falls. Unless there is a "special relation-
ship" established between college and student - unless, for example, the
college voluntarily undertook a duty to the student it did not otherwise
have and the student relied on the undertaking, or unlesi the injury was
highly foreseeable and the college did nothing to warn the student about
it or to try to prevent it - the college will not be liable to the athlete for
the injury. 4 In return, the college gives up some control over the ath-
lete's life and some control over college affairs - that is, except in the
case of substantial risk of life threatening injury, the college cannot refuse
an athlete's request to play. The college also is required to undertake the
very serious responsibility of making sure the student is provided with
and understands the information relevant to treatment and return to play
decisions and is offered a supportive environment in which to make those
decisions.
The compromise does not seem too much to ask of either college or
athlete. Colleges and universities - and society at large - demand
much of student athletes, especially those in the revenue producing
sports. Some have called for making major college football and basket-
ball teams "farm clubs" for professional football and basketball teams, or
at least for paying college athletes far above their current tuition, room,
board, and incidental expense money.465 Even without paying athletes
salaries, colleges and universities and those who support college athletics
464. Because, under my proposal, student athletes are treated as autonomous adults, they would
be precluded from arguing that their particular vulnerabilities placed the college in a special relation-
ship to them, thereby necessitating greater caretaking of them by the institution.
465. A "nearly perennial measure" introduced in the Nebraska legislature would allow state
universities to pay football -players a stipend over and above tuition, room, and board. Douglas
Lederman, Athletics Notes Bills to Regulate College Sports Introduced in 3 Legislatures, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 13, 1991, at A38. In 1988, the measure passed the Nebraska legislature, but
was vetoed by the governor. In 1991, the bill passed by a vote of 28-1. It must be voted on twice
more before being sent to the governor for signing. Id The recent legislation introduced by Repre-
sentative McMillen, see supra note 278, would permit NCAA schools to provide $300 per month to
needy athletes in addition to their athletic scholarships. A Bill to Change the NCAA, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., July 31, 1991, at A24.
See also Ira Berkow, Only Two Ways to Free College Sport, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 27, 1989, at A25;
William P. Gerberding, College Sports. Maybe They Should Play for Pay; A University President's
Growing Doubts about "the Shimmering 'Ideal ofAmateurism," "WASH. PosT, Sept. 5, 1989, at A19;
Charles Grantham, It's Time to Give College Players a Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1990, § 8, at 10;
George Veesey, Somebody Else Saw It, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1988, at A22; George Vecsey,
Whos Hiding the Money?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1988, at D25; Pay College Athletes Openly, N.Y.
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can do better by athletes than they currently do. In addition to providing
them with safe playing conditions and good medical care, they can pro-
vide them with a sound educational experience in the classroom and the
opportunity to exercise the rights and responsibilities which they other-
wise accord to their students.
Athletes, too, benefit by their relationship with their college or uni-
versity. For scholarship athletes, they receive a partially or fully paid
education. They frequently live in separate, special housing, eat special
meals, and receive individualized academic attention." 6 In return, it
does not seem too much to ask of them to take responsibility for the
major decisions affecting their lives.
Some will resist this proposal. They will say it is impractical.
Adopting the rationale of physicians, they will argue that informed con-
sent is not possible - young athletes, like patients in general, cannot
understand the information necessary to make so-called informed deci-
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1987, at A18; The 'Student-Athlete'Myth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1988, at A18; Polk
Top Sports Colleges Doubted, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1989, at C2.
But see KNIGHT FOUNDATION COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, KEEPING
FAITH WITH THE STUDENT-ATHLETE: A NEW MODEL FOR INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 11
(1991) [hereinafter KNIGHT COMMISSION REPORT]. The report of the Knight Commission, a pri-
vate foundation commission constituted to study intercollegiate athletics and to make suggestions for
reform, stated:
We reject the argument that the only realistic solution to the problem is to drop the
student-athlete concept, put athletes on the payroll, and ieduce or even eliminate their
responsibilities as students.
Such a scheme has nothing to do with education, the purpose for which colleges and
universities exist. Scholarship athletes are already paid in the most meaningful way pos-
sible: with a free education. The idea of intercollegiate athletics is that the teams repre-
sent their institutions as true members of the student body, not as hired hands. Surely
American higher education has the ability to devise a better solution to the problems of
intercollegiate athletics than making professionals out of the players, which is no solu-
tion at all but rather an unacceptable surrender to despair.
Id. Not all agree, however, "that, as a general proposition, college athletes are materially 'un-
derpaid' and 'exploited.'" Richard B. McKenzie & G. Thomas Sullivan, Does the NCAA Exploit
College Athletes? An Economics and Legal Reinterpretation, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 373, 398 (1987).
466. See Edward G. Lawry, Conflicting Interests Make Reform of College Sports Impossible,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 1, 1991, at A44. Lawry rejected the Knight Commission's descrip-
tion of student athletes as "true members of the student body":
[S]tudent athletes are far from a representative sample of the student body; they cer-
tainly don't blend in very well on their own campuses. How are athletes "true" mem-
bers of the student body when they have special computers, special tutors, special dorms,
special food, special enrollment procedures, and special counselors? These special aids,
designed to help athletes maintain academic standing, are not provided to other students
to help them remain eligible for non-athletic, extra-curricular activities. Student athletes
"represent" an institution only in the sense that they play their sport under its name -
exactly as they would if they were paid employees of the university.
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sions; testing the athletes' comprehension of such information and pro-
viding more information when necessary would be too resource intensive;
athletes are too sheltered or too young or too caught up in their own
sense of immortality to make such decisions; athletes would prefer that
others make the decisions for them; and others, perhaps physicians and
coaches in particular, can convince athletes to do what the physicians
and coaches believe to be in the athletes' best interests. It will be impos-
sible, the critics will say, to remove the pressures affecting young athletes
so they can make truly "voluntary" decisions. And, as with everything
that takes time and effort, the proposal will cost money, perhaps in more
sophisticated medical testing of ill or injured athletes, perhaps in new and
better safety equipment, certainly in professional time spent with the ath-
lete during the informed consent process.
Such disagreement is welcome. The National Collegiate Athletic
Association, the governing body for many of the intercollegiate athletic
programs in this country, has little policy on matters such as informed
consent to medical care and return to play.467 Most colleges and univer-
sities deal with the question on a case-by-case basis. Tragedies like the
death of Hank Gathers or the quadriplegia of Marc Buoniconti sporadi-
cally force the issues onto the front pages of the Sports Section. But in
short time the issues fade as fans and athletes and coaches and university
presidents again become more concerned with the overall record of a
team rather than with the injury to one player here and there.
The law is finally becoming concerned with the academic exploita-
tion of student-athletes.468 It is time for those interested in college athlet-
ics - players, coaches, physicians, college officials, parents, alumni/ae,
467. See sources cited supra notes 137 & 228 for the NCAA's position relating to an athlete's
return to play after illness or injury.
468. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1092(e) (West Supp. 1991) (Student Right-to-Know and Campus Secur-
ity Act, effective July 1, 1992, requiring colleges and universities receiving federal funds to issue an
annual, public report on graduation rates of athletes, by sport, race, and gender). In an attempt to
pre-empt enactment of this statute by Congress, the NCAA took steps to require its members to
publicize the graduation rates of their athletes, as well as information related to admissions and
academic progress of student athletes. 1990-91 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 131 § 30.1. See also
Irvin Molotsky, Congress Pressing Colleges to Give Figures on Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1990, at
Al. The NCAA, however, "represents just 800 of the nation's 2,200 four-year colleges and none of
the 1,200 two-year colleges .... Id. at A15. The federal act affects not only colleges and universi-
ties belonging to the NCAA, but also those belonging to the National Association of Intercollegiate
Athletics and the National Junior College Association. Id. At least six other bills which would
regulate NCAA affairs are currently pending in the House of Representatives and a House subcom-
mittee is holding a series of hearings on sports issues. Douglas Lederman, With Spate of Bills, Con-
gress Turns Up the Heat on NCAA, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 7, 1991, at I. Concerned that
such Congressional action might impact adversely on the Association's image, the NCAA has hired
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commentators, fans - to expand the debate from academics to all as-
pects of college athletics, including how we perceive and treat college
athletes in the world of adult decisionmaking.
POSTSCRIPT: On December 8, 1991, the New York Times reported that
the family of Hank Gathers had settled their lawsuit against Gathers'
cardiologist, Dr. Vernon T. Hattori, for $1 million dollars.46 9 The Times
reported further that negotiations with the other defendants, including
Gathers' coach Paul Westhead, are "stalled."'47 The suit is scheduled to
go to trial on February 24, 1992.471
Fleishman-Hillard Inc., a major public relations firm, "to help it get its own message out." Id. at
A25.
Perhaps spurred on by the fear of further legislative involvement in college athletics, the NCAA
and other groups are also offering proposals to "reform" college athletics. For example, the
NCAA's academic-requirements committee has proposed plans to raise academic standards for ath-
letes by requiring a 2.5 grade point average in 13 core high school courses (the standard is currently
a 2.0 in 11 courses) in order for any student to participate in athletics during his or her first year of
college, by requiring a 1.9 average by the start of the fourth academic year and a 2.0 by the start of
the fifth in order to retain continued eligibility to play, by requiring athletes to complete 24 credit
hours during their first year of studies and 27 each year after that, and by requiring each athlete to
pass at least 8 credit hours each semester to be eligible to play the following semester. Douglas
Lederman, Panel Asks NCAA to Strengthen Academic Standards, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., April 3,
1991, at A33-34. See also Douglas Lederman, Council Backs Tougher Academic Standards Proposed
by NCAA Presidents' Commission, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 14, 1991, at A26; Douglas Leder-
man, Emboldened Presidents' Commission Urges NCAA to Toughen Its Academic Requirements for
Athletes, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc., July 3, 1991, at A25. If these proposed requirements would con-
stitute "reform," one can only wonder at the "standards" college athletes are currently required to
meet.
An NCAA-appointed committee, whose membership includes former United States Chief Justice
Warren Burger and Brigham Young University President Rex Lee, is studying the due process ele-
ments of the NCAA's enforcement and infractions procedures. Amid More Outside Pressure, an
N. CA.A. Committee Meets, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1991, at 32. See also Douglas Lederman, Group
Reviewing NCAA's Enforcement Process May Recommend More Than Just Fine-Tuning, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 7, 1991, at A26.
Similarly, the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, a private committee
made up primarily of current and former college administrators, along with the Executive Director
of the NCAA, a member of the House of Representatives, and several private corporate executives,
issued a report recommending a structure for addressing problems raised in intercollegiate athletics.
KNIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 465.
469. Gathers's Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1991, § 8 (Sports), at 4.
470. Id.
471. Id.

